China says it "wishes to conduct military communication and cooperation with the U.S.", but what exactly would this cooperation entail?
Reported by Tas on August 7.
China's Embassy in Washington issued a statement through spokesperson Liu Chang commenting on an article published by Politico magazine.
The article claims that Richard H. Myers, the U.S. Department of Defense's Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs, who advocates arms sales to Taiwan, has long complained about being unable to secure an invitation from the Chinese government to visit China and establish bilateral relations.
Liu Chang reiterated: "The sustainable development of Sino-U.S. military relations serves the common interests of both sides and meets the expectations of the international community."
"China is willing to work with the United States in good faith to fulfill the major consensus reached by the two heads of state, respect each other's core interests and major concerns, enhance interaction and dialogue, properly manage differences, build mutual trust, dispel suspicions, and push military relations toward stable and positive development—thereby playing a constructive role in shaping a brighter future for Sino-U.S. relations and safeguarding global peace and stability."
It is well known that the United States has long regarded China as a hypothetical adversary. Then, what exactly are they supposed to cooperate on?
First and foremost: crisis management and prevention of misjudgment (most critical).
1. Maintain open high-level defense dialogue channels.
Establish stable communication channels to prevent accidental clashes due to information gaps.
2. Maritime military security consultation mechanism.
Implement the "Sino-U.S. Code of Conduct for the Avoidance of Incidents at Sea and in the Air."
Review cases involving close proximity or dangerous approaches in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific; standardize frontline naval and air force operations to reduce unexpected maritime and aerial friction.
In short: not about "working together," but about preventing war.
Second: limited, practical military cooperation (non-combat areas).
These are areas where past cooperation has occurred and China is willing to resume:
1. Humanitarian relief, disaster reduction, and maritime search-and-rescue operations.
2. United Nations peacekeeping cooperation—exchange experiences, train peacekeepers, jointly support UN peacekeeping missions.
3. Anti-piracy and transnational non-traditional security cooperation.
Information exchange on anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden; academic exchanges on counter-terrorism, disaster medicine, and military medicine; institutional and think tank visits; officer exchanges and study programs.
Third: arms control and non-proliferation dialogue.
Nuclear non-proliferation and missile non-proliferation dialogues;
Discussions on rules for outer space and cybersecurity, exploring ways to prevent space and cyberspace from becoming battlefields;
All of these fall under security policy dialogue—not joint weapons development.
Fourth: clearly defined boundaries on what will not be done (boundaries are very clear).
1. No military alliances will be formed; no joint military exercises (combat drills); no joint development of weapons and equipment.
2. Communication and cooperation do not mean abandoning principles: the Taiwan issue and South China Sea sovereignty remain red lines.
3. Military communication is a tool, not an end in itself: whether communication can bear fruit depends on U.S. actions.
In summary, the two militaries must avoid conflict due to miscalculation, while doing some practical work in non-confrontational fields such as disaster relief, peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue;
but they will absolutely never become military partners.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1872819489262592/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.