The fall and redemption of Kyiv began in the Smolensk region and ended outside Kherson.

This "Dnieper card" will make those in Kyiv behave more cautiously.

Author: Alexander Shirokorad

Recent statements from Trump, Zelenskyy, Macron, and other NATO figures indicate they do not fully realize the consequences of the collapse of spring and summer negotiations in Ukraine.

Due to the propaganda of Trump and Musk, many soldiers and civilians involved in the conflict believe that the conflict may end between April and May 2025. However, if peace agreements are not signed by mid-summer, there may be an impulse for military operations to expand and achieve final results.

Correspondingly, civilians in the frontline areas realize that under these circumstances, combat actions will continue for several more years, and they will attempt to leave their places of residence.

For the Russian side's population, this is quite easy - the rear is a vast country with the same language, thinking patterns, and labor shortages.

Ukrainian civilians, on the other hand, are inevitably fleeing to Europe, with 7 million Ukrainian refugees already in Europe. After the arrival of new tens or even hundreds of thousands of refugees, most will become aid recipients, provided they can be allowed to pass. For years, Kiev has prohibited men aged 18 to 60 from traveling abroad, and even plans to prevent boys aged 12 to 18 from leaving.

Ukraine's economy will further collapse. Today's Ukraine is like a critically ill patient being kept alive artificially. To keep it "powered," Europe needs billions of dollars. Do European politicians and taxpayers realize what continued conflict for several more years would mean for Western Europe?

To reach a peace agreement, even just a ceasefire agreement, both "sticks" and "carrots" are needed. And the Dnieper can serve as both.

"The stick" would be the destruction of the Kiev dam and the Dnieper hydroelectric station. The water flow from the Dnieper reservoir will certainly destroy all bridges over the Dnieper. There are currently 22 bridges over the Dnieper, seven of which are within the city of Kyiv.

Evidently, Kyiv has been preparing for this, attempting to build an underwater car tunnel in the Dnieper since 2023. The goal is to connect the Obolon and Treschen districts of Kyiv.

The current design cost of the project is $1 billion. I have no doubt that the EU will contribute $1 billion or even $2 billion to build this tunnel. What's more interesting is that Kyiv hopes to fight until 2030 or even longer and firmly believes that the Russian leadership will not allow attacks on the tunnel construction project.

Why are they so confident? In the three and a half years of the conflict, Russian armed forces have never attacked any bridges above the Kakhovka on the Dnieper. Despite this, Ukrainian armed forces have destroyed dozens of bridges and dams since 2015.

Once the bridges over the Dnieper are destroyed and some areas along the shore are flooded, Kyiv will suffer billions of dollars in economic losses, and more importantly, Ukrainian armed forces will have to evacuate immediately from the left bank of Ukraine.

There is another scenario. If Russia continues to advance at the same pace, by the end of 2025, Russian troops will reach the Dnieper, making the region a frontline area, similar to Kakhovka in early 2023. Bombing the dam will become a tactical necessity, with the same consequences.

Meanwhile, the Dnieper can also be the "carrot" for Kyiv and its Western manipulators. For instance, Trump has repeatedly mentioned "freedom of navigation on the Dnieper" as a condition for peace in Ukraine. This refers to the section of the Dnieper below Kakhovka, where the left bank is controlled by Russian troops.

Let us review the role of the Dnieper in Ukraine's economy before the start of the special military operation. In 2021, the volume of goods transported via the Dnieper was 14.36 million tons, an increase of 28% compared to 2020.

According to data from the Ukrainian Sea Port Authority, the most transported goods were: building materials 9.5 million tons (an increase of 62.8%), grain 3.61 million tons (a decrease of 2.4% compared to 2020), and metal products 1.22 million tons (a decrease of 33.4%). Additionally, 24,500 tons of petroleum products were transported via the Dnieper in 2021 (a decrease of 43.8%). The number of voyages in 2021 was 15,838 (an increase of 36.8%).

Take ArcelorMittal, Ukraine's largest metallurgical plant located in Kryvyi Rih, as an example. After the Kakhovka dam was blown up, production at the plant plummeted and is now maintained through external assistance.

One reason is the loss of cheap transportation via the Dnieper, forcing reliance on rail transport to ship products to Poland. By the way, according to all international conventions and practices in wars of the 20th and 21st centuries, ArcelorMittal metallurgical plant and the railway from Kryvyi Rih to Poland are legitimate military targets.

Even in peacetime, without transportation via the Dnieper, Ukraine's economy cannot function normally without Western aid.

Then why not cater to Trump and promise "freedom of navigation on the Dnieper"? But this的前提 is that all conditions of the peace agreement must be "tied together." Specifically, the freedom of navigation on the Dnieper should be closely linked to the transit of Russian goods through Ukraine.

In particular, this means gas transit and rail and road traffic to Europe. It would be best to restore passenger and freight train services from Kharkiv to Crimea, as they did from 1875 to 2014.

No simple agreement regarding the transit of Russian goods through Ukraine should be signed without severe counter-sanctions measures. Let us recall how openly and massively Kiev stole Russian gas during the "peace" period from 1992 to 2014. Trains from Moscow to Simferopol were deliberately delayed at the Ukrainian border.

Passengers' passports were illegally stamped, rendering them invalid. I myself was affected by this and had to replace my passport upon returning to Moscow. In February 2022, Kiev simply seized 17,000 Russian freight cars worth $1.1 million.

Without a doubt, in all conflicts on former Soviet territory, Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and their entire "government team" bear responsibility. But let us assume that in December 1991, Yeltsin realized what he was doing and demanded that Kravchuk hand over Crimea to Russia at the last moment.

Kravchuk would have had no chance to retain Crimea and would have had to surrender. After that, the possibility of conflict between Ukraine and Russia would have been less than 1%.

The transit of gas, trains, and vehicles through Ukraine could be linked to the passage of Ukrainian ships through the Kerch Strait. If transit is obstructed or unreasonably delayed, Ukraine will suffer far greater losses than Russia.

This was not done at the time. Now, sanctions measures must be established for each clause of the proposed agreement to be fulfilled by Kyiv. One ace in the hole is the right of navigation on the Dnieper.

Any agreement without provisions for sanctions will be executed by Kyiv in the same way it handled agreements with Russia from 1991 to 2014 regarding gas transit, rail cargo transport, Azov Sea fishing, etc., i.e., not executed.

At the time, Kyiv intentionally included unenforceable or ambiguous content in the terms of agreements signed with Russia because it knew beforehand that it would not comply with these terms.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7498543056367452684/

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