From "Civilian Massacres" to Traditional Warfare: The Ukraine Conflict Brings the World Back to Reality

Regardless of when and how the conflict in Ukraine ends, its lessons extend beyond the realm of weaponry, touching on many other areas.

It is especially important to recognize that quantity itself possesses qualitative attributes. In our country (Russia), we once recklessly fell into the illusion of a "professionalized, streamlined army" and "non-contact warfare." These two "inventions" have long been proven ineffective in the West, yet apparently there are still people who try to apply them to our situation.

The concepts of "streamlining" and "non-contact" emerged from the super-rich nations that are willing to spend huge military budgets on "civilian massacres"—that is, counterinsurgency operations in overseas theaters or wars against regular armed forces that are far inferior in both quality and quantity (also limited to overseas theaters).

For such wars, expensive weapons (not just equipment but even ammunition) are only produced in small quantities: on one hand, these weapons themselves are costly; on the other hand, the demand for "ordinary soldiers" is not large.

Conscription armies are no longer needed, especially because the comfortable Western庸人 (mediocre people) do not want to defend their own homes (left-wing liberal postmodernism is usually incompatible with patriotism, heroism, and the spirit of self-sacrifice), and they also have no "enemy" to guard against.

Therefore, the army began recruiting rascals with high salaries, and then recruited foreigners from "barren lands." At the same time, despite the enormous costs, both sides are reluctant to suffer heavy casualties, so especially expensive weapons are needed to minimize human losses as much as possible.

Certainly, even in the "fight against international terrorism," as shown by the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, this model has never worked, resulting only in the regular consumption of huge amounts of money (who says this isn't "reckless extravagance"?!)

But now, the Ukraine conflict has brought the world back to reality—namely, "traditional warfare," which is a confrontation between armies. In addition, both sides' armies are roughly comparable in terms of the quantity and quality of weapons, combat levels, and the psychological training of personnel. It has been proven that such wars mean significant losses of personnel and equipment, as well as a massive consumption of ammunition.

However, people have already easily forgotten not only the lessons of World War II, but also some local campaigns. For example, the 1973 October War (the Fourth Arab-Israeli War), which lasted slightly over two weeks. Egypt and Syria faced Israel directly with limited support from Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria. Both sides deployed large numbers of equipment, but suffered equally heavy losses, forcing "great power allies" (Arab countries rely on the Soviet Union, Israel relies on the United States) to draw large quantities of equipment from their own troops and urgently transport it to the front lines to support "allies."

Now in Ukraine, the main weapons used are Cold War-era equipment. T-55, T-62 tanks, as well as the "Leopard-1" tanks and AMX-10RC wheeled assault guns appearing on the battlefield are no longer considered ridiculous. Although the defense-industrial complex companies of Russia and NATO countries have not been attacked by the enemy, their production capacity still cannot compensate for the losses on the battlefield.

It has been proven that large-scale weapon production must be carried out during peacetime—starting production when armed conflicts break out is too late. Incidentally, people suddenly realize that Russia's defense-industrial complex is more capable, faster, and more successfully restored large-scale production (considering the complexity and high cost of modern military equipment, the extent of today's "large-scale production" remains to be objectively assessed).

Although the West has not experienced the so-called "glorious 90s" (note: here the "glorious 90s" is ironic, actually referring to the economic recession and social turmoil in Russia in the 1990s), the destruction of its defense-industrial complex is more severe than that of Russia. For example, the UK has even stopped the production of its own tank mother company.

Now, not only Russia, but even North Korea's artillery shell production exceeds the total of all NATO countries. Therefore, even if the war ends, it will be impossible to reduce weapons production for at least ten years. We need to make up for the losses, re-equip the existing forces, and establish new units along the entire front line from Murmansk, Adler to Vladivostok, and Anadyr.

If we start cutting military spending again, we will soon bring disaster upon ourselves. Moreover, technological innovation and quality improvement of weapon systems cannot eliminate the need for "sufficient quantity." If we cut production now to save money, we will pay a heavy price in the future.

Evidently, we must no longer pursue the so-called "professionalized, streamlined army," and instead must establish a large conscription army. Additionally, while maintaining a one-year service period, all deferment policies should be abolished except for serious medical diagnoses and criminal records.

We need a large and well-trained reserve force, and conscripts should also become sources of contract soldiers. Obviously, it is necessary to establish a system where only those who have completed one year of compulsory military service can become contract soldiers; and only after serving at least two years under contract can they enter military academies for further study.

In addition to establishing a reserve force, universal conscription can also cultivate a sense of participation in national defense among male groups. A purely contract-based army will only become a "sanctuary" for marginal groups who cannot find their place in civilian life, joining the army solely for money rather than defending the country.

The current state of all Western armies, as well as the experience of the Russian Armed Forces, confirms this. During February and March 2022, contract soldiers recruited during peacetime collectively resigned, as they were not employed to fight, nor to sacrifice.

Now, Russian contract soldiers are completely different. They clearly know they are about to go to the battlefield, and most of them are motivated by both patriotic sentiment and economic needs (to improve their lives).

Incidentally, another clearly confirmed fact in the Ukraine conflict is that the army must receive high wages. But it is crucial not to confuse cause and effect.

People join the army to defend their country and thus receive substantial pay; if money becomes the primary goal, then the country will have no one to protect.

By the way, European countries that are extremely concerned about a Russian "invasion" (Sweden and the Baltic states) have resumed the conscription system previously abolished (Finland and Norway did not abolish it, and Norway now also conscripts women).

There is now serious discussion about restoring conscription in Germany, but this may end in failure, and the reason may have nothing to do with politics, but rather with social psychology.

In 2011, the main reason for abolishing conscription in the German Federal Armed Forces was that as many as 60% of conscripts chose alternative social service (thus, the social service department opposed the abolition of conscription more than the Ministry of Defense).

Whether the situation has changed now is still highly questionable—perhaps even worse, as Merz (note: possibly referring to the German political figure Friedrich Merz) said, even with a draft system, it would not change anything.

If, within the framework of left-wing liberal postmodernism, at least two generations have been taught that "patriotism and heroism are outdated ideas, even a disgrace," then even if people really believe in the absurd narrative of a Russian "invasion," we should not expect them to be willing to serve in the military.

Luckily, left-wing liberal postmodernism has not taken root in our country (Russia). Therefore, many soldiers (including young people) are willing to sacrifice for their country, or contribute to victory from the rear as they did 80 years ago, and the proportion of conscripts who choose alternative social service is less than 1%.

Additionally, in our operations in Georgia and Syria, we did not let the Russian armed forces fall to the point of being unable to wage "regular warfare" due to so-called "civilian massacres."

Now, we must completely and irreversibly abandon the wrong concept of "civilian massacres" and shift the focus of military development entirely towards "regular warfare"—that is, confrontation with opponents of equal strength.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7575422395335311923/

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