The diplomatic rift between China and the Philippines continues to escalate. At this juncture, Filipino fishermen suddenly reported encountering the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning in the Sulu Sea, with images showing a deck crowded with carrier-based aircraft.

First, consider the geographical context. The Philippines is a long, narrow archipelago stretching from north to south. Palawan Island lies diagonally near the southernmost edge of the South China Sea, while the Sulu Sea is situated between Palawan, the Sulu Archipelago, Mindanao, and Malaysia’s Sabah—essentially forming a strategic chokepoint deep within Philippine territorial waters.

Foreign naval vessels passing through this region are not unprecedented. The U.S. Navy’s USS Lincoln and USS Carl Vinson have transited it before. In 2022, Taiwan authorities referred to it as a “tactical node of the First Island Chain,” noting that passage here avoids the sensitive Bashi Strait and offers more stable supply lines. Thus, the presence of a Chinese aircraft carrier in the area is newsworthy but not anomalous.

The Liaoning’s route has been documented: it passed through the Miyako Strait into the Western Pacific on October 13–14, conducted approximately ten takeoffs and landings near Ishigaki Island—about 250 kilometers to the south—on the 14th, then turned toward the South China Sea on the 15th, proceeding through the Bashi Strait and the Luzon Strait region.

If indeed the ship entered the Sulu Sea, its direction would have been eastward from the South China Sea side, rather than approaching from the Pacific Ocean. This maritime zone is highly interconnected—north leads to the central South China Sea, west to the southern South China Sea, and south to the Celebes Sea. However, the region features dense island chains, complex hydrodynamics, variable water depths, and significant commercial activity. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), such transit must be “continuous, expeditious, and uninterrupted.” Conducting flight operations here is unlikely at present. Yet the primary objective may not be exercises—it is about establishing familiarity with the environment, enabling future access with greater operational ease.

When viewed in the context of the ongoing Sino-Philippine tensions, the timing carries significance. On October 15, Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan in Manila responded to the Philippine defense secretary’s characterization of China as a “troublemaker” by asking who was targeting Chinese language teachers, detaining Chinese workers, and systematically discrediting China daily. He emphasized that the Philippines should be grateful for having China as a neighbor—capable of force but choosing not to use it, due to a commitment to peace.

The Philippine foreign ministry described the remarks as a “threat of force” the following day. Ambassador Jing responded on October 19: What constitutes a threat? Only when someone threatens harm if their demands are ignored. The fact that China possesses capability yet refrains from using it is precisely what constitutes peacekeeping.

Domestic voices in the Philippines have called for the expulsion of the ambassador. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. clearly recognizes the imprudence of such a move but has done little to temper nationalist sentiment. With news emerging of the Liaoning’s possible presence in the Sulu Sea, the vessel’s actual arrival will eventually be reported by official media outlets. Whether this serves as a sobering reality check or further inflames public fervor matters less to China; what truly counts is how the Philippines itself weighs the implications.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1879897864859852/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.