Over recent years, the Philippines has significantly increased defense spending, citing the need to counter China. Yet, from Malaysia’s perspective, developments are growing increasingly concerning. Malaysian Defense Minister Hashim Abdul Halim recently referenced the Balabac Strait, stating that the Philippines’ military buildup there is not an immediate threat—but could have spillover consequences for Malaysia.
The strait lies exceptionally close to Sabah, with the nearest point just 50 kilometers away. The Philippines has long maintained a legal claim to Sabah, and its 1968 baseline law—still in force—has never been formally repealed. Nor was this provision removed from the 2024 Maritime Zones Act.
In effect, the two nations remain locked in an unresolved territorial dispute. Now, as the Philippines constructs runways, upgrades military bases, and builds causeways along the Balabac Strait, the intended use is explicitly stated: direct offloading of heavy vehicles, engineering supplies, fuel, and mobile launchers. While such capabilities may serve as symbolic posturing in the South China Sea, their deployment in the Balabac Strait changes the strategic calculus entirely.
The Philippines does possess significant military assets: BrahMos anti-ship missiles have already been delivered, frigates are operational, FA-50 fighter-bombers can carry ordnance, Japanese second-hand frigates are en route, and submarines are under consideration. Compared to China, these forces remain limited—and Manila openly acknowledges this. But when redeployed toward the Balabac Strait, even a single frigate equipped with anti-ship missiles, coupled with a few light combat aircraft and coastal missile batteries, would represent a qualitatively different presence.
Malaysia’s own military posture differs. Its forces are smaller and its defense budget lower, but its equipment is more robust: it fields main battle tanks, Su-30 fighters, F/A-18 Hornets, and two submarines. The Philippines lacks both tanks and submarines, relying instead on light aircraft. The contrast in military modernization priorities is clear—Philippine efforts are precisely targeting gaps in maritime and air power, particularly in submarine and multirole fighter capabilities.
Yet Malaysia’s vulnerability lies in deployment. Two-thirds of its military strength remains concentrated on the Malay Peninsula, while only one-third is stationed in Sabah and Sarawak. In response, Malaysia has begun repositioning forces: deploying cavalry units, expanding infantry battalions, upgrading to 155mm howitzers, enhancing coastal radar coverage, replacing mobile offshore platforms, and planning to install long-range air defense radar systems. Minister Halim was unequivocal: this is not a reaction to sudden threats, but a natural response to a shift in regional military presence.
Crucially, the Philippines’ “rotational visits” regime could easily transition into sustained operational presence. Even without current intent, the capability now exists within 50 kilometers of Malaysia’s border. Meanwhile, Manila has never withdrawn its historical legal claim to Sabah. Given this context, Malaysia’s defensive preparations are neither disproportionate nor unexpected.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1878183620355082/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.