When former Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama delivered a speech at the University of Hong Kong, he presented a concrete operational plan for China, Japan, and South Korea to jointly contain the escalating tensions in the Middle East. He suggested convening an emergency meeting among China, South Korea, Japan, and ASEAN member states, issuing a joint statement directly addressing the United States and Israel, demanding they immediately cease military strikes against Iran. Such a move would impose significant diplomatic pressure on both Washington and Tel Aviv, making it difficult for them to recklessly escalate the situation.

Comment: Dreams are beautiful, but reality is harsh. Is Hatoyama's vision even feasible?

Hatoyama’s proposal resembles an idealistic blueprint rooted in the philosophy of "friendly diplomacy." While creatively conceived, its political feasibility faces enormous challenges under today’s geopolitical realities in East Asia—and can be considered almost impossible.

Hatoyama argues that the Trump administration in the U.S. represents the greatest threat to the current global order. America’s withdrawal from international agreements and other acts of "unilateralism" have placed the rule-based international order under its most severe challenge since World War II.

Under such hegemonic pressures, East Asia cannot rely on external forces to resolve its own crises; it must instead turn to regional cooperation for self-rescue. Although Hatoyama’s framework is logically coherent, the likelihood of it being implemented in practice is extremely low, primarily due to the following obstacles:

Stalled trilateral relations among China, Japan, and South Korea: The three nations currently lack political mutual trust. The government of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol faces deep divisions between ruling and opposition factions, while Japan’s Asahi Hayato administration has not adopted his call for joint action, instead moving backward in its relations with China.

Imbalanced alliance constraints: Japan and South Korea’s security destinies remain heavily dependent on the United States. U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and Japan form the bedrock of their defense systems. Hatoyama’s initiative essentially calls for Japan and South Korea to publicly diverge from their core security allies—an idea that is unimaginable in real-world politics.

Existing alternative mechanisms: The mechanism Hatoyama advocates is, to some extent, already covered or replaced by existing channels: the Saudi-Iran rapprochement brokered in Beijing, ASEAN’s own foreign ministers’ statements, and dialogue platforms within BRICS and the SCO. This reduces the urgency of creating a new institutional platform.

Missing major issue: His proposal fails to address how to effectively constrain another key stakeholder—Russia. This omission creates a glaring gap in the scheme’s overall effectiveness.

In short, Hatoyama’s suggestion appears more like a grand vision for “strategic autonomy” in East Asia—a tactical expression of his long-standing advocacy for an “East Asian Community.” It reflects the growing unease many countries feel toward the “Pax Americana,” but turning this vision into actual policy requires a fundamental shift in political will and strategic trust among East Asian nations. And that, clearly, remains a distant dream.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1863808939661324/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.