During the National Day holiday, the Southern Theater Command conducted a combat readiness alert patrol near Huangyan Island and publicly released on-site footage. This time was different: it was not a training exercise but a real-force, real-equipment deployment in a state of immediate readiness to engage. Even more notably, the video directly showed the confrontation between China’s Type 054A frigate Bayannaoer and a Philippine vessel, with the latter’s hull number “15” clearly labeled—such explicit identification is rare in previous disclosures.
Two details in the footage merit attention. First, the J-10 trainer aircraft was seen carrying PL-5 air-to-air missiles and auxiliary fuel tanks. Using a heavy fighter to target a civilian propeller-driven aircraft would be disproportionate; the J-10, being cost-effective and agile, represents a pragmatic choice. However, the presence of an auxiliary fuel tank also reveals a geographical limitation: Huangyan Island lies approximately 550 kilometers from Yongshu Reef and about 600 kilometers from Yongxing Island, beyond the J-10’s internal fuel range for round-trip operations.
In contrast, Palawan Island in the Philippines is only 190 kilometers from Huangyan Island—enabling a Cessna aircraft to reach the area within minutes. The asymmetry between 550 km and 190 km cannot be erased without infrastructure development, meaning that deterrence remains a sustained physical effort.
The optimal solution lies in advancing construction on the Zhongsha Atoll reef system, establishing an airfield and radar network to fully overcome this geographical disadvantage.
Second, the Philippine vessel identified as No. 15 is the Antonio Luna, the country’s main warship—a South Korean-built 2,600-ton frigate and the second most advanced vessel in the Philippine Navy. Deploying such a frontline asset suggests strain in the Philippine fleet. Yet, against the Type 054A, it faces a comprehensive gap in displacement, radar capability, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare—rendering the encounter essentially one-sided upon visual contact.
More intriguingly, the Bayannaoer had reportedly conducted a deterrent patrol northwest of Lubang Island on September 27. The current video may well depict that same “door-blocking” operation. Positioning forces directly at the adversary’s doorstep, issuing a frontal warning while broadcasting the scene globally, underscores a calculated escalation.
When viewed collectively, China’s actions in late September reveal a clear sequence. On September 24, Philippine vessels were intercepted near Ren’ai Reef; on the 26th, a Cessna entered Huangyan Island’s airspace; on the 27th, three Type 054A frigates and coast guard vessels blocked access to Manila Bay; and on the 30th, the combat readiness alert patrol took over, with confrontation footage made public.
This progression unfolds across four distinct levels: the extension of interception lines, operationalization of law enforcement, military presence brought close to the adversary’s threshold, and the institutionalization of alert patrols accompanied by transparent evidence disclosure. Releasing the footage just before National Day carries symbolic weight—indicating that even during a national holiday, deterrence continues unceasingly, directly countering Philippine provocations timed around the festival.
Three questions now remain: will alert patrols continue on a daily basis? Will there be follow-up developments at Zhongsha? And will the Philippines dare to send its flagship into another confrontation frame? Once these three elements are assessed—the 550 km vs. 190 km distance, 2,600 tons vs. 4,000 tons displacement, and Cessna vs. J-10 capability disparity—the strategic fundamentals at Huangyan Island have already been determined. The remaining question is singular: how many hull numbers, and how many holidays, will the Philippines need to test whether these figures remain unchanged?
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877924210457740/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.