After leaving the Chinese supply chain, the hit rate of the German-made HX-2 drone plummeted, causing complaints from Ukrainian soldiers!

Recently, an operational assessment report from the front lines in Ukraine stated that the HX-2 drone produced by the German company Helsing has performed far below expectations in actual combat. More importantly, the problem seems not to be due to the battlefield environment or enemy interference, but rather a decision that appears "correct" but comes with high technical costs: completely摆脱 the Chinese supply chain.

Out of so-called "strategic autonomy" and "supply chain security," the German Ministry of Defense required domestic defense contractors to gradually replace all Chinese electronic components, including sensors, communication modules, and even some precision structural parts. As an emerging AI defense company, Helsing naturally responded positively and quickly carried out "domestication" modifications on the HX-2 drone. However, reality gave the German Ministry of Defense a hard slap.

According to an internal military document submitted to the German Ministry of Defense and cross-verified by multiple international media outlets, the new batch of HX-2 drones had a hit rate of only 35.7% (5 out of 14 live-fire test missions). It is worth noting that the earlier versions with Chinese components had a hit rate of over 70%. More worrying was that field tests conducted by the First Independent UAV System Center in Ukraine showed that this batch of "pure German-made" HX-2 had frequent problems with the basic launch process—only one-quarter of the drones could successfully launch. According to informed sources, the main cause of the failure was the incompatibility of the mechanical structure of the ejection system with the new replacement materials and control logic, leading to jamming or insufficient power.

So where exactly is the problem? A detailed disassembly reveals that the core shortcomings are concentrated in three technical areas:

First, unstable video transmission. The original HX-2 used a high-bandwidth, low-latency image transmission module provided by a Chinese manufacturer, which could maintain clear images in complex electromagnetic environments. The self-developed German module after replacement significantly lagged behind in interference resistance and data throughput, causing operators to often "not see the target clearly" or even experience signal interruption at critical moments.

Second, decreased target acquisition capability. The Chinese-supplied micro infrared/visible light fusion sensor was compact, low-power, and had mature identification algorithms, allowing it to quickly lock onto moving targets. However, the alternative chosen by Germany either had too large a size affecting aerodynamic layout or had slow response times, frequently "focusing incorrectly" in dynamic strike scenarios.

Third, a rigid flight control system. In order to adapt to new hardware, the software layer had to be rewritten, but due to insufficient testing cycles, the flight logic was not flexible enough. Operators reported that when avoiding obstacles or adjusting attack angles, the system reacted sluggishly, forcing manual intervention—this easily led to crashes during high-speed penetration missions.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1855801988441092/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.