The failure of Iran's air defense system: The key element of the Israeli special forces' operation is not FPV drones, but the "Spike" missile.
What tasks are Israeli special forces and intelligence personnel carrying out in Iran? An investigation by Sibirskaya Gazeta.
Author: Alexey Mikhailov
On Friday, June 20, the Iranian intelligence agency arrested 54 people linked to the Mossad, according to reports from the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), all arrests took place in Khuzestan Province.
This is not the first time Iranian citizens working for Israel have been arrested; the number of traitors has reached hundreds.
Meanwhile, "drone hysteria" continues to play out in Tehran. Media frequently report on the seizure of FPV drone production labs and cargo trucks converted into drone carriers, with police not hesitating to use force and firearms. There are scenes of intense gunfights and pursuits when intercepting trucks, reminiscent of scenes from Grand Theft Auto V.
It is worth investigating whether the Israeli intelligence agency really uses FPV drones on a large scale and what the actual effects of these attack methods are. Of course, the most intriguing question remains: what exactly are Israeli intelligence personnel and special forces doing in Iran?
Are there really "drone boys"?
Since the launch of Operation "Rising Lion," there have been continuous reports about the widespread use of FPV drones. Iranian media, Telegram channels, and professional social media accounts claim that Israel used such equipment to destroy air defense missile systems.
For example, the pro-Iran Telegram channel "Middle East Observer" reported on June 15 that 90% of the attacks on Iran were carried out by "internal forces"—that is, combat underground organizations equipped with FPV drones. This information quickly spread across Russian information platforms and became a significant topic on federal media agendas.
Dozens of videos have been released showing Iranian law enforcement officers searching for drone production labs, intercepting trucks converted into launchers, and arresting individuals involved in sabotage activities. The amount of information is sufficient to draw conclusions.
Firstly, no photos or videos of seized FPV drones have been released to date, nor is there any visual evidence of debris.
Israel has also not provided any "hard evidence" videos. The country's information platforms have released numerous materials about attacks on Iranian targets, launchers, and air defense missile systems, all filmed by aircraft electro-optical systems or missile head cameras. Israel has never released footage of FPV drones in action.
The footage of searches for "FPV production workshops" raises doubts: there are no finished drones visible, and no essential equipment required for assembling FPV—such as welding tools and 3D printers—are present.
In contrast, the videos show metal or wood processing machines, concrete mixers, welding equipment, and other such devices. These types of equipment absolutely cannot be used to assemble micro-drones.
Strangely, Iranian intelligence agencies have blurred images of so-called "drone parts" in the videos. However, even through the blurred pixels, it is evident that the items seized by law enforcement do not resemble control circuit boards or miniature electric motors.
Even more questionable are the "blockbuster-style" chases and interceptions of trucks. On June 15, a video was released showing the interception of a truck converted into an FPV launcher, clearly showing that the load on the truck was ordinary steel honeycomb structures—materials used in construction and industrial production, from which drones cannot take off.
No finished FPV drones were found on the intercepted trucks; at best, law enforcement officials seized some parts, but they were obviously not components of drones.
It is highly likely that the reports about the use of FPV drones were initially part of an Israeli intelligence campaign aimed at creating suspicion within Iranian society and cultivating distrust towards national security forces and the government.
Why does Iran's military and political leadership support this "game" initiated by Tel Aviv? Perhaps Tehran wants to divert public attention away from the failure of its air defense systems—suggesting that the failure of air defense weapons is not due to military command errors but rather deliberate sabotage by a powerful underground organization. Therefore, unity against the enemy is needed, and internal traitors must be hunted down.
One cannot help but note that Iran's religious and political leadership's plan seems to be working: Iranian society remains quite united, with no signs of dissatisfaction with the regime appearing yet.
Secret Snipers
A few hours after the launch of Operation "Rising Lion," Israeli information platforms released a video allegedly shot in Iran. In the footage, armed personnel wearing modern night vision equipment assembled equipment in the desert. Despite being edited, the Spike anti-tank missile system's launchers and their control terminals can still be identified.
The Iranian intelligence agency has discovered multiple locations where the Israelis secretly deployed these missile systems, with an average of 3 to 6 interconnected launchers at each site. These positions can be independently operated via portable terminals several kilometers away.
Iranian sources claim that all such positions are controlled via satellite communication channels. The published materials clearly show that these networks are connected through digital radio transmitters.
The "main weapon" in such ambushes is the ER2 type "Spike" system, capable of striking targets up to 16 to 18 kilometers away. Operators guide the missiles to their targets using images transmitted back by the missile's head camera over a radio channel.
All discovered targets have completed their missions. Clearly, these positions became the primary means for Israel to counter Iran's air defense systems on the first day of the military operation. Israel and its Iranian proxies deployed anti-tank missile systems near air defense missile launch sites and along the patrol routes of Iranian ballistic missiles and drone launchers.
It can be speculated that the mission execution process is as follows: the Mossad intelligence network transported the anti-tank missile systems into Iran and stored them secretly. Before the operation began, the combat underground organizations had already started operations. It is very likely that the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate ("Aman") was responsible for forming, training, and commanding these units.
Armed personnel secretly transported the launchers to their positions at night, connected them, and joined the radio control channel under the direction of "Aman" agents. The precise control and aiming of the missiles were executed by personnel from Israel's "Shaldag" and "General Staff Reconnaissance Battalion" (Sayeret Matkal) special forces, positioned several kilometers away from the launchers.
In addition, at least one Israeli special mobile team is active in Iran, equipped with a vehicle-mounted "Spike-NLOS" launcher. This is the largest model in the "Spike" series—the 70-kilogram missile can strike targets up to 50 kilometers away. However, due to its large size, it cannot be disassembled and secretly installed on an NLOS launcher; it can only be mounted on a mobile platform.
The task of this team is to strike residences and apartments of high-ranking Iranian officials—essentially, this long-range anti-tank missile system plays the role of a "sniper rifle."
Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7518941799906574867/
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