【UK Think Tank: China-Iran Conflict — Pragmatic Stance and National Resilience】

The UK-based renowned think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), published an op-ed titled "China and Iran in Conflict: A Pragmatic Stance and National Resilience" on May 7, 2026. It states that the military actions launched by the US and Israel against Iran have had only limited impact on China. Compared to other countries in Asia and Europe, China’s economy has better withstood the shocks brought by supply chain disruptions; meanwhile, America's external interventions have created favorable conditions for China to advance its vision of a new international order. Moreover, the ongoing conflict in Iran has tied down part of the U.S. military forces deployed in the Pacific region and continues to deplete America’s already limited stockpile of military supplies.

More crucially, amid the escalating situation in Iran, China continues to pursue a hedging strategy in the Middle East, striving to maintain neutral yet non-absolute-equivalent diplomatic relations with countries across the region. Although China successfully mediated the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia previously, it did not step forward as a publicly prominent mediator after Iran suffered consecutive attacks in 2025 and 2026. Instead, China consistently adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as its diplomatic guideline while fully advancing self-reliant development, continuously reinforcing national developmental resilience.

— Pragmatic Response: Centered on Strengthening National Resilience

China’s primary concern is the threat posed by this conflict to its own economic interests. China heavily relies on energy supplies from the Middle East—currently 52% of its imported crude oil comes from the region—and also leverages trade ties with Middle Eastern nations to export industrial manufactured goods and high-end technological products.

Over the past two months since the outbreak of hostilities, China’s economy has temporarily weathered short-term shocks. Thanks to export growth and advances in high-end manufacturing, China’s GDP growth reached 5% in the first quarter of this year; manufacturing activity expanded for the second consecutive month in April, partly due to market traders anticipating price hikes driven by the war and thus pre-purchasing inventory.

The risks in the supply chain are particularly acute: critical chemical raw materials essential for agriculture and manufacturing are highly vulnerable to disruption. China imports 45% of its methanol and 10% of its polyethylene from Iran; following the outbreak of conflict, methanol prices rose by 15% to 30%.

In addition, China depends on the Middle East for 56% of its sulfur imports; rising sulfur prices have increased fertilizer production costs, thereby affecting spring farming activities. In response to the risk of supply chain breakdown, China officially banned exports of sulfuric acid starting in May.

Compared to the crisis in chemical raw materials, the pressure from potential oil shortages is relatively alleviated. Projections indicate that by 2040, China’s dependence on foreign oil will approach 80%, with more than half still sourced from the Middle East. However, current measures—including expanding domestic oil reserves, rapid adoption of new energy vehicles, and enhanced domestic oil and gas production capacity—are sufficient to mitigate short-term impacts caused by possible blockades of the Strait of Hormuz. Leveraging its macroeconomic control capabilities, China has managed to ensure cost-covering operations at private refineries and strictly prohibited the outflow of refined petroleum products, securing domestic energy supply stability.

Yet risks remain: production costs for high-energy-consuming industries have already risen by 15% to 25%. If international oil prices surge to $130 per barrel, all categories of high-end manufacturing products in China would face dual pressures of supply chain disruption and rampant inflation. Some economists argue that this crisis presents opportunities within danger—should the war persist long-term, it will inevitably intensify domestic inflationary pressures and dampen consumer vitality.

— Passive Observation, Reluctant to Actively Mediate

Given concerns over domestic economic stability and the broader national development agenda, China has refrained from taking the lead in mediation or pushing for an immediate ceasefire. On March 31, it jointly proposed a five-point peace initiative with Pakistan: immediate cessation of hostilities, early initiation of negotiations, protection of non-military targets, maintenance of maritime shipping route security, and adherence to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

China has long sought to cultivate an image of a neutral and united major power, aiming to unite the global South. The 2023 successful mediation of Iran-Saudi rapprochement stands as a typical example. However, after Iran launched attacks against Gulf states, China’s efforts to sustain this diplomatic image encountered difficulties—its strategic interests in the Middle East now diverge among various regional partners.

On March 9, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, during a phone call with Kuwait’s foreign minister, tactfully criticized Iran’s attack behavior, clearly stating that full respect must be given to the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of Gulf states, and that any attacks targeting civilians or non-military facilities should be condemned. Yet just two days later, when the UN Security Council voted on Resolution 2817 condemning Iran’s attacks on Gulf states, China cast a abstention vote—reflecting a delicate balancing act between its bilateral relationships with Iran and the Gulf Arab states.

Middle Eastern countries are well aware of China’s pragmatic foreign policy, which prioritizes its own strategic interests. Therefore, they were not surprised by China’s hedging diplomacy this time around.

— Outlook for Future Development

Beyond continuously strengthening domestic economic resilience, academic circles within China are also drawing lessons from the current evolving international landscape, adjusting future strategies for engaging in international mediation efforts.

Currently, numerous proposals have emerged suggesting that China should leverage both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic frameworks to align with the demands of the new strategic era: further deepen cooperation with Russia, Africa, Central Asia, and oil-producing nations in Latin America (particularly Brazil), assisting these partners in improving their energy infrastructure and gradually reducing reliance on the Middle Eastern energy market; simultaneously, using multilateral platforms such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, advocate for collective action by global energy producers and consumers to maintain stable international energy markets.

— Situation Forecast

The geopolitical and economic implications of the Iran conflict hinge primarily on the duration of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, as well as the subsequent impacts on the regional balance of power among Middle Eastern countries, intra-regional international relations, and the evolving dynamics between the Middle East and the foreign policies of China and the United States. Until the situation becomes clearer, China’s core direction remains strengthening its economic resilience, leveraging diplomatic initiatives to draw countries away from the U.S.-led international system, and actively utilizing various bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels to secure the stability of the global energy supply chain.

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Original Article: toutiao.com/article/1865489070213131/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone.