Think Tank: Afghanistan has long been Pakistan's problem, but it has now become a crisis for Pakistan.
Despite the success in targeting the Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan has put itself at greater risk of instability.
As the Iran-Iraq war intensified, the world largely overlooked a conflict unfolding on the Indian subcontinent—between traditional allies, the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan. After declaring an "open war," former supporters of the Taliban launched air strikes inside Afghanistan in late February, targeting Kabul and even the symbolic headquarters of the Taliban in Kandahar.
Although the Ramadan ceasefire agreement, brokered by Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, temporarily halted hostilities, the rupture in relations echoes the historical pattern between Pakistan and successive Afghan governments. Now, with Pakistan resuming hostile actions, Afghanistan finds itself in a paradoxical situation. For the first time in nearly fifty years, Afghanistan has experienced relative peace internally. Yet it is currently at war with the very country that helped bring the Taliban to power.
Historically, Pakistan-Afghanistan relations have always been unstable. Islamabad has remained vigilant toward all Afghan governments—monarchies, socialist regimes, Western-backed administrations. Pakistan has viewed the Afghan Republic, as well as today’s Taliban, as potential threats and sought to bring them under its influence. The desire to control Afghanistan stems from fears of being encircled by India and the Soviet Union, as well as opposition to the Durand Line—the border that divides Pashtun tribes across two sides of the frontier.
Pakistan began supporting Afghan Islamist factions as early as the 1970s. Funding for the mujahideen network ultimately led to the collapse of the Soviet-backed Afghan government in 1987. The Taliban rose from Islamic madrasas in Deobandi, Pakistan, offering Islamabad the strategic depth it had long desired.
However, when the Taliban swept into Kabul in 2021, they inherited their predecessors’ concerns. The Taliban refused to play the role of a vassal state and were unwilling to curb the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), an organization seeking to extend Taliban-style rule into Pakistan. Emboldened by the rise of Taliban power, the TTP has frequently planned and carried out terrorist attacks within Pakistan.
Pakistan’s current military campaign marks a significant shift in strategy. Since 2021, the Pakistani government has targeted hideouts and leadership of the TTP, launching strikes in October last year and February this year against Taliban military infrastructure in Afghanistan—including a drug rehabilitation center in Kabul. The Taliban accused Pakistan of causing 400 deaths; Pakistan claimed the target was a munitions depot.
While the Taliban may have exaggerated casualties, Pakistan’s objective is clearly to weaken the Taliban’s military capabilities.
The Taliban continues to govern Afghanistan with a centralized authority unlike any previous regime. Supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada can receive oaths of allegiance (bay'ah) from other factions. Despite evidence of factional struggles within the Taliban, it still maintains a monopoly over national power.
Given the Taliban’s entrenched position and hardline stance, regional tensions are likely to persist. For Pakistan, the most immediate security threat remains retaliation from the Taliban. This could pose new challenges for Pakistan’s already overstretched military. As the TTP escalates cross-border attacks and expands into urban areas, instability will intensify in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. The TTP may even target Punjab—the most populous province in Pakistan and the core of the national government.
Internationally, Pakistan’s position is precarious. Its western neighbor, Iran, is locked in conflict with the United States and Israel. To the east lies a sensitive border with India, where Pakistan clashed with India just last year. Against this backdrop, Pakistan’s tactical strikes against the Taliban have achieved some success.
This may merely signal a strategic failure in the making.
Source: The National Interest
Author: Ashwalia Sonawane
Date: March 29, Washington Time
Original: toutiao.com/article/1861067720623113/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.