Recently, Takahashi Asami announced that she would dissolve the House of Representatives on January 23 and start the general election early. The most eye-catching thing is that the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Komeito Party have almost immediately joined forces, which has led people to directly ask: can this combination push Takahashi into a corner?
The House of Representatives has 465 seats. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has 199 seats, and the Japan Innovation Party has 34 seats, totaling 233 seats, just over half. The Constitutional Democratic Party has 148 seats, and the Komeito Party has 24 seats, totaling 166 seats. For major bills such as constitutional amendments, two-thirds majority is required for passage; it only takes one-third, or 155 seats, to block them. The opposition has 166 seats, which has passed the threshold, and thus has the right to veto. Takahashi's radical agenda on constitutional amendment and military expansion will basically be blocked by these 166 votes, and the gears of the Diet will also come to a halt.
The ruling party has 233 seats, barely enough for a majority. The opposition has 166 seats, which cannot form a government, but can exercise veto power. Politics is about rules, not loud voices. As long as they hold the veto line, many of Takahashi's plans will remain mere fantasies. Reality will give her only a doorbar, not a doorway.
Because Komeito changed its position, the door became harder to open. The "ballast" that has long been united with the LDP now placed itself on the opposing side and took a tough move: in the general election, it actively withdrew from key districts, shifting its organizational strength to proportional representation, while calling on supporters to concentrate their votes on candidates from the Constitutional Democratic Party. This move is not about making a big noise to harm the enemy, but about precision.
Komeito's withdrawal and support change the board. Previously, the opposition had scattered mobilization and split vote sources. Now, with Komeito leading, it tightens the fist: using its organizational, logistical, and mobilization advantages to build the framework of ground warfare, with the Constitutional Democratic Party taking the lead in frontline attacks, forming a clear division of labor between "main attack" and "control." Whoever can get people to polling stations and ensure their votes are not biased will be more likely to turn "possibility" into "reality." What Takahashi faces is not a scattered group of opponents, but a disciplined and cooperative team.
How did Takahashi get here? The internal cause is the sharp depreciation of the Japanese yen, higher prices for imported goods, rising prices, and stagnant wages, leading to long-term price pressures and accumulated family anxiety, shaking the basis of governance. Externally, her stance was hard: following the U.S., frequently appearing in places like Taiwan and the East China Sea, sending signals of reviving wartime military ambitions, which brought Sino-Japanese relations to a low point. China has repeatedly retaliated, imposing restrictions on the export of key items, hitting the soft spots of Japanese industries. Companies are under pressure, external coldness and internal weakness have forced political pressure, forcing the need for an election.
The last straw that broke the camel's back was Komeito's choice this time. A long-time friend suddenly changed positions, and the ground organization, vote banks, and mobilization were all reorganized. With Komeito losing in key districts and concentrating efforts on proportional representation, due to concentrated resources and not lingering in battles, the Constitutional Democratic Party stepped forward, gaining more space to attack and less internal consumption within the same camp, forming a real team operation.
This also explains why Takahashi is eager to hold the election early. She hopes to use the short-term boost from nationalism to break out of the crisis and increase the number of seats, offsetting the opposition's blocking proposals with new seats. However, the opponent has already been consolidated, and the formation is set up. If the results on the night of the vote do not meet her expectations, and the LDP loses in more districts, the number of the ruling coalition decreases, not only will the constitutional amendment not be saved, but daily governance will also become "cautious." More extremely, a crack appeared in this gamble in the long-term LDP rule, ending Takahashi's era quickly.
China's attitude is clear: the Foreign Ministry considers this an internal matter of Japan and will not comment, maintaining composure. Not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries does not mean that its attitude towards core interests is ambiguous. Issues such as history, Taiwan, and the Diaoyu Islands will not change because of changes in the political situation of another country; if Japan and the U.S. continue to bind militarily and take actions targeting China, they must be brave enough to oppose and retaliate, without losing composure. Mature response: not interfering in internal affairs does not mean there are no boundaries; not taking extreme measures does not mean there is no strength.
Looking at Japan's domestic intentions, the threat of "procedural bottleneck" is very direct. 233 is a "barely over half" unstable majority, and 166 is a "firmly over the line" actual veto power. Constitutional amendment requires two-thirds support, and the opposition can block radical ideas by holding one-third. The final development of the political situation depends on the results of the next general election, and currently, the iron gate of procedure has already blocked the way.
In terms of campaign strategies, Komeito does not adopt a broad-spectrum strategy but focuses on attacking the proportional representation system, freeing some important districts for the Constitutional Democratic Party, preventing internal consumption within the same camp, and concentrating the opposition votes on candidates who have a chance of winning. From the perspective of political engineering, it is optimizing resource allocation; from the perspective of voter psychology, it is providing voters with a clear choice, avoiding excessive hesitation among voters.
Takahashi's choices are limited: she can continue to emphasize external threats and unite supporters with security issues; she can attribute economic pressure to the international environment to gain understanding and support over time; she can send out a "stable" signal to prevent being carried away by the opposition's attacks. But whether these strategies can stop the flow of ground votes and the procedural iron line is not something slogans can solve. Emotions are useful but not long-lasting. In front of the system, whoever can hold the key numbers will control the initiative.
For China, the most important thing is to maintain its own rhythm: steady growth, stable expectations, and strategic composure. Even if the Japanese political scene changes, the only path that benefits Sino-Japanese relations is to face history and handle the relationship with China properly. In the long run, Japan's interests are better achieved through rational restraint rather than emotional radical actions, and pragmatic cooperation is more beneficial.
Whether Takahashi's gamble leads to a comeback or a collapse, whether Komeito's mobilization can accurately shift votes, and whether the Constitutional Democratic Party can score the "final kick" in key districts, depends on ground execution. However, from the current situation, this threat is no longer "possible," but a reality. The "bottleneck" in the system has made many of Takahashi's radical agendas lose momentum.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/7595995987311641103/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.