【Text by Observer Network Columnist Yang Zhi】
The word "Gipfel" has three meanings in German: "peak" in a geographical sense, "summit" or "high point" in an abstract sense, and "summit" as a political concept.
In a way, the more summits there are, the more problems and crises need to be addressed.
Internationally, issues are complex and continuous, so German Chancellor Merkel, who took office in May, has had to attend many summits, earning her the nickname "diplomatic chancellor" domestically.
For years, international conflicts have been on the rise (military conflicts, trade tariffs, etc.), and Germany's industries, which rely heavily on exports, have naturally not been immune. Combined with their structural issues, various summits have emerged domestically:
For example, the "Digital Summit" (Digitalgipfel) held in Frankfurt last October discussed how Germany and Europe, which have fallen behind, can catch up with the global trends of digitalization and artificial intelligence.
Last month on the 9th, the Berlin Chancellery hosted the "Automotive Summit" (Autogipfel), discussing how to get through the "winter" of the automotive industry and its supply chain. Almost simultaneously, the Dutch government intervened brutally in Nexperia, a Chinese company fully controlled by Wintek Technology, using "coercive means," triggering a near-disruption of the global supply chain known as the "Nexperia crisis," further worsening the situation for German automakers.
A month later, the Berlin Chancellery welcomed another "summit": On the 6th of this month, Chancellor Merkel personally chaired the "Steel Summit" (Stahlgipfel), bringing together senior representatives from the government, companies, unions, and multiple federal states. The main discussion focused on the challenges and future development paths faced by the steel industry, one of Germany's core industrial sectors.
After the Steel Summit, Chancellor Merkel and Klinke met with industry leaders at a press conference
Merkel emphasized that the German steel industry is facing a "crisis threatening survival" (high energy prices, environmental protection, U.S. tariffs, and international competition), calling for stronger trade protection at the EU level and promoting the use of European and German steel in the domestic market. In the face of multiple challenges from international competition and energy transition, Merkel called for stable energy supply and measures to reduce the burden on businesses. This summit was seen as a key political signal from the German government and the business sector seeking to strengthen the competitiveness of the domestic steel industry.
Against this backdrop, the German government recently announced the establishment of an annual mechanism for assessing dependence on China (Mechanismen zur Prüfung der Abhängigkeit Deutschlands von China). This decision is seen as a signal of the restructuring of Germany's economic strategy.
The background of the establishment of the "China Dependence Assessment Mechanism"
The creation of this mechanism was not a sudden whim of the German government but rather had prior groundwork.
Two years ago, the Union parliamentary group submitted a motion titled "Establishment of a Committee to Review the Economic Relations Between Germany and China with Security Significance" (20/9323) to the Bundestag and discussed it.
The motion suggested that the committee would consist of 19 members to examine "how to enhance the security and reliability of energy and raw material imports within the framework of national and European security in the context of changing trade and geopolitical environments and global competitive pressures," focusing on "value chains" (Wertschöpfungsketten), especially in energy and raw material imports, while also assessing "dependence" and "vulnerability." Furthermore, the committee would investigate existing and potential investments by Chinese investors in critical infrastructure sectors in Germany. The committee would also review economic and legal measures to implement a so-called "de-risking" (De-Risking) strategy, i.e., reducing dependencies on specific imported goods and certain export or sales markets.
The motion was eventually handed over to the Economic Committee (Wirtschaftsausschuss des Bundestags) for further consideration.
Last April 10th, the "Economic Committee" held an in-depth discussion on this matter. At the time, six invited experts unanimously believed that Germany's economic dependence on China was not as serious as commonly perceived or promoted.
· Julian Hinz, head of trade policy at Bielefeld University and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, stated that if one objectively examines the data, one finds that Germany's trade with China accounts for about 9% of its total foreign trade.
