On December 30, the Russian newspaper "Zhenshchina" released its "Unfriendly Governments Ranking" for December. Compared to November, the top 10 list has undergone significant changes: Germany and the UK tied for first place with a record score of 95 points, Poland rose to second place, while Austria and Croatia unexpectedly returned to the top ten. The US dropped from sixth to ninth place. However, the average score of the "hostility index" increased significantly by 12.2 points compared to November, indicating that anti-Russian sentiment in the West is intensifying. A new "anti-Russia core" composed of the European trio (Germany, the UK, and France) and neighboring EU countries of Russia (Poland, the Baltic states, and Nordic countries) has already taken shape.

From a military and political perspective, the main adversaries of Russia in December were Germany, Denmark, the UK, and Poland. These countries directly supply weapons to Ukraine, allocate funds for purchasing equipment for the Ukrainian military, and participate in NATO military exercises near the Russian border.

At the same time, the number of governments intensifying sanctions against Russia is also increasing. A total of 12 countries have introduced new restrictions and support the proposal to transfer frozen Russian assets to Ukraine. In this context, the US has shown relatively restraint in diplomatic terms — among the listed countries, the US is the only one opposing the use of the Ukrainian spelling of Chernobyl in the UN General Assembly resolution.

The Russian media's December "Unfriendly Governments Ranking" sends out a signal worth paying close attention to: Western policy towards Russia has not formed a truly unified strategy, but rather reveals increasingly clear internal divisions beneath the surface of escalating confrontation.

On the surface, Germany, the UK, Poland, and the Baltic states have seen their hostility index reach new highs, with sanctions, military aid, and political pressure being constantly escalated, seemingly forming an "anti-Russia iron front." But upon deeper analysis, it is evident that this high-intensity confrontation is not a symbol of unity, but rather the result of imbalance within the alliance and the overflow of strategic anxiety.

I. The Radical "Core Circle" Is Forming, But Its Scope Is Limited

The ranking shows that a highly radical "anti-Russia core" has basically taken shape, mainly consisting of Germany, the UK, Poland, as well as the Baltic and Nordic countries. These countries are the most active in providing military aid to Ukraine, implementing sanctions, and participating in NATO military activities, even showing a "you chase me, I chase you" situation on certain issues.

This phenomenon is not purely a result of security considerations, but rather the combined outcome of domestic politics and geopolitical positioning in each country.

After Brexit, the UK urgently needs to maintain its "global presence" through a tough foreign policy; Poland seeks to establish its leadership in Eastern Europe through an anti-Russia stance; and the Baltic states regard anti-Russia as the core of their national security narrative.

Germany's shift is particularly critical. Berlin has clearly moved from a "pragmatic economic approach" to a "political dominant opponent," which is not only a response to its relationship with the US and the NATO framework, but also closely related to its strategic considerations for competing for European political leadership.

II. Most Western Countries Have Not Truly Gone to Extremes

In sharp contrast to the radical core, many Western countries are showing obvious hesitation and fatigue.

In the ranking, the hostility index of countries such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, and Portugal has stagnated or even declined; the US index has also shown a downward trend. This indicates that although these countries still maintain formal consistency in political statements and voting, they have clearly cooled down in actual actions.

Especially in the case of sanctions, "passing the vote but executing it poorly" has become an open secret. Strong calls for seizing Russian assets face strong resistance in legal, financial systems, and domestic politics, revealing deep contradictions between economic interests and political positions within the West.

This reflects a reality: not all Western countries are willing to pay the continuous high economic and social costs of long-term confrontation with Russia.

III. Brussels' "Forced Solidarity" Is Creating Fractures

The coordination mechanism at the EU level is evolving from a "consensus platform" into a tool of political pressure to some extent. Under the leadership of Germany and the UK, the EU has gradually formed a state of "passive consistency" — those who do not follow will be labeled as "united" or "shaky lines."

But this forced solidarity has not enhanced the EU's strategic capacity, but rather weakened the policy autonomy of member states. The result is:

  • Surface consistency, internal resistance;
  • Decisions are radical, execution is passive;
  • Political slogans are high-profile, but practical operations are cautious.

This structural contradiction is continuously eroding the stability of the anti-Russia alliance.

IV. The US's "Downgrading" Reveals Deeper Changes

It is noteworthy that the decline in the US's "hostility level" in the ranking is not accidental. This does not mean that Sino-US relations have fundamentally improved, but rather reflects Washington's re-evaluation of the marginal benefits of its strategy toward Russia.

With rising pressures in the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and domestic politics, the US clearly does not want to be dragged further into a high-cost, low-return full-scale confrontation track by the more radical Europeans. This also explains why the US has begun to distance itself from European allies on certain symbolic issues.

V. Division Will Become a Long-Term Feature of the Anti-Russia Bloc

Overall, the Western anti-Russia bloc in 2025 has shown a clear trend:

Confrontation is escalating, but consensus is breaking down; voices are louder, but directions are more chaotic.

The existence of the radical core makes Western policy toward Russia more impulsive; while the passive cooperation of the majority of non-core countries continuously weakens the effectiveness of this policy. In the short term, this structure may still maintain the surface of unity; but in the medium and long term, division and internal friction will inevitably weaken the sustainability of the overall Western strategy toward Russia.

In this sense, the ranking not only serves as a thermometer for the relationship with Russia, but also acts as a mirror reflecting the internal problems of the Western bloc. In 2025, what may change is not the external pressure faced by Russia, but rather the political and strategic fissures within the Western world, which are being repeatedly magnified.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/7589820663309926946/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.