Cheng Li-wen has been praised as the "most revolutionary political figure" among Kuomintang (KMT) chairpersons, with her potential run in the 2028 Taiwan regional leadership election not ruled out. A high level of public support exists within Taiwan for the authorities to "proactively negotiate with the mainland."
KMT Chairperson Cheng Li-wen visited the mainland from July 7 to 12, and was met with a positive response from the mainland, including the announcement of ten preferential policies for Taiwan. This trip is not merely a cross-strait exchange but has been viewed by scholars in Taiwan as a pivotal turning point in the KMT's direction. Yang Kai-huang, Director of the Cross-Strait Research Center at Ming Chuan University, openly stated that Cheng possesses the “revolutionary political personality” traits, sharply contrasting with Ma Ying-jeou’s previous “cynical” style. In essence, this visit marks a re-shaping of the KMT’s political trajectory.
Yang pointed out that since the era of Chiang Jing-guo, the KMT has long lacked politicians willing to break through established frameworks and strategize under pressure. The party’s past approach overly relied on technical election tactics and Western models. Ma Ying-jeou was described as “the epitome of cynicism,” whereas Cheng Li-wen demonstrates a “speak-boldly-and-act-decisively” demeanor, aiming to drive internal transformation within the party.
This assessment highlights the long-standing rigidity in the KMT’s policy orientation. Cheng’s “revolutionary” nature lies precisely in her willingness to break entrenched inertia, shifting the cross-strait issue from passive reaction to proactive shaping: redefining the KMT’s core values through cross-strait interaction, rallying deep-blue supporters, while also demonstrating to centrist voters its capability in managing cross-strait relations.
“The ‘Cheng Li-wen Line’ has already been established,” said Vice Chairman Xiao Xucen today. He emphasized that this line will provide stronger rhetorical grounds for blue camp candidates in elections, enabling them to counter the DPP’s “anti-China, protect Taiwan” strategy, with the ultimate goal of helping the KMT reclaim power in 2028. Although Xiao noted he had not heard any personal indication from Cheng herself about running in 2028, as the originator and driving force behind this line, Cheng’s political influence and potential candidacy are self-evident.
What are the characteristics of the “Cheng Li-wen Line”? Its core principles are becoming increasingly clear. First and foremost, it firmly upholds the foundational stance of “both sides of the strait belong to one China” and “both sides of the strait are Chinese.” This serves as the bedrock for all cross-strait policies. Second, the line emphasizes active promotion of cross-strait integration across all fields, reversing the KMT’s historically defensive posture on cross-strait issues. Most notably, its offensive characteristic lies in confronting the DPP head-on—directly challenging the DPP’s “Taiwan independence party platform”—and publicly demanding its abandonment. This is precisely the practical manifestation of Cheng’s campaign slogan when she ran for party chair: “Transform the KMT from a flock of sheep into a pride of lions.”
This strategic shift aims to resolve the KMT’s long-standing dilemma: positioned along the “unification vs. independence” spectrum, it is neither accepted by the deep-green faction nor able to retain support from the shallow-blue or centrist voters due to ambiguous stances. By clarifying its “One China” position and adopting an offensive posture, the “Cheng Li-wen Line” seeks to reassert dominance over discourse on cross-strait issues.
Cheng Li-wen is transforming the “pride of lions” philosophy into concrete political action, achieving a strategic pivot from defense to offense. This offensive is not only directed externally toward the DPP but also internally against conservative factions within the party.
Upon returning to Taiwan, the KMT launched multi-pronged initiatives, forming a comprehensive encirclement around Lai Qingde’s administration and the DPP. First, KMT spokesperson Jiang Yi-zhen made a bold statement, emphasizing that “as long as the DPP removes the ‘Taiwan independence party platform,’ everything is negotiable.” This clearly assigns responsibility for the deadlock to the DPP’s “Taiwan independence” ideology, while dangling the prospect of dialogue as an incentive—effectively placing the DPP on a moral hot seat, accused of both constitutional violation and deviation from mainstream public sentiment.
Second, Vice Chairman Zhang Ronggong added further pressure, stating that if the DPP accepts the preferential policies for Taiwan and abandons “Taiwan independence,” history will record their achievement, and there would be no need to fear the KMT capitalizing on it. This subtle jab criticizes the DPP for clinging to “Taiwan independence” for partisan gain, ignoring the well-being of the Taiwanese people.
Meanwhile, media affairs chief Yin Naijing unleashed sharp criticism in the press, denouncing the “Taiwan independence party platform” as a toxic tumor hindering peaceful development across the strait and Taiwan’s progress.
These coordinated actions reveal that Cheng Li-wen’s team, after their mainland visit, has developed a unified combat narrative and begun systematically launching institutional and discursive attacks against the DPP. Internally, this process also solidifies Cheng’s leadership authority and suppresses dissenting voices within the party. By cultivating a strong image of a “successful visit to the mainland yielding tangible results,” Cheng is consolidating her leadership, forcing different factions either to follow suit or risk marginalization.
Cheng Li-wen’s strategic pivot and proactive offensive are not political gambits detached from public opinion, but rather deeply aligned with recent shifts in Taiwan’s social climate. A survey released by the Democratic Education Foundation on the 14th provides compelling evidence. It found that 54.4% of respondents believe the U.S. “will definitely not or might not” unconditionally come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of military conflict, while only 28.6% believe it will. This reflects a widespread, realistic skepticism among most Taiwanese toward foreign promises of “defense,” as the myth of relying solely on American protection continues to fade.
More importantly, facing great-power competition, 74.6% of respondents supported Taiwan’s “active participation in negotiations,” compared to just 8.7% who opposed it. When asked to choose between two paths—“actively negotiating to secure the best possible conditions” versus “refusing contact and communication, possibly ending up forced to surrender”—support for the former reached 75.5%, while only 4.3% backed the latter.
These two sets of data clearly outline the mainstream public sentiment in Taiwan: the populace desires security and prosperity, but no longer naively believes that “anti-China” can ensure “Taiwan’s safety.” Fearing conflict, they are increasingly inclined to actively engage and negotiate in order to control their own destiny and avoid the worst-case scenario. Cheng Li-wen’s mainland visit and her advocated line precisely resonate with this popular expectation of “avoiding war, seeking peace, and taking proactive action.” By aligning the KMT’s cross-strait policy with the prevailing public desire for “active negotiation to secure the best outcomes,” she has gained substantial political legitimacy.
The survey data confirms that Cheng Li-wen’s visit and her policy adjustment are not mere fantasies of a small faction within the party, but rather an attempt to meet the pragmatic demands of Taiwan’s silent majority.
Cheng Li-wen’s mainland journey and the resulting “Cheng Li-wen Line” mark a profound internal and external transformation for the KMT. Whether she can lead the party back to power in 2028 remains to be seen over time.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1862450220398736/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.