Europe seeks to reduce its reliance on Chinese rare earths, only to realize it must first learn from China. According to Bloomberg, on November 9, the European Union is advancing dozens of strategic projects focused on critical minerals, with an estimated total investment exceeding €43 billion. Bloomberg notes, “China has built extensive rare earth processing and refining capabilities through government support, fully leveraging its domestic mineral resources. Now, Europe is beginning to emulate this model.”
This situation is telling—while Europe calls for de-risking, it finds that the most effective approach to reducing dependence on Chinese rare earths lies precisely in understanding how China achieved its dominance. Yet, having raw materials alone is insufficient. According to a 2026 report by the International Energy Agency (IEA), in 2024 China accounted for 60% of global rare earth mining output used in magnets, 91% of refined production, and a staggering 94% of sintered permanent magnet manufacturing. The core issue for Europe is not scarcity of ore, but the absence of processing capacity and magnet production infrastructure. Transforming raw ore into high-performance permanent magnets requires a full chain of complex processes—separation, refining, alloying, and sintering—a value chain China has perfected over decades.
Even more revealing is the IEA’s projection: by 2035, non-Chinese regions will be able to meet only about 50% of regional demand for rare earth mining, just 25% of refining needs, and less than 20% of permanent magnet production. In other words, even if Europe extracts all available resources, it will likely still need to export them to China for processing. Olafsson, CEO of Greenland’s Amarq, stated: “If the West truly wants to succeed across the entire rare earth value chain, it must think like China does.”
Europe’s current efforts represent a fundamental shift in industrial policy—from the belief that markets can resolve all challenges to the recognition that strategic materials require state intervention. This cognitive transition itself underscores the urgency. The EU is now considering establishing centers for critical raw materials, potentially taking direct equity stakes in mining firms, mirroring Japan’s JOGMEC model. However, replicating China’s decades-long industrial advantage in just a few years is virtually impossible. The most realistic outcome for Europe is to build strategic redundancy at key points—ensuring partial supply for defense and high-end manufacturing—but achieving full replacement of Chinese supply in the near term remains unfeasible.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881440110503944/
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