· Mikko Huotari, head of MERICS, pointed out that in areas without strategic dependence, most economic relations can still proceed smoothly. Unless it involves critical raw materials, Germany's relationship with China can still be assessed as positive.
· Even Tim Nicholas Rühlig, an expert nominated by the Green Party and a researcher on China, believed that trade with China "is largely unproblematic," but emphasized that clear boundaries must be drawn on key issues. He stated, "In recent years, we have achieved good results through cooperative policies."
· Friedolin Strack, head of the International Market Department at the German Industry and Trade Federation (BDI), pointed out that the BDI supports the "de-risking" approach, but believes that forcing companies to join a transparency system is not wise.
· Cora Francisca Jungbluth, senior expert for Asia-Pacific and China at the Bertelsmann Foundation, said that China itself is also implementing a de-risking strategy. "They call it 'Made in China 2025,' aiming to reduce dependence on foreign products while increasing dependence on China."
· Thomas König, head of the China Department at the German Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DIHK), called for greater attention to the local business environment in Germany. He emphasized, "We must take actions that are close to businesses because increasing bureaucratic burdens is not beneficial for competitiveness. Instead, we should reduce bureaucratic procedures to maintain Germany's competitiveness."
Discussion of Sino-German economic relations by the Economic Committee of the Bundestag
As can be seen, although politicians and media repeatedly warn of the "danger" posed by China, scholars and business representatives still considered the Sino-German trade to be beneficial as of last year.
Clearly, the current decision by the Merkel government to establish a committee is closely related to the downward trend of major German industrial enterprises and the instability of domestic and international situations.
The former is reflected in the various "summits" mentioned earlier, and the latter is rooted in broader changes in the international trade landscape: Tensions between the US and China continue to escalate in 2025, the energy crisis caused by the Ukraine war has not yet subsided, and global supply chain risks are emerging constantly. As the largest economy in Europe, Germany faces strategic pressure from the US bloc and must balance its high dependence on the Chinese market.
With the determination of the Sino-German trade assessment mechanism, Berlin's political and economic direction has undergone a fundamental shift. Previously, Germany took market efficiency as the highest standard for economic governance; now, this standard is being replaced by "risk identification" and "security awareness" of protectionism.
On the surface, the German government seems to be responding to the concerns of the industry about the vulnerability of supply chains, but in reality, it shows that Berlin has lost confidence in Western control of globalization. The German government is trying to alleviate its own geopolitical anxiety by institutionalizing ways to test its openness limits and redefine its relationship with China and globalization. This is not just a simple policy adjustment, but a rethinking of security, trust, and future cooperation.
Merkel has repeatedly stated publicly that policies centered on free trade are "no longer able to cope with the current tense geopolitical environment" and that it is necessary to take "national interests and economic security" as the guiding principle, strengthening trade protection and industrial security, which is particularly evident in her support for increasing import tariffs on steel from China.
To put it plainly, in order to deal with the current crisis, Germany is willing to adopt measures it used to disdain and strongly criticize: supporting domestic enterprises through subsidies to enhance competitiveness and building protective barriers abroad to "protect its own interests." In short, Germany is gradually moving away from "globalization" and turning towards protectionism.
Why does the mainstream narrative in Germany "distrust, guard against, and oppose" China?
Is the establishment of the risk assessment committee on China by the Merkel government a concentrated embodiment of "distrusting, guarding against, and opposing" China?
According to normal logic, a country like Germany, which is completely dependent on the outside world, should try to maintain good relations with all countries, especially with the US, Russia, and China, which are crucial to people's livelihood and security. It is perplexing that since Merkel left power, both governments have taken the opposite approach from the traditional pragmatic one.
After observing and analyzing, the following are the main internal and external reasons:
Externally, the Ukraine war and the Sino-US competition play a decisive role.
