Idleness and Neighbors as Obstacles: Kazakhstan Will Not Become Russia's Ally, Nor Will It Side with Ukraine
Qasym-Malik Tokaev. Photo source: The Press Service of the President of Kazakhstan
Why is Russia losing its influence in the post-Soviet space? Why is Kazakhstan observing a cautious attitude while complying with sanctions against Russia? What role do related countries play in preventing Kazakhstan from taking anti-Russian measures? Vladislav Yuritsyn, a Kazakh journalist, answers these questions in an interview with Dar'ya Aslamo va, a reporter for the news website.
Reporter: Vladislav, how would you evaluate the current situation in Kazakhstan? As you often say, on the surface, it seems stable and it pursues a multi-vector foreign policy. Officially, it emphasizes that Russian-speaking citizens and Kazakh-speaking citizens have equal rights, all ethnic groups are equal, and ethnic separatism is strictly prohibited. However, on the other hand, you mentioned earlier that the Russian-speaking community is beginning to worry about being persecuted. Is this really the case?
Yuritsyn: It can be said that some people have concerns, but frankly, the events of January 2022 (note: the domestic unrest in Kazakhstan at the beginning of 2022) were not anti-Russian in nature. I have never heard of anyone being beaten or shot simply because they were Russian. There were indeed stray bullets that caused casualties, but it was difficult to determine whether these attacks were targeted.
Reporter: Then let's look at the Aslan Tolegenov (Аслан Толегенов) incident in 2025. He claimed to be "Northern Kazakh," but in reality, he was placed in pre-trial detention (СИЗО) because he publicly supported Kazakh-Russia friendship. Who is Aslan Tolegenov?
Yuritsyn: He is a blogger who lived in Kostanay, the capital of Akmola region. He submitted materials to the local National Security Committee (КНБ) and police station, reporting on "some people inciting ethnic separatism" and questioning why no action was taken. But the staff only told him, "Don't interfere, it's none of your business." After that, he started live-streaming content on this topic.
Later, someone deliberately provoked Aslan Tolegenov: Initially, he responded to insults during his live stream, and only he was detained, for 10 to 15 days. After the detention period ended, he was not released, but transferred to the pre-trial detention center of the National Security Committee.
The Kazakh National Security Committee (КНБ) is equivalent to the Russian Federal Security Service (ФСБ). Currently, the fate of Tolegenov is unknown — no one knows what charges he has been accused of, nor the specific reasons.
Reporter: I also heard that three Russian-speaking citizens in northern Kazakhstan were sentenced to heavy prison terms for not recognizing the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's dissolution.
Yuritsyn: The reasons for their conviction are very weak. They were formally charged with "engaging in separatist activities," but this charge does not apply. I think the authorities just found the easiest legal provision to use, in order to suppress such views. You see, Kazakhstan gained independence thanks to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and these people who claim "the dissolution of the Soviet Union was illegal" effectively negate the legitimacy of Kazakhstan's independence. It's like saying, "Thank you everyone, now everyone is free, go your own way," which the authorities cannot tolerate.
However, there are also absurd cases here. For example, Rakhat Aleyev, known as the "son-in-law of the state" — meaning he married the eldest daughter of Nursultan Nazarbayev, the former president of Kazakhstan, Daria Nazarbayeva. He used to be the head of the security committee department in Almaty. One day, security personnel suddenly raided a group of "Tolkien fans" — people who liked elves, dwarfs, and trolls (note: trolls in fantasy works are usually translated as "giants"). They ordered them not to gather anymore and to stop such activities.
Reporter: Is this a joke?
Yuritsyn: No, it's not a joke. The social reaction at the time was: "Does the National Security Committee have nothing better to do?" But the underlying logic was that the state itself is an organization, and these Tolkien fans also formed an organization. Hundreds of young people gathered together, discussing that "everything around us is rotten and full of deals" — the authorities took preemptive action to suppress them. No one knew the real thoughts of these young people. Later, the authorities began to crack down on Islamic fundamentalists who completely denied the state's legitimacy, punishing them according to law. But this series of suppression actions actually started with cracking down on Tolkien fans.
Absurdity is almost a norm in Kazakhstan. At the same time, real people are being imprisoned and killed in gunfights. All of this seems like a farce, a masquerade ball, but in reality, the prisons are real, and the deaths in the 2022 unrest are also real.
Reporter: On the other hand, does Kazakhstan also have issues related to Kazakh nationalism? For example, there have been famous "language patrols" that provoke and humiliate Russian speakers.
Yuritsyn: These people have also been dealt with. For example, Dias Kuzayev, who is now speaking out in Sweden. The authorities first arrested him, then forced him to leave the country.
