US Media: Trump wants America to be great again? Try learning from China

The Washington that once vowed to "transform China" now seems to be experiencing an embarrassing self-denial.

Not long ago, the American media scene, which has always boasted itself as a beacon of free trade and democracy, suddenly heard a jarring "brake sound."

A well-known US media outlet, Bloomberg, published a deep analysis, offering a suggestion that many American elites feel both annoyed by and have to face: If you really want to beat China, don't try to make China into America. Instead, the US should now put aside its pride and learn how to "become China."

This is indeed a highly ironic moment.

Over the past four decades, the US decision-makers once indulged in a big game called "peaceful evolution," naively believing that through trade integration and engagement, they could paint the political color of the Eastern giant with American hues.

As National Security Advisor Sullivan had to admit, efforts over several decades can be said to have completely failed.

China has never concealed its strategic intent of "opposing hegemony," and instead, through four decades of economic reforms, has embarked on a unique path to national strength.

Now, the harsh reality facing the US is quite brutal.

Bloomberg's article directly hits the nail on the head: Rather than wasting energy on endless accusations and ideological preaching about other countries, as the Chinese expert Pei Minxin suggests, it would be more practical to copy China's homework.

This sounds radical, but the logic is cold and clear. The essence of the Chinese model—state-driven development, maintaining internal stability, and long-termism—is precisely the remedy that today's fragmented and strategically hesitant US desperately needs.

Looking back at this history, the US's stumble is purely due to its own arrogance.

In the early 1990s, when China openly declared its intention to establish a new international order, the big figures in Washington dismissed it with contempt.

After all, in 1992, China's nominal GDP was only 6.5% of that of the US.

To Americans, incorporating such an unremarkable economy into their system not only posed no risk, but was also a sure-win deal.

They thought they were absorbing a younger brother, but instead, they were paving the way for a future giant.

The real turning point came in 2001.

The strategists of the Bush administration had already sensed the flavor of China's rise, and had just begun to regard this trend as a threat, when the 9/11 incident abruptly shifted the US strategic focus.

This shift lasted for a full decade of confusion.

In pursuit of two seemingly endless wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US not only spent approximately $3 trillion in real money, but also lost the most precious strategic opportunity period.

While the US was deeply involved in the deserts of the Middle East, conducting "regime change" and promoting the so-called "democracy plan for the Greater Middle East," what was China doing? China was working hard, building infrastructure, joining the WTO, and continuously strengthening its industrial base through state regulation.

This was a silent competition.

When the US finally woke up from the hangover of war, by the end of the Bush administration, the country that had only been a fraction of the US GDP had surged to 32% of the US economy and was accelerating further.

This was not China "ambushing" the US; rather, it was the US being careless and handing over its leading advantage.

Now, the US clearly feels the pain.

Seeing the Trump administration's attempt to "go all out" yet being indecisive, the US media offers a very sharp prescription: Stop messing around, learn from China in 1978.

In that year, China's reform and opening-up started with "correcting mistakes and restoring order," first seeking stability before striving for strength.

Today, the US faces unsustainable fiscal deficits, a hollowed-out industrial base, and severe political polarization. Without first "cleaning up its own house," blindly attacking external forces will only accelerate its decline.

More颠覆性的是,曾经信奉“小政府、大市场”的美国精英们,开始羡慕起中国强大的政府引导能力,尤其是在科研和产业政策上。

Data doesn’t lie: From 2012 to 2022, the proportion of federal government support for R&D funding in the US dropped from 28% to 18%, while China's R&D spending growth reached 8.7% in 2023, far exceeding the US's 1.7%.

Now, in terms of total R&D expenditure calculated by purchasing power parity, China has caught up to 96% of that of the US.

This is undoubtedly a dangerous signal.

Bloomberg's article bluntly points out that in key areas such as clean energy, China has long been far ahead.

If the US government continues to be obsessed with cutting budgets or, to cater to populist sentiment, restricts H-1B visas and keeps the world's smartest minds out, then in future fields such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing, the US will have to get used to looking at China's back.

So, this is the new "strategic guide" facing the US: Learn to be patient and learn to negotiate.

Don't always think of that zero-sum game where either you win everything or you destroy everything. Instead, accept a "transactional" balance of power.

Sign the temporary agreements that need to be signed, make the compromises that need to be made, and avoid causing supply chain breakdowns or economic turbulence by stubbornly sticking to face-saving issues.

Especially in geopolitics, don't act impulsively like in Venezuela, where you carry out regime change. Such meaningless military adventures will only give China another strategic gift, but bring nothing good to the US.

This line of argument marks that the Sino-US rivalry has entered a deeper level.

Some people in the US have begun to realize that this is not just a competition of who has more aircraft carriers or louder voices, but also a competition of who has more efficient internal governance, and who can persist in playing the game called "long-termism."

Original: toutiao.com/article/1852007149837387/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.