Shoals, who was full of ambition, soon after taking office in 2021, the Ukraine war "unexpectedly" broke out. His "traffic light" coalition government took a stance of supporting Ukraine. However, there were differences in the coalition's attitude towards aiding Ukraine: the Greens, who started with pacifism, and the Free Democrats (FDP), who were liberal, were relatively radical, while the Social Democratic Party (SPD), traditionally somewhat ambiguous in its relationship with Russia, was more cautious and followed the Biden administration in the US.
At the time, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led by Merkel, as the opposition party, harshly criticized the Shoals government for not providing enough aid to Ukraine, with radical statements coming one after another. Now, having taken over the Chancellery himself, the previous high-profile support for Ukraine could not be retrieved, so he had no choice but to persist stubbornly.
The ongoing Ukraine war, with no sign of peace
But supporting Ukraine is not just empty rhetoric; it is real money.
At the beginning of the war, two things surprised the West: first, the initially underestimated Ukraine showed considerable resilience and tenacity, and second, the initially overestimated Russian army did not achieve a quick victory. These two points led Western governments to misjudge that the war would not last long and that the pressure of aid would not be too great, so they actively supported and armed Ukraine.
Unfortunately, the Western camp saw a third and fourth misjudgment: they believed that their strong support for Ukraine and multiple rounds of sanctions against Russia would bring Putin back to the negotiating table, but they didn't expect that Moscow's temporary and emergency "wartime economy" mode operated surprisingly smoothly. Worse still, the Democratic Party's loss in the US election, which the EU had bet on, led to Trump's return with popular support.
Thus, the war, which has lasted more than three years, will continue. The financial pressure caused by Germany and other EU countries' aid to Ukraine remains high, and Putin pays no attention to them, maintaining a close relationship with Trump. Trump, instead of mediating, is either pressuring both sides. Merkel and other EU leaders cannot bring themselves to approach Putin, but they collectively rush to Washington, trying to flatter Trump to bind him to the Ukrainian war chariot, but with little success.
Thus, under the continued burning of taxpayers' money, Germany and the EU began to change their narrative, blaming Beijing for the continuation of the war, claiming that China's "dual-use products" and continued purchase of Russian oil and gas are the reasons why Putin continues to fight.
It must be pointed out that those spreading the narrative that "China is a helper for Putin's invasion of Ukraine" are not only politicians who cannot account to the public, but also mainstream media that do not have to answer to the public.
Up to now, their approach has been: when they thought the war would end soon, they excluded negotiations with Moscow, missing an opportunity; when they felt they couldn't win, they blamed Moscow for not wanting to negotiate, and even blamed other countries that hadn't joined them. China is thus "innocent also caught in the crossfire."
Another important external reason is Trump's trade wars against the globe and the strategic competition between the US and China.
Merkel complained on the night of her victory last year that Germany and the EU are suffering from a double squeeze from China and the US, and their situation is quite difficult. Unfortunately, as a "victim," the EU has performed poorly in solving the problem: instead of standing up with the self-proclaimed "strong single market" to defend globalization and multilateralism, the EU has hesitated and tried to sacrifice others' interests to gain Trump's "exemption" to protect itself.
But they ignored one thing: the rising "MAGA" movement in the US is actually a new crusade against the old continent - Europe. Trump said on November 10, during an interview with Fox News, "Many of our allies aren't really our friends. Our allies are taking advantage of us in trade more than China."
Regarding trade issues, Merkel and the EU, like in their stance on the Ukraine war, dare not speak out against Trump's America, but instead try to show off to China, which is culturally accustomed to "harmony as the highest virtue."
The "distrust, guard against, and oppose" of the mainstream narrative in Germany also has its internal reasons.
Since the late 1960s, the "leftists" have had a profound influence on all strata of German society. Their original intention may have been good, but their religious-like mission and stubbornness have elevated "political correctness" to a moral altar. A group of young people who once raised the "Red Book" and worshiped Mao are now the most active in questioning and opposing China; many members and politicians of the Green Party and the Social Democratic Party, as well as intellectuals and middle-class people, belong to this group.
