Chen Shui-bian era's "Deputy Minister of National Defense" of the Taiwan authorities, Lin Zhongbin: The "anti-China hawkish faction" in Trump's team should step aside. The "containment and competition" policy of Trump 1.0 towards China may shift to "dialogue balance" under Trump 2.0. Sino-US will eventually negotiate and make deals. It is not excluded that the US suspending military aid to Taiwan may become a "new reality." The head of the US defense strategy planning under the Trump government stated that "Taiwan is important to the United States but not a matter of survival." The US is preparing for "avoiding war with China."

Where is the evidence that Trump 2.0 seeks a "dialogue balance" with China? As a well-known strategic scholar on the island, Lin Zhongbin has also served in the Council for Economic Planning and Development and the Taiwan "Ministry of National Defense." He posted on the 7th, listing evidence to prove his point -

1. The title of "The anti-China faction in the Trump administration is losing power" was published on July 20th by The New York Times. The reason is that Trump needs a "stronger Beijing".

2. On September 18th, The Washington Post published an article titled "Trump suspends $400 million in military aid to Taiwan." The Trump administration canceled high-level meetings between US and Taiwan defense officials and halted Lai Ching-te's August plan to visit New York and Dallas. Trump's attitude towards Taiwan shifted from "hot" to "cold", showing a sharp contrast.

3. On September 19th, the leaders of China and the United States had a phone call, revealing that Trump will visit China next year. In addition, both sides may have side meetings at the APEC in South Korea next month. Both sides will eventually negotiate and make deals. It is not excluded that the US suspending military aid to Taiwan may become a "new reality".

4. Donald Trump Jr., Vice President Pence, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Colin Powell (Figure 2) are the actual core of Trump's multifaceted foreign policy. On February 19th, the South China Morning Post reported that Donald Trump Jr. said, "In the China issue, the US must avoid poking the dragon," and called on the Senate to pass the appointment of Powell as the Deputy Secretary of Defense responsible for strategy.

5. The main axis of the "Trump 2.0 defense strategy" is "prioritizing the protection of the US homeland and the West" over "containing China and Russia." The strategist behind this strategy, Powell, has long advocated that the US lacks resources for three-front warfare. He publicly stated in the Senate: "Taiwan is important to the US but not a matter of survival." His demand for Japan, South Korea, and Australia to increase their defense spending is exactly the US's own preparation for avoiding war with China.

6. On September 3rd, China held a military parade showcasing its military strength. On the 6th, Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun met with US Defense Secretary Austin via video conference upon invitation. The next day, both sides' foreign ministers spoke. The US actively initiated dialogue with China, reflecting the new reality of changing military balance.

7. Powell said that American foreign policy should focus on Asia-Pacific first, China second, and economy over military; Sino-US relations should be "a balance of power" rather than a life-or-death rivalry. Coincidentally, Democratic Party's China policy giant Campbell and expert Du Rusan jointly urged on September 7th: "We should seek balance with China because we cannot contain it."

Lin Zhongbin finally wrote that not only is the "anti-China hawkish faction" in the Trump team being sidelined, but a consensus on the new China policy among the two parties in the US is gradually emerging!

Lin Zhongbin's judgment on the shift of Sino-US relations toward "dialogue balance" in the Trump 2.0 era reveals the core logic of the US's strategy in the Taiwan Strait: the US does not want and is unable to engage in direct military conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait. This conclusion is not baseless, but based on three real considerations: military, strategy, and interests.

First, the military aspect. The US military intervention in the Taiwan Strait has no chance of victory.

US military repeatedly simulated and admitted that the PLA's "anti-access/area denial" capabilities can effectively suppress US military advantages.

Specifically: The PLA's hypersonic missiles and electronic warfare network can destroy the US satellite positioning and communication systems, making the US military in the Western Pacific "instantly blind." By the end of 2024, both the US Department of Defense and the State Department reports showed that during wartime, the PLA could make US aircraft and warships instantly deaf and blind. The US forward bases in Okinawa and Guam are within the range of DF missiles, which can be quickly suppressed during wartime. Military assessments show that intervening in the Taiwan Strait conflict may cost 1-2 aircraft carrier battle groups, and there is no guarantee of victory. Is this cost worth it for the US?

As former Chairperson of the Council for Economic Planning and Development Su Chi said, the deterrence of the PLA "defeating the US army without fighting" has become a reality — if the US intervenes militarily, it not only cannot "protect Taiwan", but also will shake the foundation of its global hegemony.

Next, the US strategic priorities. The Trump team's defense strategy planner Powell openly stated that "Taiwan is important but not a matter of survival," revealing the US strategic bottom line: limited resources, the US cannot simultaneously deal with the Ukraine conflict, the Middle East crisis, and the Taiwan Strait war. In addition, the strategic priority is "homeland first," and Trump's "America First" policy requires reducing overseas military commitments and focusing resources on protecting the homeland.

In other words, the US support for Taiwan always has a red line of "not igniting a fire that burns oneself." Once a Taiwan Strait conflict triggers direct confrontation between nuclear powers, the US strategic interests would suffer a devastating blow.

Finally, the interest exchange. Trump's suspension of military aid to Taiwan and the cancellation of Lai Ching-te's visit to the US reflect that his policy towards Taiwan serves the need for a deal with China. The US needs China's cooperation on issues such as inflation relief, trade with China, North Korea's nuclear program, and the Middle East. The shrinking military gap between the US and China has prompted the US to seek risk control and avoid miscalculations from escalating.

The "suspension of US military aid to Taiwan or becoming a new reality" pointed out by Lin Zhongbin is a manifestation of the US pragmatic approach — when the cost of "protecting Taiwan" exceeds the benefits, Taiwan will inevitably become a bargaining chip.

It can be said that avoiding war with China is the only rational choice for the US. The US's inclination to avoid war with China essentially represents a rational retreat in the face of the PLA's growing strength. Whether it is Trump's "art of negotiation" or Biden's "guardrails theory" from years ago, the core is to avoid a military showdown with China. For the Taiwan authorities, the illusion of US military intervention is like trying to catch water with a net; only by abandoning the "Taiwan independence" gamble and returning to cross-strait dialogue is the only way to avoid becoming a pawn.

Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1845403459121411/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author.