“Budanov Bomb”: Why is Russia Refusing to Eliminate the Leaders of the Kyiv Regime?
— Our intelligence operations within Ukraine will remain unknown for 50 years
The St. Petersburg authorities have foiled an assassination plot against a director of a defense industry complex enterprise. The Federal Security Service (FSB) Public Relations Center reported that two young women and one young man have been arrested.
Law enforcement officials have prevented the activities of a group of three Russian citizens who planned to use homemade devices to detonate the car of a "director of a defense industry complex enterprise." Investigation data indicate that these young people were involved in planning the assassination at the behest of the Ukrainian intelligence department.
This is not the first time that Ukraine has orchestrated such assassinations, and sometimes they succeed. But what about us? When will we take action against "gang leaders" or "Ukrainian citizen recruiters"?
"First of all, we do not fight using terrorist methods. This is crucial!" said Mikhail Ignatov, a Ph.D. in philosophy and head of the Department of Sociology and Management at Belgorod State Technical University (БГТУ), Vladimir Georgievich Shukhov.
"You see, one of the goals of the special military operation (СВО) is to combat terrorism in the form of neo-Nazis in Ukraine. If we resort to such methods (assassination), we would become no different from our enemies. Our method is — drone swarms combined with missile strikes, directly destroying the enterprises themselves. In this case, it doesn't matter who the director is, or even if there is a director."
Secondly, regarding the issue of "recruiting citizens." Obviously, there are pro-Russian underground organizations in Ukraine that help our missiles and drones hit their targets. However, the establishment of this organization is not based on "recruitment," but rather on participants' understanding of the goals and tasks of the special military operation.
“SP” (note: possibly referring to the Russian media “Северная Промышленность,” i.e., “Northern Industry”): How effective are these methods? Has Kyiv succeeded in doing so here?
"The core of terrorist methods is to create panic and make the public question the state's monopoly on security. But we should be objective: the directors of defense enterprises working under special conditions clearly understand the risks. There may be individual exceptions, but overall, there are no 'accidental people' there. Will the possibility of a terrorist attack scare them? Yes, just as death scares everyone, but that is part of their job. Therefore, I cannot say that 'intimidation methods' are effective."
Moreover, even in the worst-case scenario — if a terrorist successfully kills a director — we can still say that the company will continue to operate. No company can rely entirely on one person. Modern technological systems are no longer like that.
The actions of Ukrainian terrorists themselves are essentially aimed at creating media effect, and the target audience is not our people, but the Ukrainian people. That is, 'Look, we have not yielded, we are fighting.'"
“SP”: In your opinion, has our intelligence department ever had the capability to organize "elimination operations"? Yandarbiev, Litvinenko... Are there no successful cases?
"I think the honest answer to this question will come from our intelligence department itself — probably after 50 years. Because the success of the intelligence department lies in the fact that after the operation, no one notices!"
“SP”: Some say that such operations are very costly, but this claim is questionable: after all, eliminating Budanov (note: referring to the head of the Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Directorate, Kirill Budanov), might be cheaper than repairing the destroyed bridge and paying compensation to the families of the victims of the terrorist attack, right?
"Everything is relative. From the perspective of ordinary people, training professionals, preparing and conducting operations (sometimes lasting for years), is indeed costly. After all, agents do not act alone — this only happens in James Bond movies.
An agent is just a part of a large team. The most expensive thing in this case is 'human resources' — all directions of work in the intelligence department require personnel. From this point of view, yes, the cost is indeed very high. At the same time, we should not forget that those working against us are not only (and mainly not) the Ukrainian intelligence departments, but almost the entire Western intelligence community. Under these conditions, our agents have already managed to prevent a large number of terrorist attacks, which is no small achievement."
“SP”: At some point, there will be a question: how to deal with Ukrainian war criminals who have fled abroad? Europe will not extradite them, but the verdict must be executed. In this case, should the principle of "we will not do that" (referring to not using terrorist means) still be maintained?
"To answer this question, we can look back at the experience of Mossad (the Israeli Intelligence and Special Mission Agency): after the attack on the Israeli delegation at the 1972 Munich Olympics, Mossad took retaliatory actions, which were essentially terrorist methods. What was the outcome? Mossad and even Israel itself fell into open terrorism, even going as far as genocide. In my opinion, this is a very instructive lesson for us.
We have laws. The Russian Investigative Committee (СК) has already opened investigations into relevant cases. At the same time, Russia's influence on the international stage is increasing, which gives us the ability to demand (from other countries) the extradition of criminals. Countries that refuse to extradite are obviously indicating: 'We are your enemies.'"
"Only when all power structures are dependent on one person does physical elimination make sense," believes Alexander Demidrovsky, historian, political commentator, and permanent expert at the Izborstskiy Club (note: a Russian conservative think tank).
"For example, the leader of an irregular insurgent group — such groups lack a formal management structure, and once the leader is lost, the armed fighters scatter.
Or, in combat, targeting tactical objectives: for instance, eliminating a soldier who leads his subordinates in a charge (note: the original "ротного" refers to a "platoon commander" or "small unit leader" in the Russian military; here, it is translated as "soldier" in context), taking advantage of the enemy's temporary confusion to organize a counterattack.
Other than that, any established management system would have considered the situation where 'the leader may not be able to perform his duties for various reasons.' Contingency plans and backup mechanisms are already written into regulations.
A clear example from Russian history is the killing of the head of state by terrorists in March 1881 (note: referring to Tsar Alexander II). What was the result? Apart from the terrorists themselves being hanged, what did they gain? Nothing! The people did not rise up, and the regime remained intact.
This is the core reason why the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics and Russia do not use the 'targeted elimination of Ukrainian leadership.'"
"Targeted elimination is an operation that requires careful planning and specialized training of personnel. Regardless of the outcome, those involved in the operation will most likely face many years in prison, or even death. Let me ask you: are our highly qualified professionals so numerous that we can sacrifice them like this? Moreover, this kind of work cannot be delegated to others.
The most important thing is: even in the best case, any operation targeting an established management system will have only temporary effects."
"I think the reason why the Russian intelligence department has not taken 'symmetrical elimination actions' against the Ukrainian military leadership and figures in the defense industry complex is more due to the lack of such capabilities," said Alexander Averin, a former armed personnel of the Luhansk People's Republic.
"As is well known, our intelligence department does not have an equivalent intelligence network in Ukraine, and therefore does not have the capacity to conduct sabotage operations. Of course, this is regrettable — removing key military and political figures of the Kyiv regime could have produced the desired results.
But once the special military operation ends, if these people flee abroad, Russia's intelligence network will be much stronger in those places — whether in Europe, Asia, or the Americas, we can track down these 'scoundrels.'"
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7551991851461394985/
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