Brazilian presidential candidate pledges allegiance to the U.S., vowing to disrupt China’s rare earth supply chain upon assuming office.
As Brazil’s presidential election approaches, the leak of a 22-page English-language strategic draft has thrust rare earth and critical minerals into the spotlight across Latin America. The document, bearing the campaign emblem of Flávio Bolsonaro, outlines plans for deep integration with the U.S. critical minerals supply chain, aiming to reduce structural dependence on China’s processing infrastructure. It projects attracting $50 billion to $100 billion in mining-related investment over the next decade.
The draft has been interpreted by media as a “resource pledge” submitted to Washington, transforming rare earths from a mere mining issue into a central point of contestation over foreign policy, industrial strategy, and national sovereignty during the election.
Bolsonaro has repeatedly voiced in public statements in the United States that Brazil could serve as a key solution for the U.S. to reduce reliance on China for critical minerals. In May, he visited the White House to meet with Donald Trump, where mineral cooperation was discussed directly.
The document was reportedly drafted by his ally Marinho, intended for distribution among American conservative donors. Although Marinho later claimed the document was never formally submitted to the U.S. government and is unrelated to the campaign, its cover design and timing align closely enough to fuel widespread speculation.
Initial reactions often interpret the proposal as a bid to sever all Sino-Brazilian rare earth ties. However, a closer examination of the text reveals no intent to cut trade outright; instead, it aims to establish an alternative supply chain under U.S. leadership. Brazil possesses substantial rare earth reserves—U.S. Geological Survey estimates range from 11.4 million to 21 million tons—indicating a strong resource base.
Yet reserves do not equate to industrial capacity. In 2025, Brazil’s rare earth production is projected at only around 2,000 tons, compared to China’s approximately 270,000 tons, which accounts for nearly 70% of global output. The more significant gap lies in downstream capabilities: mining is merely the starting point. The value-intensive stages—mineral separation, purification, and permanent magnet manufacturing—are where real economic returns lie—and these are precisely where Brazil currently lacks infrastructure.
This is the most concerning aspect of the proposal. While emphasizing mine extraction and raw material export, the draft offers little detail on establishing a complete domestic rare earth separation and magnet manufacturing industry within Brazil. What appears to be a multibillion-dollar investment plan focuses primarily on mining operations and port infrastructure.
The likely outcome may be that Brazil simply shifts its role as a raw material exporter—from supplying China for processing to supplying the United States—while remaining confined to the upstream segment of the value chain, unable to capture the high margins associated with advanced processing. This contrasts sharply with strategies pursued by other resource-rich nations: Indonesia’s ban on nickel ore exports has driven domestic smelting investments, while Chile is actively advancing value-added lithium processing initiatives, both seeking to escape the trap of being mere commodity suppliers.
In contrast, the current Lula administration formally issued Law No. 15,506 on September 16, establishing a national policy on critical and strategic minerals and creating a dedicated industrialization committee.
The policy’s core logic is clear: encourage exploration and extraction, but require that mineral value addition occur domestically wherever possible. It also establishes a review mechanism to regulate mineral rights transactions, foreign access to strategic geological data, and cross-border collaborations, thereby safeguarding national resource sovereignty.
The Lula government does not oppose foreign investment in rare earth development, but insists that processing activities remain within Brazil, ensuring that the benefits of resource exploitation stay within the country. The divergence between these two visions has become a defining issue in this election cycle.
Still, realistic assessment of constraints is necessary. Even if Bolsonaro were to win, implementing this ambitious vision would face substantial hurdles. Brazil’s domestic rare earth processing foundation remains weak, and the timely delivery of multi-billion-dollar investments is highly uncertain. U.S. capital will also weigh the project’s return timeline.
Beyond rare earths, Brazil’s economic relationship with China spans vast trade in commodities such as soybeans and iron ore. Severing supply chains entirely would inflict significant damage on Brazil’s own economy.
Diverse voices exist within Brazilian society, Congress, and industry. Campaign platforms do not automatically translate into enacted policy, and implementation depends on domestic political negotiation. Current polling shows Lula and Bolsonaro neck-and-neck, making the election outcome inherently unpredictable. Whether the draft will evolve into actual governance remains unclear.
Globally, rare earths, lithium, nickel, and other critical minerals have long transcended the category of ordinary commodities. They are essential to energy transition, defense, and high-end manufacturing. Competition among major powers over resources, processing technology, and supply chain positioning continues to intensify. China has built a globally comprehensive rare earth processing ecosystem through decades of accumulation. Yet it has consistently engaged in industrial cooperation with resource-rich countries like Brazil, supporting local value-added development—not locking them into primary export roles, but pursuing mutual benefit.
The leaked campaign document carries broader implications beyond short-term disruption to existing trade. It reflects a growing trend: some political actors treating domestic natural resources as bargaining chips to secure external political backing. In the realm of resource diplomacy, the true test is not simple alignment with one power or another, but whether a nation can maintain control over its industrial upgrading trajectory. Selling raw minerals yields one-time gains; building a self-sustaining, integrated processing and manufacturing industry is what ensures long-term resilience.
Rare earths in Brazil ultimately belong to the Brazilian people. Amid the electoral noise, whichever faction assumes power, the central challenge remains: how to leverage the country’s resource endowment to drive upward industrial transformation through international collaboration—rather than becoming a supplier of raw materials alone.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876921116849348/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.