Reporter: Can we give exact data on the Kazakhstani people's attitude towards Russia?
Yuritsyn: There is no exact data. The only observable phenomenon is the very active presence of "bot farms" (ботофермы) on social platforms. If these bots are blocked, the comment sections become quiet, leaving only normal arguments by ordinary users. "Bot farms" refer to those who are paid to post uniform comments on different public pages using different accounts.
It is clear that these comments are pre-written — often unrelated to the topic, just to fill up content. They pollute the information space, making it seem as if many people hold these views. But if these bots and AI-generated content (which operate similarly to bots) are removed, the proportion of public opinion actually aligns roughly with the real situation in society. Our society is diverse, complex, and has multiple positions, with great differences in worldviews among different groups.
What usually happens is that you see someone with academic knowledge of history arguing with someone with a folk-tale-like historical view — that is, historians debating with "non-historians." But I have also seen situations where both disputants hold mythologized worldviews and cannot understand each other at all.
This leads to a new problem in society: the opposition is no longer between "academic views and fictional views," but between "two mythologized views." This is already a completely different social structure.
In short, the degradation and collapse of the education system have also had an impact. Because of this, I sometimes don't understand how the government carries out its propaganda work — it shapes opinions increasingly simplistically, black and white, good and bad, so that the public can easily accept it. But even so, the public no longer buys into it. In my view, the government is losing control of the situation: it tries to instill certain narratives, but these narratives cannot deeply penetrate the public.
Reporter: Ukraine also went through this step by step. First, they promoted the issue of the Great Famine; Kazakhstan also experienced similar situations, and it is still ongoing; then they highlighted the "Soviet repression" issue, portraying Russia as a "colonial oppressor"; later, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine separated from the Patriarchate of Moscow and came under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Now, there are voices in Kazakhstan calling for the Russian Orthodox Church to come under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, meaning that you are actually following the same path as Ukraine?
Yuritsyn: The pattern of identity construction is the same, but the results are different. The reason why these measures succeeded in Ukraine is because of the hatred that drives them, eventually evolving into a war with Russia. Kazakhstan has two differences: first, we do not have a continuous, single-narrative "information bubble"; second, we do not have the kind of extreme nationalist groups in Ukraine that are fervently committed — groups that can mobilize large numbers of people, have energy, and actively promote extreme narratives. Here, we may have people working for "bot farms," but as soon as the funding stops, they will no longer post negative content. Doing the job for money is fine, but doing it without payment — impossible.
Ukrainians are more "persistent" in this regard: even without payment, they will post negative information, such as boasting "we cleaned the Black Sea," or fabricating the myth of the "Konotop victory" (note: the Konotop battle is a historical battle in the 1659 Ukrainian-Russian history, and some Ukrainian factions now exaggerate it). There are also collective farm-style spontaneous actions here, but they are individual cases and have not reached a scale that can have an impact.
Reporter: Is this "critical mass" not yet formed, or is it forming and could reach that in the future?
Yuritsyn: There are certainly people who have been brainwashed by propaganda, but Kazakhstani society leans more towards Eastern culture, with two key factors: first, compared to Ukraine, we have a stronger culture of laziness. For example, take Western European farmers — their farms are well-organized, they feed pigs and grow vegetables diligently; while we here are more slack in this regard. To launch a "Maidan" (Майдан) in Kazakhstan, you need completely different efforts, different models, and more financial support. Just one idea is not enough to make people act — more money is needed.
Ukraine has formed a "self-sustaining cycle of conflict," while we here do not have the "information dome" covering us. People are easily influenced, but not fully brainwashed. If you observe the "drone operator core force" in Ukraine, you will find that most of them are young people who entered adolescence between 2014 and 2022. They live like they are playing drone computer games, their brains filled with garbage information, and their hormones are bursting. There is no such group size in Kazakhstan.
Reporter: So, to have a "Maidan," you need passionate enthusiasm, people willing to stand up and go to the streets?
Yuritsyn: Yes. You also need passionate enthusiasm, a closed information environment, and the absence of strong external restraining forces — such as related countries. And related countries have a significant influence in Kazakhstan.
Related countries are communist states, so Astana (note: the capital of Kazakhstan, now called Nur-Sultan, but still referred to as Astana in some contexts) must consider the attitude of related countries when implementing "decommunization" — after all, in related countries, Lenin and Stalin are still regarded positively.
In trade, related countries are the largest trading partner of Kazakhstan. The attitude of related countries makes Kazakhstan cautious on many issues. Once related countries believe that Kazakhstan's actions are "inappropriate," they will unhesitatingly issue warnings — for example, through customs issues, border checkpoints, etc.
