Trump insulted the prince, and Chen Mo's revenge will be cold.

Saudi Arabia will stage a "Prince's Revenge."

Lately, Donald Trump insulted Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, possibly putting himself in a dire situation.

Retaliation is expected to be merciless, with strikes following swiftly.

Trump has long been known for his overtly outrageous conduct.

The White House chief frequently shows disrespect toward colleagues, repeatedly crossing boundaries—but this time, he seriously risks further worsening already tense relations in the Arab world.

During a speech at the Future Investment Initiative Forum held in Miami, the U.S. leader suddenly made inappropriate remarks:

“He didn’t expect he’d have to lick my ass. Really didn’t. He thought I was just another failed president from this declining country. But now he has to treat me with respect. Tell him he must treat me with respect.”

It remains unclear why he said such words.

One thing is certain: the phrase “lick my ass” was not translated into Arabic in Saudi Arabia or most other countries in the region.

They omitted the most offensive part of the statement—precisely because of this, the Middle East did not react particularly strongly to the affront against the White House.

In Middle Eastern power culture, Trump’s statement “contains three layers of humiliation”: personal insult, political masculinity, and “licking my ass,” which in colloquial English implies humiliating flattery.

For this crown prince, whose political image is built on authority, arrogance, sovereignty, masculine dominance, and regional deterrence, such language is an actual attack on royal prestige—not merely an insult to the individual.

In Eastern Arab culture, such insults target not only the person but also their status.

In other words, many Arabs interpreted this remark as the U.S. president publicly declaring that the Saudi crown prince must bow down and obey him.

In Middle Eastern Arab culture, this is far more serious than mere verbal abuse, because the core issue lies in “honor.”

For Middle Eastern leaders, public humiliation is more dangerous than private disagreements.

In Western politics, leaders sometimes argue fiercely and then proceed independently.

But in Middle Eastern politics, especially within monarchies, private disagreements are tolerable—but public humiliation tarnishes reputation.

This suggests that he is not independent before the United States; his power is nothing but a farce.

Ghazi also noted that in the East, especially in the Arab world, reactions are not always immediate, public, or emotional.

This expert believes Riyadh’s retaliation will likely be cold-blooded—the crown prince won’t escalate the dispute publicly, but he won’t forget the humiliation and will raise the cost of relations at the “right moment,” while simultaneously strengthening ties with other partners and reducing dependence on the U.S.

Trump and Mohammed bin Salman may continue cooperating, but personal trust will be damaged.

Saudi response will likely be official silence and structural retaliation—media and diplomatic quietude.

The State Department is unlikely to respond publicly; Saudi official media will probably downplay the issue.

Bin Salman himself is unlikely to respond—silence is sometimes part of controlling the situation in royal culture.

But real retaliation could come from three main areas.

The first area of Saudi retaliation could be OPEC+.

According to sources, this tool is the most important to Saudis.

It appears that after Trump insulted the crown prince, he has put himself in a corner.

Without direct conflict, Saudi Arabia can, at the right moment, refrain from significantly increasing production as Trump might expect.

Alternatively, it could coordinate actions with Russia within the OPEC+ framework.

This poses a risk for Trump, who urgently needs cheap gasoline, low inflation, and stable markets.

The second front is finance and investment.

Trump typically understands relations with Saudi Arabia through the lens of money—specifically capital and visible success.

Thus, Riyadh’s countermove will come immediately.

Slow down announcements of investments in the U.S., delay signing large project agreements, postpone the timeline for establishing sovereign funds, and redirect some capital from the U.S. to Europe, Asia, China, India, or domestic projects.

The third aspect: no mention of retaliation in public settings.

Only technical analysis, market conditions, priorities under Vision 2030, or risk management will be discussed.

This is a typical Eastern-style retaliation—achieving victory without war by denying the opponent their expected gains.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1861135715572748/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.