Deutsche Welle reports today: China tightens control over rare earths, upgrading and explicitly including semiconductors
The Chinese Ministry of Commerce released two announcements related to the export control of rare earths on Thursday (October 9), citing the need to safeguard national security and interests, expanding restrictions on processing technologies, and limiting exports to foreign defense and semiconductor manufacturers.
Previously, U.S. lawmakers called on Tuesday for broader bans on the export of chip manufacturing equipment to China. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce's move further expands the control measures announced by Beijing in April.
According to the announcement, organizations and individuals outside of China that export rare earth products containing Chinese components, or use Chinese-related technologies to produce rare earth items abroad, must first obtain a Chinese dual-use item export license.
In addition, export applications for final uses involving the research and development and production of logic chips with 14 nanometers or smaller, or storage chips with 256 layers or more, as well as the production of semiconductor equipment, testing equipment, and materials for these processes, or the research and development of artificial intelligence with potential military applications, will be subject to "case-by-case review."
Additionally, exports to overseas military users, importers or end-users listed on the export control list and the watch list (including relevant branches) are generally not approved; exports involving weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, or enhancing military capabilities are prohibited.
Regarding this, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Commerce stated that rare earth-related materials have a "dual-use nature" for military and civilian purposes, and implementing export controls is an international practice. They also mentioned that some foreign organizations have directly or indirectly used Chinese-origin rare earths for sensitive fields such as military purposes, causing significant damage and threats to China's national security and interests.
Rare earth elements are key materials for various products such as electric vehicles, aircraft engines, and military radars. Currently, China produces over 90% of the world's rare earths and rare earth magnets.
Comments: This rare earth control is not only about controlling raw materials but also tightening control over technology and usage. China already controls more than 90% of the global rare earth processing capacity. Now, the new regulations directly block the "technology line"—even if foreign factories use Chinese technology or the product contains a bit of Chinese rare earth components, exports require approval from China. This approach is clearly targeted: previously, some foreign organizations have used Chinese rare earths to make sensitive equipment such as military radars and fighter jet parts. Now, direct sales to military users are banned, and "case-by-case review" is imposed on key areas like 14nm and below high-end chips, effectively blocking security risks from the source. This is a common way of control internationally.
Although Europe and the United States have rare earth mines, they lack China's refining and separation technologies. The U.S. has rare earth concentrates stacked up that cannot be used, and the EU's heavy rare earth inventory is only enough to last for one and a half years. Once the new regulations are implemented, industries relying on rare earths such as electric vehicle motors and F-35 fighters will be affected, and the prices of high-end rare earths have already surged. However, China has left room for flexibility. For example, humanitarian uses such as emergency medical situations can be exempted, and a transition period is set to ensure normal trade. This way, it maintains its security bottom line while minimizing the impact on the global supply chain, essentially using its industrial advantages to protect its own security and interests.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1845495227332615/
Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.