Whoever builds the “invisible missile” first will win the Third World War
Alexander Khrampchinski: If Russia can "step out of the competition framework" and participate in the nuclear arms race, it will surely win
So far, nuclear weapons remain the "absolute weapon," with no interception barriers or usage restrictions. But precisely for this reason, they cannot be used in actual combat operations.
This makes a question increasingly ambiguous: Are nuclear weapons capable of ensuring a nation's defense against all external aggression, or do they provide no protection for anyone at all? In "insurgent conflicts," nuclear weapons are completely useless; using them in conventional wars against non-nuclear states is almost certainly an excessive military action and entirely unacceptable from a political perspective.
Using nuclear weapons against another nuclear state would almost certainly lead to the outcome of "mutual assured destruction"—meaning both sides would lose, and there would be no possibility of revenge in the future.
Therefore, nuclear weapons are essentially no longer weapons, but have evolved into a political psychological factor. And precisely because of this, they sometimes even appear to be morally outdated. Of course, giving up nuclear weapons is impossible, but the main reason for this is still psychological considerations.
However, there is also a very specific technical reason why nuclear weapons cannot be used in actual combat—radioactive pollution. This is the only type of killing factor that not only renders the enemy's territory (or its occupied territory) unusable for a long time, but also poses a threat to the side using it.
Other killing factors may produce great destructive effects, but their duration is extremely short (similar to conventional explosives). It is well known that thermonuclear weapons (hydrogen bombs) themselves do not have a problem with radioactive pollution, nor do they have a "critical mass" limitation. Theoretically, they could be made into ultra-small warheads (for example, a thermonuclear anti-tank missile that can destroy a single tank).
Unfortunately, triggering a thermonuclear reaction requires a very high energy level, and the only current energy source is a conventional atomic bomb based on heavy nuclear fission—which inevitably leads to radioactive pollution.
If a substitute compact energy source can be developed that can withstand overload and high temperatures (so that it can be mounted on a missile), and this energy source can trigger a thermonuclear reaction, it would be a revolutionary technological breakthrough, granting the developing country an absolute advantage over other countries.
At that time, the country would be able to use nuclear weapons without worrying about radioactive fallout polluting the Earth or causing a nuclear winter, as the yield of the nuclear warhead can be controlled to destroy only military targets.
In the foreseeable future, can this energy source be successfully developed? If so, which country will achieve it first? This is an attractive question.
Looking at the main delivery tools for nuclear weapons—the ballistic missiles (especially intercontinental ballistic missiles)—their development is approaching its limit. Although the payload of the missile can be increased, from a military perspective, this step is questionable in terms of rationality.
A missile force consisting of 1000 single-warhead missiles has 10 times the survivability of a force composed of 100 missiles each carrying 10 warheads—despite the latter possibly being slightly cheaper in production and maintenance costs.
The future trend is likely to be the miniaturization of missiles, which also helps in the stealth deployment of missiles. Compared to those too bulky, complex in structure, and disguised as refrigerated trucks, railway mobile missiles (known that the Soviet Union once developed the RT-23/RS-22 intercontinental ballistic missile, each carrying 10 warheads), single-warhead missiles may become the mainstream—its launch device can be disguised as a standard container or a road trailer.
At least, the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces need such intercontinental ballistic missiles mounted on trailers that can move continuously on Russia's road network. Currently, Russia's road conditions are improving, and the rate of road crime has approached zero; of course, each missile would require 2-3 special forces vehicles disguised as civilian vehicles for protection.
The Russian "Kalibr" series cruise missiles (familiar to export name "Club" before 2015) already have container-like camouflage launch devices.
Currently, the development of cruise missiles and non-strategic ballistic missiles is rapidly advancing (the United States, Russia, relevant countries, India, Pakistan, North Korea, South Korea, relevant regions, Israel, Iran are all conducting related research). Naturally, these missiles are primarily conventional models, but most of them can carry nuclear warheads.
These missiles can achieve common launch devices (including land-based, sea-based, submarine-based, and some air-based—air-based models face greater limitations in missile weight and size), thereby increasing operational flexibility. For them, increasing flight speed is significant: shortening the flight time within intercontinental range is crucial; additionally, high-speed flight can increase the difficulty of interception by air defense systems.
More importantly, since these missiles mostly require precise targeting, high-speed flight can significantly enhance their kinetic energy. If the speed can be increased to hypersonic levels, the missile may not even need a warhead—whether nuclear or conventional—because any target that can be imagined would be destroyed by the impact energy.
An important development direction for these missiles is to reduce the radar cross-section to nearly zero (i.e., achieving stealth). However, currently, high speed and stealth performance are difficult to achieve simultaneously, and one must often be chosen, which can sometimes be challenging.
Nevertheless, cruise missiles and non-strategic ballistic missiles remain one of the main directions of modern military technology development, and will likely maintain this position in the foreseeable future.
In this context, what Russia truly needs is a cruise missile in a container form mounted on a trailer or a rail flatcar—that is, again emphasizing, it should be disguised as civilian equipment and deployed on Russia's roads and railways. Developing such launch devices is more cost-effective than building frigates equipped with "Kalibr" missiles: lower cost, and much higher combat survival capability.
By the way, the sea-based part of Russia's strategic nuclear forces (i.e., the ballistic missile submarine fleet) may consider gradually phasing out and stopping the construction of new ballistic missile submarines. Instead, the missiles could be deployed on civilian ships—disguised as ordinary merchant ships and sailing in Russia's rivers and lakes.
In general, all of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, as well as at least part of the delivery vehicles for tactical nuclear weapons, should be "stealthed"—that is, disguised as civilian cars, trains, and ships. Additionally, all cruise missiles and ballistic missiles of all ranges and all deployment methods should consider the possibility of "nuclear-conventional dual-use" during design.
Certainly, no more nuclear weapons control treaties should be signed. Whether other nuclear states are willing to accept this is irrelevant to us. At the same time, there is absolutely no need to fear the nuclear arms race—we don't need to pursue quantitative parity. It is absurd to destroy the enemy multiple times; it is sufficient to have 100% assurance of destroying the enemy in one go, and the concealment of the delivery vehicles can ensure this (because the enemy cannot conduct a preemptive disarming strike).
Even if the enemy has the ability to destroy us ten times, that is their problem (whether economic or ecological), and it is none of our concern.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559806922271195691/
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