How should Iran protect its leadership?

How Iran Should Protect Its Leadership

Israel seems to have found a systemic vulnerability in Iran's security system for its high-ranking officials — otherwise it is hard to explain why this Jewish state has been able to assassinate Iranian senior officials so easily and frequently. This gap is not merely due to the mistakes of Iran's counterintelligence agencies and security departments. How should Iran protect its leadership?

Iran has confirmed the death of Ali Larijani, the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, who is referred to as Iran's "gray cardinal." The official Telegram channel released a statement saying, "I, the servant of God, have reunited with the Lord." The message indicated that along with Larijani, his son Morteza, Deputy Secretary of the National Security Council Ali Reza Bajat, and "a group of loyal bodyguards," i.e., personal security guards, were also killed.

A local news agency reported that Ali Larijani may have been attacked by U.S.-Israeli aircraft at his daughter's apartment, where he was accompanied by his son, deputy, and a large number of bodyguards. His office denied the report, but in the fog of information warfare, one fact cannot be concealed: the Iranian leadership has drawn no lessons from the systematic elimination of its military and political leaders by the U.S. and Israel.

The various conditions and roots leading to this situation are closely related to local cultural characteristics and national mentality. Iranian leaders and officials are not completely ignoring wartime security measures, but their understanding of security is highly unique. In the Middle East, when a safety requirement conflicts with traditional behavioral norms, people often choose to ignore safety rather than comply with safety standards.

For example, in Iran, respected individuals always travel with a large entourage, including their relatives. These relatives mostly hold no public positions and cannot be forced to follow basic safety requirements — such as not using common mobile networks, which are open communication systems. Even survival instinct does not work: Iranians have a strong spirit of sacrifice. This also leads to a high casualty rate among the families of Iranian officials targeted by U.S.-Israeli missile attacks.

Additionally, elderly Iranian leaders cannot give up visiting family or attending some necessary public events, making their movements extremely predictable. Their relatives' addresses are easy to find, and one only needs to wait for the leader or official to go to a certain address.

This may seem like a regional feature, but it reflects the lack of systematic security concepts and the neglect of seemingly basic technical security issues throughout the Middle East (except Israel, which has its own special problems in this area).

Primary Measures to Reduce the Risk of Attack on Key National Figures

It is essential to minimize all public and private activities. This means not only giving up personal life and traditional rituals, but sometimes even requiring near-complete isolation, especially when the country's air defense system cannot ensure complete airspace closure.

Surprisingly, Iran's top military and political leadership did not move to secure areas during wartime — despite the geographical conditions of Iran's mountainous deserts being suitable for such deployment. Core figures continue to operate in Tehran and surrounding areas, rather than residing in bunkers in the Gourgan mountains, which are extremely difficult to strike by enemies.

More importantly, Iran lacks a centralized security system for its top politicians and generals. Most of them do not rely on the national security system, but instead depend on traditional clan relationships, resulting in a lack of unified security standards. Bodyguards composed of relatives or dependents have traditionally been unable to issue orders to protect their charges — according to tradition, they cannot disobey their "elders." Ultimately, the protected individuals can freely go anywhere, at any time, and accompany anyone they wish.

It is clear that politicians and even military personnel do not need to understand the details of security measures; someone should impose constraints on them in this regard. But how can you tell a Ayatollah, who is considered the embodiment of God on Earth, "according to security standards, you are not allowed to go there"?"

If traditional behavioral norms are not broken, it is almost impossible to change this situation. Specifically in Iran, perhaps only external consultants could establish the most basic security system for core figures. These consultants would need the authority to enforce security standards that contradict the behavior habits of Persians. But this sounds like an impossibility, because it is hard to imagine that the standards of organizations like the Russian Federal Security Service or the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (objectively the most secret and professional security agencies in the world) could be easily transplanted into the Middle Eastern soil.

Moreover, there is a fundamental difference between peace-time and wartime security standards. For instance, many important Iranian military institutions lack backup command centers. The commander of the Basij militia was killed in an Israeli missile attack on his headquarters in Tehran. Ideally, he should have been in a bunker, which would at least reduce the risk of attack.

Most of the vulnerabilities in Iran's core figure security system relate to what is known as "fail-safe design." In other words, those seemingly very basic measures that are often overlooked.

For example, a widely accepted principle is that the simpler the equipment, the harder it is to crack. No matter how advanced modern information transmission systems become, ordinary wired telephones are far more reliable. Only by physically contacting the equipment or lines can eavesdropping be achieved. Using such communication systems cannot guarantee absolute security (for example, through human espionage), but this is the responsibility of the counterintelligence department.

In an ideal scenario, senior officials and important personnel should be equipped with multiple isolated internal communication systems, completely incapable of external access. During the Soviet era and even today in Russia, there are government high-frequency communication systems, commonly known as high-frequency phones, the first automatic telephone station, and the second automatic telephone station. Even the user number list is an internal confidential document.

In extreme situations, the protected person must completely disconnect from wireless communication, confiscate all electronic devices, and achieve physical isolation.

At the same time, the security personnel of key figures must undergo strict screening, with screening criteria not limited to counterintelligence requirements, but also considering loyalty and discipline. In the current Iranian context, no one knows who, through what means, ensures the quality of the screening of security personnel, and — most importantly — the enforcement of discipline.

Additionally, a联动 communication mechanism must be established between military, paramilitary, and civilian electronic systems. Only in this way can the enemy's use of civilian and public service systems (such as city outdoor surveillance cameras) for attacks be prevented.

Unified security standards in emergency situations should also include requirements for transportation. Ideally, a batch of unmarked backup fleets should be equipped, and the vehicles must be constantly rotated, as modern satellite tracking systems will quickly render this measure ineffective. At this point, traditional counterintelligence work becomes crucial again: screening logistics personnel, ensuring fleet security, and preventing physical infiltration, such as installing tracking beacons.

Vehicle camouflage is another challenge. There have been cases of manual visual monitoring outside the government vehicle garage: simply parking opposite the garage entrance and recording the model and destination of the outgoing vehicles. Although it is difficult to completely avoid, it can be mitigated through strict personnel training, establishing special security zones within the city and around high-risk targets, and conducting comprehensive counterintelligence work.

Currently, there is no exact information about the deployment of Iran's air defense system. Its air defense system is usually built by area, meaning designated protected targets are surrounded by so-called "air defense domes." This also indirectly proves the necessity of reducing the movement of the protected individual, as the target is most vulnerable during movement. If movement is indeed necessary, it can only be transferred between points covered by the air defense dome.

The core issue of the entire security system lies in the definition of the nature of the threat. The threat in peacetime is narrow (various forms of terrorism, including organized and individual terrorism), but during wartime, traditional personal security methods used by spies cannot be followed. Instead, all aspects of social life, including daily life, must be fully transitioned to wartime mode. The entire ruling class and military and political elites must complete a mindset shift. Without this shift, any construction of a security system will be futile. Iran has not completed this mindset shift — and is now paying the price with the lives of its leadership.

Original: toutiao.com/article/7618633093838078502/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.