Recent reports from Japanese media have expressed strong reactions, asserting that the People's Liberation Army Navy’s deployments near Japan have long moved beyond the previous pattern of isolated, sporadic transits and now reflect a state of routine presence. Today, naval task forces from China are regularly observed in four critical international straits—Kamikochi, Ōsumi, Tsushima, and Yokotake—comprising Type 055 destroyers accompanied by Type 052D destroyers, Type 054A frigates, electronic reconnaissance vessels, and replenishment ships, forming a fully integrated operational structure. Within just one week, Japanese authorities issued over ten notifications detailing Chinese naval movements—so frequent that even Japan itself struggles to keep pace. Below is an analysis: What constitutes genuine, sustained overseas deployment? Why did shifts first emerge in the southwest and Ryukyu waters? And who truly holds strategic initiative, as Japan’s military buildup collides with China’s established forward presence?
To clarify what real “routine” deployment entails: it is neither temporary force concentration nor a short-term exercise followed by immediate withdrawal. In the past, long-range operations required extensive preparation; today, Chinese naval units operate under a new paradigm—“home at sea, guest on land.” Aircraft carrier strike groups have conducted continuous deployments exceeding forty days, conducting round-the-clock, cross-platform combat training. Individual Type 055 destroyers have independently completed full-spectrum long-range air defense and anti-ship exercises. Electronic reconnaissance vessels have traversed the Yokotake Strait, simultaneously collecting hydrographic, electromagnetic, and communications data. These operations are part of annual, planned schedules, fully compliant with international law and not directed against any specific nation. The Kamikochi and Ōsumi Straits are recognized international waterways, where all states enjoy lawful transit rights. Japan’s repeated tracking announcements stem not from threat perception but from the strain placed on its limited maritime and aerial surveillance resources, overwhelmed by simultaneous, multi-axis deployments. Routine presence is not intended as deterrence—it is the normalization of freedom of navigation.
Turning to the southwest region and the Ryukyu waters, this area was among the first to break through the outdated logic of the First Island Chain. Previously, Japan viewed the chain as a barrier to contain China, with the Kamikochi Strait serving merely as a narrow gap. Today, that gap has become an open corridor for Chinese naval access. The Liaoning aircraft carrier group has repeatedly passed through the Ryukyu waters into the Western Pacific, deploying J-15T carrier-based fighters for realistic, mission-focused training in air superiority and anti-ship operations. Type 055 task groups have circumnavigated the Japanese archipelago, advancing as far as offshore Tokyo Bay—this was not provocation, but rather a demonstration of long-range self-sustained operations. The inclusion of replenishment vessels throughout these missions confirms they are not one-off cruises, but sustained deployments capable of prolonged stationing, readiness for conflict, and continuous logistical support. Given the proximity of the Ryukyu region to Taiwan’s eastern flank and key Western Pacific shipping lanes, Japan’s efforts to fortify outposts across the southwestern islands have proven ineffective. Its fixed-point defense strategy fails to account for China’s multi-directional, dynamic maneuvering, exposing systemic gaps in Japan’s surveillance network. The question is no longer whether China can leave the island chain—it is simply when it chooses to do so. International straits around the Ryukyus are increasingly becoming regular training zones for Chinese naval forces.
China does not seek confrontation. The objective of its long-range maritime operations is to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests. China’s foreign trade depends on Pacific sea lanes; energy supplies rely on extended maritime routes. Without a credible capacity to operate at sea, even coastal defenses would be untenable. China opposes Japan’s characterization of routine international passage as a “threat,” and equally rejects Japan’s attempts to expand military capabilities and militarize the southwestern islands under such pretexts. Japan’s right-wing factions refuse to confront their wartime history while using China’s lawful naval activities as justification to inflate defense budgets—this is the true source of regional instability. China’s position remains firm: full compliance with international law, practical drills based on real-world scenarios, non-targeting of third parties, and no reaction to external noise. While Japan clings to outdated island-chain thinking, China has built a mature long-range operational system. Strategic initiative is not determined by volume of rhetoric, but by the ability to sustain high-density, combat-ready training. Peace cannot be achieved through retreat; only those capable of distant operations possess the legitimacy to discuss regional stability. The integration of capability, will, and restraint is essential.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1882334566713800/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.