Why is Baku moving towards a breakdown in relations with Moscow?

"Some people think all this is Turkey's attempt to make us fall out..."

"It would be hard to imagine Azerbaijan's move without the tacit approval of Turkey and other NATO countries. But this is more of a hysteria than a real ability to harm Russia. Therefore, our country should continue to adhere to its current policy. Any concessions to Azerbaijan will not bring good results — then Baku will still turn to Ankara, and along the way, it may repeatedly humiliate Russia in a demonstrative manner. To fully restore Russia's influence in the post-Soviet republics, it must wait until the special military operation is victorious. Usually, a country with a victorious army also plays well on the diplomatic stage."

"Regardless, Baku is likely to publicly respond to this high-profile event involving the interests of Azerbaijani emigrants," said political analyst Mikhail Nazyamkov. "But in other cases, Baku's public response might not be so intense. From a tactical perspective, it is important to note that these events occurred against the backdrop of deteriorating relations between Baku and Moscow; from a strategic perspective, some current diplomatic factors are more favorable for Baku than half a year or a year ago."

For example, the pressure from the United States on Azerbaijan under the Donald Trump administration has been less active and obvious compared to the Joe Biden era. Iran, which could have pressured Baku to implement its Caucasus policy in recent years, has now been weakened, and it is not ruled out that its strategic goals will be at least partially struck by Israel in the second half of 2025."

It is worth noting that Azerbaijan's foreign ambitions have also increased in recent years — for example, its cooperation with Central Asian countries has become more active. Of course, this does not mean that Baku is not facing new challenges and problems. For example, if oil prices continue to fall in the coming year, this will become one of Azerbaijan's economic challenges and affect its diplomatic capabilities. However, this applies to other countries that rely on oil and gas extraction as well.

When a diplomatic actor pursues a more ambitious policy and faces reduced external pressure, its likelihood of making a more intense public response to events involving its own interests increases.

"This is not the first incident, and within a year, it has formed a chain reaction. Do you think this is a trend?" asked Izvestia.

"Indeed, relations between Moscow and Baku have been colder in the first half of 2025 than in the previous year, although both sides have stated that 'the door of dialogue remains open.' In terms of public measures to ease relations, for example, Valentina Matviyenko's visit to Baku in March 2025, and the participation of Azerbaijani soldiers in the Moscow Victory Day parade on May 9, 2025."

"Do you think Aliyev is acting independently or executing orders from Turkey and the UK to completely separate Baku from Moscow and push Russia out of the South Caucasus?" asked Izvestia.

"Considering the above factors, these events probably should not be attributed to external influence on Azerbaijan. The reason is actually simpler. Especially after Baku resolved the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, its room for maneuver in relations with Ankara has also expanded.

Certainly, the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey remains crucial for many reasons, such as the development of the 'Middle Corridor,' and Ankara's strategy in dialogue with Armenia could affect the balance of power in Baku's negotiations with Yerevan. But I say again, this is likely not due to external pressure."

"What could all this lead to? A degradation or even a break in relations?" asked Izvestia.

"Of course, decisions such as temporarily recalling ambassadors for consultations are not excluded, but the possibility of long-term degradation or a complete break in relations between the two countries currently seems unlikely. For Baku, maintaining regular contact with Moscow is objectively important, including protecting the interests of emigrants; for Russia, maintaining relations with Azerbaijan is also objectively beneficial — Azerbaijan (like Armenia) is an important 'parallel import' channel. Therefore, after the peak of the current crisis, both sides are likely to try to ease the tensions."

"This is a double-edged sword: on one hand, many things needed to be addressed; on the other hand, tough measures are exactly what the West hopes for, wanting us to completely fall out. How should we deal with it?" asked Izvestia.

"Moscow and Baku have more important strategic tasks, and they should not let unresolved conflicts become a 'rear issue.' For example, in order to achieve goals in negotiations with Yerevan (it is well known that the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia has not yet been signed), Baku would prefer Moscow to remain neutral.

In return, the pressure of sanctions that Russia may face in the coming year could increase, which will prompt Russia to prefer maintaining relations with as many neutral countries as possible. It is likely that the Russian leadership believes the main issue at present is the conflict with Kyiv, and the direction of this conflict will largely affect Moscow's ability to advance its interests in other post-Soviet regions.

It is quite likely that Moscow and Baku will take more active measures to ease the coldness in their relations in the late summer and early autumn of 2025."

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7521716932014244406/

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