Western media are the cradle of the "leftists," and they regard "critically examining power and the world" as their responsibility. Therefore, their media is filled with negative reports, and they never let go of anything that doesn't meet their moral standards. To demonstrate "justice," some media and journalists even resort to fabricating facts and misleading the public. A recent example is the BBC's "editing incident" regarding Trump.
Another example is that the German Foreign Minister, Wang Defu, recently had to cancel his visit to China due to the lack of willingness of the Chinese side to receive him. When the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged the German side to respect each other when dealing with bilateral relations, the German mainstream media ignored the fact that Wang Defu had previously made anti-China remarks when visiting neighboring countries of China, and supported their foreign minister, believing that canceling the visit to China was a necessary response to "disrespect for China."
"Europeans, defend your sacred property!" — a woodcut created by German painter Hermann Knackfuß in 1895, with the title given by Emperor Wilhelm II of the German Empire. The painting depicts the "threat from the East," representing the "Yellow Peril" theory.
The rejection of China by Germany's political elites and mainstream media is mainly ideological, whereas German companies and experts generally do not oppose cooperation and mutual benefit with China, as they value results and practical benefits. Politicians and media are different; they don't have to bear the risk of bankruptcy, so they speak freely without considering the consequences.
In fact, if you ask them why they doubt China, they can't give a proper reason, but they always talk about morality and the system. They say it's for the people's and the country's interests, but in reality, they are far from the people's real needs and interests. However, the Western system and atmosphere are like this: whoever occupies the moral high ground will be invincible.
Unfortunately, ordinary citizens fulfill their civic duties by voting, but the electoral system is like a "laboratory," where votes are various chemicals, and finally, it's unclear what kind of result is produced. If the government works well, politicians say it's because of their own ability; if the government fails, politicians say it's because the voters chose it themselves.
At this point, it might be worth mentioning a few prominent aspects of the German national character:
1. Influenced by religion (especially Protestantism) and reflections on the Nazi and East German authoritarian regime. Many of them have a "spiritual purism," with high moral standards, both for themselves and others. Therefore, they have a natural aversion to "arbitrary rule."
2. Deep down, they revere and believe in authority, so when politicians and media say that Russia cannot continue the war without China's dual-use products, the people truly believe it.
3. Naturally anxious, with a strong sense of foreboding, they think carefully about everything; they dislike disorder and are always worried about uncertainty and uncontrollable factors, so they are very planned and law-abiding, but they are also easily frightened. As a result, politicians say Huawei phones and devices are actually serving the Chinese government, and experts say Chinese-made electric vehicles on German roads can be remotely controlled by China, and they really believe it.
Understanding these characteristics may make it easier to understand and grasp Germany's handling of situations and the underlying logic of its "distrust, guard against, and oppose" toward China.
Conclusion
From a historical perspective in Europe, whenever the environment is turbulent and external risks increase, Germany's response model is to build new systems to restore order: the customs union of the 19th century, the establishment of the social market economy after the war, and the coexistence diplomacy during the Cold War are all variations of this logic. Today's "de-risking" is a continuation of this tradition.
Germany's situation is contradictory: it expects Europe to have strategic autonomy, but it cannot do without the US security framework; it wants to reduce risks with China, but it has to maintain cooperation; it emphasizes transparency and balance, but cannot escape its reliance on complex procedures.
From another perspective, "de-risking," although arising from "German anxiety," may force China to make better strategic adjustments, transforming from a passive reactor into a co-governance responsible party. China has significant technological and policy advantages in areas such as new energy, digital governance, and green finance, and can fully participate in standard-setting to enhance its collaborative influence.
In the end, the core of de-risking is not "risk," but "rationality." It reminds people that globalization is not a natural state, but a mode that needs careful governance. By replacing "emotional confrontation" with institutionalized assessments, Germany may be taking a cautious step, attempting to provide a new paradigm for international relations.
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