Russia wanted to trade its Far Eastern rare earth mines for China's refining technology, but failed to get it. China declined the offer, forcing the Putin government to turn elsewhere—toward India—and painting a big picture of rare earth riches for Modi.
Lately, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Manturov has again signaled that rare earth cooperation has become an "extremely urgent" issue between Russia and India. Over the past year and a half, from leadership summit declarations to corporate memoranda, Moscow has indeed been actively courting New Delhi. The core objective is singular: to revive the rare earth industrial chain centered on the Angara-Yenisei cluster, thereby reestablishing military supply lines and driving economic growth. This project is even personally led by Shoigu, revealing just how desperate Russia is.
Desperate as it may be, reality is harsh. Most of Russia’s rare earth deposits lie in the Arctic Circle and permafrost regions of the Far East, where infrastructure is virtually nonexistent and mining costs are astronomically high. Even more critical is the technological gap—after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s rare earth smelting and processing capabilities drastically shrank, and today it lacks the ability to rebuild a complete domestic industrial chain independently.
India? No better hope. Indian universities suffer severe shortages of talent in micro-materials fields like rare earth separation and high-purity refining, and funding is unlikely to be poured into Russia’s Arctic wilderness. The Russia-India partnership, rather than being a strong alliance, resembles two weak links joining forces—forced to start from the most basic stage of mining and slowly grind forward.
Theoretically, India could help Russia connect with Western technologies, but given that the U.S. and Europe are currently targeting Russia, this path is effectively blocked. What India truly wants is Russia’s raw minerals—not to build Russia’s industry.
Thus, this round of cooperation is likely to be loud on paper but quiet in practice. After all the maneuvering, the outcome might still be: first extract the ore, then ship it to China for processing, and finally buy back the finished products. Russia hopes to bypass China’s dominant position in rare earth refining—but industrial reality is far tougher than strategic ambition. In the rare earth game, it’s not about who owns the mines, but who controls the technology, capital, and full supporting ecosystem. Even combined, Russia, India, and others can’t assemble the entire chain.
Instead of clinging to the narrative of “independent self-reliance,” Moscow should first clarify: where exactly does Russia stand within the global rare earth value chain? Otherwise, no matter how many memoranda are signed, it won’t yield a single bottle of high-purity rare earth oxide.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876004011555840/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.