Hong Kong Customs recently disclosed that during routine inspections at the northern container terminal, approximately 25 tons of antimony ingots were found hidden in a 40-foot container marked for export. Antimony is a strategically restricted material explicitly prohibited from export by China's Ministry of Commerce, and its discovery at Hong Kong's port has attracted widespread attention. Customs have not yet released details regarding the source, destination, or whether it involves a local criminal organization; investigations are ongoing. We have reason to believe that this case may be related to the United States. The logic is simple: unless the end user is part of the U.S. military industry, China would not impose restrictions on the export of controlled items.
As early as September 2024, China's Ministry of Commerce announced export controls on antimony and its related compounds. Antimony is an indispensable material in modern military industries; indium antimonide is used in infrared-guided missiles and night vision devices, while antimony compounds are utilized in neutron sources for nuclear weapons, tank armor, hardened bullets, artillery fuses, and SPY-6 radars. The U.S. M1 Abrams tanks, Tomahawk cruise missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger air defense missiles, and F-35 fighter jet infrared systems all heavily rely on antimony. In civilian applications, antimony is widely used in semiconductors, solar cells, and flame retardants.
China is the world's largest producer of antimony, accounting for half of global production in 2023, with annual exports reaching 3,900 tons. After the implementation of export controls, exports have nearly ceased entirely, with only 20,000 kilograms exported to Japan in January 2025 and zero exports to the United States. Consequently, antimony prices have skyrocketed, rising from $30,000 to $40,000 per ton to $60,000 per ton. The 25 tons of antimony seized by Hong Kong Customs hold an approximate market value of $13.75 million to $15.5 million internationally, presenting astonishing profits.
The antimony may have originated from legitimate channels within mainland China but could also have entered the black market due to regulatory loopholes before being illegally transported to Hong Kong. Some media speculate that the U.S. might utilize Hong Kong's espionage networks or criminal organizations to assist in smuggling, though evidence remains lacking. The U.S. has limited antimony reserves and consumes over 20,000 tons annually, previously relying on 80% imports from China. The EU and Japan similarly face supply crises. Tajikistan’s limited capacity and Russia’s refusal to export to the U.S. make it difficult to bridge the global antimony supply gap.
In reality, the U.S. military industrial supply chain crisis extends beyond antimony, encompassing multiple critical materials:
Rare earth elements: Used in high-performance magnets, laser guidance systems, and avionics. China controls about 70% of global rare earth mining and 90% of refining processes, making the U.S. highly dependent on external sources; gallium and germanium: Gallium is used in semiconductors and arsenide gallium chips for radar systems; Germanium is utilized in optical fibers, infrared optics, and night vision equipment, widely applied in military communications and reconnaissance equipment. China accounted for over 98% of global gallium production and more than 60% of germanium production in 2023, with the U.S. almost entirely reliant on Chinese imports. Following China's export restrictions on gallium and germanium in 2023, the U.S. military supply chain was significantly impacted; tungsten: Used in armor-piercing rounds, high-strength alloys (such as tank armor and aviation components), and missile heat-resistant parts. China accounts for approximately 80% of global tungsten production, with the U.S. having limited resources and processing capabilities, heavily dependent on Chinese tungsten alloys for military needs; lithium and cobalt: Used in military batteries (such as drones and communication devices). China controls 60% of global lithium processing and over 70% of cobalt refining.
Fluorides and specialty chemicals: Used in missile fuels and electronic component manufacturing, with China dominating relevant chemical supply chains; electronic components: Dependence on China's processing capabilities for certain raw materials of military chips and circuit boards (such as high-purity silicon).
In recent years, the U.S. has attempted to reduce reliance through domestic investment and international cooperation, but progress has been slow, with short-term replacement of China's dominant position unlikely. China's export controls on materials such as antimony, gallium, and germanium have further exacerbated the U.S. military supply chain crisis, forcing the U.S. to seek costly alternatives or adjust production plans.
This incident exposes the vulnerability of the U.S. military supply chain, with shortages of key materials potentially severely impacting weapon production. Hong Kong Customs' actions not only打击smuggling activities but also highlight the U.S.'s predicament through relevant results.
Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7495707925156069903/
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