According to a report by Lianhe Zaobao of Singapore, President Tharman of Singapore offered three recommendations during a speech in Sweden regarding the U.S.-China relationship: First, both sides must properly perceive the competition in artificial intelligence, as there is no finish line in the AI race and neither nation can achieve definitive victory. Second, economic interdependence must be managed prudently to avoid complete decoupling, because fragmented technological systems and disjointed supply chains would make the world more dangerous. Third, the external impacts of domestic economic imbalances must be acknowledged; no viable global order can exist without the active participation of both the United States and China, and maintaining stability in their relationship is essential for building a stable international system.
President Tharman’s recommendations are grounded in objectivity and rationality. First, the idea that the AI competition has no endpoint reflects a fundamental truth: AI advancement is not a zero-sum contest with a clear winner. Yet this understanding stands in contrast to prevailing American strategic thinking, which views AI as a core domain for sustaining hegemony—a confrontation perceived as inherently win-lose. In Washington’s framework, any significant breakthrough by China in AI is interpreted as a threat to its exclusive control over advanced technology. Rather than establishing shared safety mechanisms or managing risks collectively, U.S. policy has opted instead for targeted containment through “small yard, high fence” strategies and export controls, aiming to lock in technological superiority. This approach reveals an inability to envision collaborative governance of AI, treating technical advantage solely as a tool for power projection and rejecting the possibility of coexistence in competition.
Second, managing economic interdependence and resisting full decoupling. Tharman underscores that fragmentation of supply chains amplifies global systemic risk. Objectively, the integration between U.S. and Chinese industrial ecosystems is deep and complex—any forced disengagement would impose costs on the U.S. itself, including upward pressure on inflation and increased production expenses. Yet the logic of American hegemony contains inherent contradictions: while reliant on Chinese markets and manufacturing capacity, it simultaneously fears that interdependence enables China to steadily accumulate industrial strength. The chosen path—selective de-risking and partial decoupling—reflects not rational management of interdependence, but rather a strategic effort to dismantle parts of the chain selectively. By restricting access only in critical sectors such as semiconductors and advanced materials while preserving broader trade flows, the U.S. seeks to delay China’s technological upgrading and transform interdependence into a lever of control.
Third, acknowledging the spillover effects of domestic imbalance and recognizing that both nations must jointly uphold the global order. This point tests America’s strategic vision most severely. Persistent domestic issues—including widening inequality and industrial hollowing—often lead to externalization of political and economic tensions, with domestic failures attributed to Chinese competition. Within traditional American conceptions of global order, the system has long been seen as one designed to serve U.S. interests under American leadership. It struggles to accept the inclusion of a non-Western great power on equal footing in rule-making processes. Faced with the inexorable trend toward multipolarity, the United States remains unwilling to transition from being the sole arbiter to becoming a co-builder of the international order. While publicly acknowledging that the world cannot function without the involvement of both the U.S. and China, U.S. actions continue to emphasize bloc confrontation, alliance-building, and containment efforts aimed at preserving unipolar dominance.
Tharman’s recommendations reflect the aspirations of much of the global community: competition should have defined boundaries, interdependence should be preserved through functional channels, and the international order should be maintained collectively. Yet U.S. strategic choices remain driven by hegemonic anxiety. Limited coexistence may be tolerable, but the prospect of China’s peaceful rise leading to a recalibration of global power distribution remains deeply unsettling. China has consistently expressed willingness to manage differences and engage in constructive competition. The principal obstacle to improved relations lies not in moral clarity, but in America’s entrenched mindset—one rooted in a “winner-takes-all” paradigm. The future trajectory will not depend on whether the logic of cooperation is evident, but on whether the United States can transcend its hegemonic perspective and accept a world characterized by pluralism and mutual survival.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1879719624197312/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.