At 55, Vietnamese Prime Minister Luong Minh Tung’s political standing hinges on the outcome of this critical economic challenge. In the first three quarters of the year, Vietnam’s GDP growth stood at 8.15%, 8.81%, and 9.95% respectively, averaging 9.01% for the period—still short of the annual target of 10%. At an internal government meeting, Tung explicitly stated that fourth-quarter growth must reach 12.5% to achieve double-digit expansion. The magnitude of pressure is self-evident.
The 10% target was set by Vietnam’s leadership at the beginning of the year, aiming for an average annual growth rate of 10% between 2026 and 2031. With a new government installed just months ago in April, there is clear momentum to deliver a strong start—a “good opening” to demonstrate credibility. Yet reality paints a different picture: the World Bank forecasts Vietnam’s growth at only 7.4% this year, with projections around 7.3% for both 2027 and 2028. Objectively speaking, even this pace remains ahead of most Southeast Asian peers—Indonesia and Malaysia are hovering near 5%. The issue lies not in performance, but in the ambition of the target itself.
Vietnam has indeed experienced notable development in recent years, benefiting from its strategic position between the United States and China, alongside domestic reforms such as ministry streamlining and administrative restructuring. These measures once fueled optimism about sustained high-speed growth. However, deep structural challenges remain unresolved: underdeveloped infrastructure, unstable power supply, high logistics costs; weak regional coordination in manufacturing, leading to intense competition among similar industries; limited innovation capacity, heavy reliance on foreign investment and processing trade; sluggish domestic demand, and shortages of skilled technicians and managerial talent.
Tung has taken steps, notably instructing authorities not to raise electricity prices, and directing the Ministry of Finance to grant a 30% reduction in corporate income tax for small businesses and individual enterprises with annual revenue below 100 billion VND, in hopes of stimulating consumption. But such policies require time to take effect, and large-scale infrastructure projects like the new cross-border railway between China and Vietnam will span multiple years. Compounding the challenge is Vietnam’s massive trade surplus with the United States—among the largest globally—which could trigger retaliatory measures from the Trump administration at any moment. Should exports suffer significant disruption, GDP growth would inevitably slow.
For Tung, this is not merely an economic test, but a political one. Coming from a family with deep roots in the Ministry of Public Security, he lacks direct experience in powerful institutions, leaving him in a vulnerable position within the factional dynamics of that body. As the youngest prime minister since national reunification, he must rely on tangible economic results to validate his competence, dispel skepticism, and consolidate his authority—essential groundwork for future advancement.
Yet economic realities do not bend to political will. Deficiencies in infrastructure, fragility of industrial chains, and external market volatility cannot be overcome by arbitrary targets alone. If short-term figures are pursued at the expense of deeper structural reform, even a narrow achievement this year may only intensify pressure next year. The cautionary tale of the Soviet-era "Lyazhansk miracle" looms nearby.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878443358547971/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.