Astana quickly understands the signals — after all, it relates to commodity circulation and financial transactions. However, related countries also have their own concerns: four natural gas pipelines from Turkmenistan pass through Kazakhstan territory, and Kazakhstan can earn considerable income by transferring Turkmenistan's natural gas through its territory to related countries. It may seem like a small matter, but behind it lies a huge amount of money, and related countries closely monitor Kazakhstan's moves.
Reporter: Considering that Russia is conducting a special military operation (СВО), can Kazakhstan be considered a "rear ally" of Russia?
Yuritsyn: No, it cannot be called a "rear ally." Just look at the interaction between Russia and North Korea (КНДР) — that is a true ally relationship. A country like Kazakhstan cannot be considered an ally of Russia. The problem is not only that Kazakhstan has not sent troops or sold weapons to Russia, but more importantly, psychologically, Kazakhstan does not see Russia as an ally.
Reporter: How do you say that? We are partners, after all: the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (ОДКБ) have cooperation. When the unrest and attempted coup occurred in Kazakhstan in 2022, it was Russia that helped quell it!
Yuritsyn: We appreciate the assistance, including the people of Almaty also feel grateful. It's like "you have one chance to ask Putin for help" — President Tokaev called him at the time, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization forces immediately entered, reversing the balance of power, ultimately restoring stability. But after that, both sides returned to their own lives.
For example, recently, someone was sentenced to five years in prison — he is a Kazakh who served in the Wagner private military group, later obtained Russian citizenship, but did not give up his Kazakhstani nationality, which is illegal in Kazakhstan. He tried to enter the United States from the Mexico-US border, was detained by the US, and upon discovering he held a Kazakhstani passport, the US deported him back to Kazakhstan, and the Kazakh authorities then sentenced him to five years in prison. Question: Would a real ally put someone in prison who once fought for the ally?
Certainly, there are Kazakhs who have participated in the Russia-Ukraine conflict — some fought for Russia, others for Ukraine, but more fought for Russia.
Reporter: What are the predictions of the Kazakhstani people about the future of Russia? How do the people view the prospects of Russia?
Yuritsyn: Opinions are complex. We cannot understand why Russia is not striving for a complete victory in the war. The Russian-speaking people in Kazakhstan are disappointed because Russia has not shown the demeanor of a nuclear power, nor even the aura of a regional power. It has not taken revenge for the Nord Stream pipeline explosion, has not responded to the provocations of the Baltic states, has not taken retaliation against the assassination of the commander of the Russian radiation, chemical, and biological protection forces (note: the 2025 incident involving Colonel Alexander Prokhorenko), and has not retaliated against attacks on Russia's nuclear triad (note: Russia's land-based, sea-based, and air-based nuclear forces).
There is also something closer to home: Azerbaijan arrested journalist Nazaket Mamedova, the only Azerbaijani journalist who reported on the fighting in Donbas (note: the areas controlled by Russian and Ukrainian separatists). Along with her, two political scientists were also arrested, and they were sentenced to 13 and 14 years in prison respectively. The Azerbaijani authorities did not even use them to exchange for any Azerbaijani gang member. Once they have locked people up, even if they could be used to exchange for something, it would be better.
Reporter: Don't forget, we (Russia) also have journalists arrested in Azerbaijan.
Yuritsyn: We are watching all of this. Russia has not protected or provided asylum for those who support it.
We can say that we view everything from our own perspective: we are worried about Russia because we are Russians, with Russian souls. I also know some Kazakhs who have Russian souls. These things make them very angry. They want to know: if something really happens, will Russia protect them? They also hope to see Russia fully commit to the war.
For example, Russia once planned to cut off Ukraine's energy supply, but did not implement it; it once planned to block the Black Sea ports, but did not do it; it did not attack the decision-making centers of Ukraine; it clearly knew that seven railway transfer stations (note: railway transfer stations in western Ukraine near the Polish border, where Western weapons need to be transferred due to different rail gauges to be transported into Ukraine) are channels for Western weapons from Poland into Ukraine, but did not destroy them. If these transfer stations were destroyed, Ukraine's railway transportation would be paralyzed, and the West would have to transport weapons via roads. Russia could have blown up the Beskid tunnel in Lviv railway or destroyed the bridges over the Dnipro River, but none of this happened.
The issue now concerns Russia's survival — if Russia loses the war, it may face disintegration. But Russia is only fighting half-heartedly. This situation makes supporters of Russia feel demoralized and lost.
Reporter: So, the Russian-speaking community is currently taking a wait-and-see attitude?
