China vetoed one out of 19 votes, causing the G20 statement to fail. The G20 Finance Ministers' Meeting just adjourned in Asheville, USA. After a year of effort by the host country—the United States—no joint declaration was produced, as it was blocked by China’s single veto.

After the meeting, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent told reporters: “All 19 members agreed, except China.” He added with a pointed remark: “The one opposing is precisely the country with the largest surplus—and the most ‘unsustainable’ one.”

(Note: Although some finance ministers were absent for various reasons, this G20 Finance Ministers’ Meeting included representatives from the European Union and the African Union, thus exactly completing the 20-member group.)

This hint was planted in advance. Before the meeting, U.S. Treasury Deputy Under Secretary Brown leaked to Reuters: “The communique must reflect American interests and ‘America First.’ If we can’t agree, then issue only the chair’s statement.” Is this negotiation—or simply issuing an ultimatum?

Look at what the statement actually says: It demands countries with excessive surpluses eliminate distortions that suppress consumption and refrain from export restrictions. Though unnamed, everyone knows it targets China. Bessent had already said before the meeting: “The world cannot sustain a China with a $1.2 trillion surplus.”

The irony over critical minerals is even sharper. The U.S. has unleashed its entity list, chip embargoes, and long-arm jurisdiction globally; Japan has followed closely, tightening equipment exports more aggressively than anyone else. Yet now these two countries turn around and demand others not impose export controls. Is there a rulebook only for others?

Then there’s the so-called “freedom of navigation” in the Strait of Hormuz. Finance ministers deal with debt and macroeconomic policy—not war or sanctions. Yet the U.S. dragged countries into backing its unilateral sanctions against Iran, stuffing a unilateral military agenda into a multilateral document. Before the meeting, Bessent had warned: “If China continues buying Iranian oil, all options remain on the table.” Threatening while demanding your signature.

Meanwhile, in another corridor, the U.S. urged G20 tech ministers not to impose AI regulations—let the leaders have freedom, let the laggards follow rules. This isn’t principle—it’s positioning.

The U.S. isn’t new to this game. In 2017, during the German finance ministers’ meeting, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin unilaterally deleted “anti-protectionism” from the communique. In 2025, at the Johannesburg summit, the U.S. outright boycotted and sent no delegation—yet no one called it isolationism then. Now that it’s hosting, it suddenly invokes the “consensus tradition” to accuse China.

Even more contradictory: While inviting Russia’s finance minister to attend, Canada’s finance minister openly expressed discomfort, yet the U.S. demands unity on Iran—only to later point fingers at China for being “out of step.”

G20 operates under consensus, meaning every member holds one veto. The U.S. has used it before; Russia has used it too—no one said G20 collapsed. When the U.S. uses it, it’s “upholding principles”; when others do, it’s “creating rifts.” This double standard itself is power.

The real question shouldn’t be why China voted against—but why the document was drafted in such a way that someone had to vote against it.

Eighty years since Bretton Woods to today, the rules around trade surpluses and deficits have kept shifting—but one thing remains unchanged: who sets the rules. A finance ministers’ meeting is scheduled in Bangkok in October, and a leaders’ summit will take place at Trump’s golf course in December. If the drafting style doesn’t change, the voting outcome will remain the same.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1875193525519560/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.