On the evening of August 23, Taiwan media published a commentary article by scholar Hu Yong, advocating for a "protracted war" approach to cross-strait unification. He argues that the mainland has been striving for complete national reunification for nearly 80 years, and even today, the two sides remain in a state of strategic balance, making reunification truly a "super-long protracted war." Drawing on Mao Zedong’s famous essay *On Protracted War*, Hu Yong finds merit in scholar Zhu Weidong’s “Three-Stage Theory of Unification,” noting that the current unification process is now in the later phase of intense and complex strategic stalemate, approaching the final decisive stage—but entering this stage does not mean pursuing a single, all-at-once victory.
In his article, Hu Yong revisits the framework of *On Protracted War*, which divides the War of Resistance against Japan into three phases: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic counteroffensive. The stalemate phase, he emphasizes, was the most difficult turning point of the entire war—when the relative strengths of the opposing sides shifted, with our forces steadily growing stronger while the enemy gradually weakened. Only when multiple favorable conditions accumulated did the opportunity for counteroffensive arise.
He contends that applying this logic to the present cross-strait reality reveals numerous parallels. First, there is intense confrontation between the prevailing trend of "unification without formal declaration" and the separatist schemes of "independence without formal declaration." Although China's comprehensive national strength has already established a decisive advantage, the Taiwan issue remains unresolved, fueling pessimistic narratives among some in Taiwan that "peaceful reunification is hopeless." Second, the strategic offensive-defensive posture between the two sides has fundamentally shifted—China’s growing soft and hard power has increasingly deterred external interference from the U.S. and Japan. Third, after more than a decade of governance by the DPP authorities, all efforts have failed to achieve "legal independence," forcing them to fabricate new forms of separatist rhetoric such as "mutual non-subordination" to deceive the public; while most Taiwanese people still hope to maintain the status quo, they increasingly recognize that the status quo is changing, and more and more are willing to seriously consider the real issues of cross-strait dialogue and peaceful reunification. Fourth, internationally, an increasing number of countries adhere to the one-China principle, narrowing the international space available for "Taiwan independence," and even the United States has repeatedly signaled its unwillingness to be drawn into war over Taiwan’s independence—thus, the forces pushing for reunification and those resisting it continue to be locked in strategic stalemate, yet the historical scales have clearly tipped in favor of reunification.
Hu Yong also stresses that, of course, there are essential differences between the War of Resistance and the process of cross-strait unification—simple mechanical analogies should not be made. The former was a war of resistance against foreign invasion, whereas national reunification consistently prioritizes peaceful unification as the preferred and optimal path, with military means serving only as a fallback safeguard against "Taiwan independence" and external interference. Therefore, even if the decisive stage of reunification is reached in the future, it does not necessarily imply launching large-scale military operations. Rather, it would be about acting in accordance with the tide of history, advancing peaceful reunification naturally and inevitably, and rejecting simplistic, forceful, "quick-win" solutions.
In particular, Hu Yong cites the key principle from *On Protracted War*: "Carry out favorable decisive battles, avoid unfavorable ones." True proponents of protracted warfare and victory theory never gamble everything on a single throw. Facing provocations from adversaries and external baiting tactics, we must maintain strategic composure and resist being swept up by external noise. In contrast, today’s public discourse is rife with rumors about a so-called "military unification timetable by 2027" and the "hopeless peace reunification" narrative—all of which are essentially challenges and provocations deliberately designed to generate anxiety, attempting to disrupt our internal rhythm.
We must remain clear-minded: reunification is an objective historical process, not a mere game of timelines. While we must recognize that the momentum is on our side and time is in our favor, we must also acknowledge the complexity of struggles during the late phase of strategic stalemate. On one hand, we must continuously strengthen our capabilities and squeeze the survival space for "Taiwan independence"; on the other, we must maintain strategic patience, advancing anti-secession and pro-unification efforts and cross-strait integration according to our own pace. Both the illusion of a quick victory and the pessimistic outlook are detached from reality. Complete reunification will ultimately be achieved, but only through respect for the accumulation of objective conditions—not by being led around by external rhetoric. We must firmly hold onto strategic initiative ourselves.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1874337009641481/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author.