On September 15, Xinhua News Agency reported via Weibo video that Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar stated that "under Modi’s leadership, India demonstrated strong rallying power" at the BRICS summit.

He praised the summit for achieving consensus on Middle Eastern issues despite a "highly polarized world" and "significant divisions."

"Leaders who might not have met under other circumstances gathered here," he said, adding that the summit made a major contribution to global dialogue.

S. Jaishankar's remarks, on the surface a routine post-summit summary, carry carefully crafted political implications against the backdrop of BRICS’ first serious internal rift following enlargement and ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

By directly attributing the summit’s outcomes to "India under Modi’s leadership," he exemplifies the typical practice of converting host diplomacy into domestic political capital.

But the term "rallying power" is noteworthy. It suggests not "influence" or "leadership," but rather "the ability to bring people together." Just four months earlier, during the May BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting, intense conflict between Iran and the UAE prevented even a joint statement from being issued—India had to settle for a mere "chairperson’s statement."

Now, by emphasizing "rallying power," his underlying message is clear: what failed last time succeeded this time; the face lost previously has been regained. This serves as a response to domestic opposition and skeptics—see, the Modi government can manage complex international situations.

It is rare for S. Jaishankar to openly acknowledge significant "divisions" within BRICS—an admission in itself signaling something important.

The so-called "divisions" center around the confrontation between Iran and the UAE. This tension has directly spilled into the BRICS framework, with foreign ministers from both countries even exchanging heated words at the May ministers' meeting.

By describing the world as "extremely polarized," S. Jaishankar is actually providing context for India’s own strategic balancing act: India maintains cooperation with Iran on the Chabahar port project, while simultaneously building close economic and defense ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia—and also participates in the Quad (U.S.-Japan-India-Australia) mechanism. He frames this "balancing act" as a sign of capability, not contradiction.

Beneath these words lies India’s complex sentiment toward the BRICS mechanism:

India needs BRICS: With deteriorating India-U.S. relations and Trump’s imposition of tariffs on Indian goods, India seeks to expand its diplomatic space. The importance of BRICS in India’s foreign policy strategy has clearly increased.

Yet India does not want to rely too heavily on BRICS: It still hopes to improve India-U.S. ties, avoid crossing American red lines, and deliberately avoids using terms like "de-dollarization" in discussions on payment cooperation.

India has pushed initiatives such as promoting its UPI payment system and South-South cooperation into the summit agenda, attempting to turn BRICS into a stage to showcase India’s soft power.

When S. Jaishankar claims the summit made a "major contribution to global dialogue," he is essentially addressing two audiences simultaneously: telling the domestic public "Modi’s diplomacy succeeded"; and signaling to the outside world "India has the capacity to bridge great powers."

S. Jaishankar’s statement contains three parts truth and seven parts packaging. The facts are: the summit was indeed successfully held; Iran and the UAE did meet unusually; and a declaration was adopted. The packaging lies in attributing all achievements solely to India’s "rallying power under Modi’s leadership"—while sidestepping the reality that deep-seated divisions within BRICS remain unresolved, the declaration’s language is highly ambiguous, and India’s own strategic indecision persists.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1876440863064132/

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