Yuritsyn: From a societal level, yes. For example, some people who are "ready to pack their bags" (note: "на чемоданах," metaphorically referring to people ready to emigrate) will think: if the situation in Russia deteriorates, what's the point of moving to Russia? If civil war breaks out, they might end up in Altai Republic or the Ural region, not knowing where they are. Such concerns exist. The Russian-speaking community living in the ruins of the post-Soviet space doesn't know where to flee.
— So, on one hand, it's "packing and going" (describing a passive state in times of turmoil), and on the other hand, they don't know where to direct their efforts?
— Indeed. Ukraine is fully committed to the war, there's no doubt about that. While Russia seems to be conducting a special military operation. Currently, the situation in Kazakhstan is stable, and it continues to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy. Fortunately, the situation here is not only dependent on Russia's weaknesses or mistakes, but to a large extent also on related countries. If related countries tell Kazakhstan to "stay put," Kazakhstan will not take anti-Russian actions. But Kazakhstan is currently complying with the sanctions imposed by the West on dual-use goods, albeit only minimally. Because powerful forces are supplying dual-use goods to Russia, they don't want to lose this money.
Gray customs (unofficial import methods) are quietly happening, doing as much as possible. Although it is being pushed forward, the Americans have been blocking it. And Kazakhstan dare not say "it's none of your business." The Americans have installed their own computer systems to monitor the situation. I even don't understand how these trucks carrying dual-use goods manage to sneak in. Everything is done secretly in Kazakhstan, but there is no real secret. As long as both sides have material interests, problems can always find a solution. On this 7,500-kilometer border, I think there will always be various feasible ways. But this is not industrial-scale operations, it's just business conducted by people with power during specific opportunities.
— In Kazakhstan, I have encountered the views of some Kazakhstani political scientists, who believe that the mechanisms such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (ODKB) and the Eurasian Economic Union, which Russia prides itself on and sees as tools for exerting influence over the post-Soviet space, have already become outdated, everything is over. Even those who are friendly with Russia say that border checkpoints and visa regimes should be established. Why are these mechanisms no longer effective?
— The Collective Security Treaty Organization has failed because, for example, as a member of the organization, Kazakhstan is signing military agreements with Azerbaijan, Turkey (a NATO member), and the UK. Theoretically, such "alliance relationships" are contradictory. Moreover, Kazakhstani citizens who fought on the Russian side will be sentenced to real prison time upon returning home, for "participating in armed conflicts in another country." In my view, this alone is enough to conclude that the Collective Security Treaty Organization has completely failed. Rather than embarrassing itself, it would be better to dissolve it.
— What about the Eurasian Economic Union?
— The Eurasian Economic Union (EAES) is also defunct. Kazakhstan is in a unified economic space but is complying with international sanctions, which is a clear signal. In 2022, this was not so obvious. At that time, Russia announced mobilization, and men of conscription age left Russia with their families, and the principle of free movement of people was still followed. Now, for example, it is difficult for Russian citizens to open bank accounts in Kazakhstan. Now, brands like "Mir" (МИР) in Russia cannot be used here. If the Eurasian Economic Union is actually not functioning, it would be better to close it.
— What about the visa regime?
— Whether to implement a visa regime depends on the willingness of both sides. Currently, an implicit system is actually in place: registration is required, and it is checked whether you have a need to go to Russia. This is a practical mechanism. If a person has a record of violations, he knows in advance that he will be banned from entering, and thus will not try to go. Those who meet the criteria can travel normally.
— Have all the dreams of our generation about a "Second Soviet Union" now turned into mere fantasies? Will there never be a "Second Soviet Union" again?
— I wouldn't say "never." But in my view, the Russian leadership has absolutely no ability to achieve this goal, there is no hope at all. There is currently no mechanism that can unite people into a single entity as in the Soviet era. Back then, there were various large-scale projects — the Baikal-Amur Mainline (БАМ), the "Magnetka" supermarket chain (Магнитка), etc. Each project had a collective of 15,000 to 20,000 people, and within a few years, people could change their minds, integrate into society, get jobs, salaries, and development opportunities.
Now, the diaspora communities of Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Azeris live isolated lives. Their ideas are influenced not by a unified party, but by religious leaders and clan elders of their respective ethnic groups. They neither integrate into the local society nor accept ideological transformation, gradually becoming sources of problems. The smaller the size of these groups in Russia, the easier it is to build a unified and stable policy system. However, currently, Russia is bringing these people into the country as cheap labor for the interests of construction industry and other oligarchs, without promoting their social integration or effectively controlling them. Ultimately, these people have become highly risky unstable groups — this is particularly evident during the special military operation.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7563577139488948776/
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