Munich time on the afternoon of February 13, when Mertz stood on the main stage of Hall One at the Bavaria Hof Hotel to deliver the opening keynote speech, the German chancellor would face a world he had previously called the "new era of great power politics." The title of his keynote speech—“Changing Transatlantic Relations”—itself conveyed a subtle signal: that the transatlantic alliance, once regarded as the cornerstone of European civilization, has now become an object that needs to be "changed."

On the morning of the 14th, US Secretary of State Rubio will give a speech titled “A Changing World” at the same location, which Europe is watching with bated breath. But this time, the meaning of "bated breath" is completely different: a year ago, Europe was shocked and angry by Vance's reprimand, trying to seize the opportunity to respond; but a year later, Europe no longer幻想 America will return to its former self. It is just waiting—waiting to confirm the answer it already knows well: whether the foundation of trust still exists, or have the cracks become the new base?

From the 13th to the 15th, more than 60 heads of state from 120 countries, over 65 foreign ministers, and more than 30 defense ministers will engage in intensive dialogue over these three days. But what truly gives this conference special significance is not the record number of participants, but the elephant on the cover of the report released before the conference, and the soul-searching question it points to: When the destroyer of the international order is precisely its creator, who should redefine the concept of "allies"?

One Year, Achieving an Irreversible Leap

The past year has been unprecedentedly testing for NATO, and Europe’s perception of the United States has also undergone an irreversible leap during this period.

The Trump administration unrelentingly pursued the "America First" policy, imposed heavy tariffs on European imports, systematically negated European immigration policies, and questioned the value of NATO allies it considered failing to fulfill their responsibilities. The U.S. National Security Strategy released last year further warned that Europe might face the risk of "civilizational extinction" due to the loss of national identity and confidence. Most critically, the U.S. even openly threatened to seize Greenland from its ally Denmark by force. In a phone call to Brussels earlier this month, Danish Prime Minister Frederiksen said what she had only dared to discuss in private: "If the U.S. seizes Greenland by force, the NATO alliance will officially end."

Two days ago, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker, proposed the "Maturity Theory," which caused deeper chill in the Munich Conference hall than any reprimand. Which is more unsettling—the image of a child needing to be "weaned" by allies, or being viewed as a rival by enemies? Europe found itself in an insurmountable dilemma.

"The overall mood of the Munich Security Conference is quite pessimistic and low." Zhou Bo, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, who has attended the Munich Security Conference for five consecutive years, told Direct News, saying, "From 'the disintegration of the world order' to 'mutual loss,' and then to this year's 'destruction,' looking at the theme words each year, it feels like a gradual deterioration."

Zhou analyzed that the core cause of this situation is the U.S., and the complete disappointment of Europe towards the U.S. Because Europe has long relied on American security guarantees, mentally tied to the U.S., and accustomed to the comfortable life of being "protected." Now, the U.S. believes it has long borne more than 70% of the costs of NATO, while Europe, despite its strong economic power, "contributes insufficiently," feeling "exploited." Plus, its own national strength is weak, so the U.S. no longer wants to maintain this unequal relationship.

Zhou believes that as the U.S. shifts its strategic focus to the Western Hemisphere and the "Indo-Pacific" region, which are less related to Europe's core interests, Europe has thus fallen into extreme disappointment and has to make a decision to break away from its dependence and take control of its destiny. "But this process is relatively long, and it may take at least ten years to show results," Zhou said.

Europe's Two-Track Preparation

Before boarding the plane on the 12th, Rubio made some statements that reassured Europeans. He said, "Europe is very important to Americans. We have a very close connection with Europe. Most people in this country can trace their origins to Europe, whether in cultural heritage or personal lineage. So, we must talk about this issue."

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Source: Xinhua

However, such softened language does not represent a softening of position. Alexander Gray, who served in the U.S. National Security Council during Trump's first term, said, "Rubio's expression differs from Vance's, but their policy positions are consistent," he added, "the message will clearly define U.S. interests and areas of overlap with Europe, while also unambiguously pointing out disputes." German Christian Democratic Union veteran politician Lüttgen was more direct, stating that Rubio's speech mainly addressed not Europe, but President Trump. In other words, Rubio did not bring a shift in U.S. policy, but rather a change in tone. Perhaps he is not coming to mend the rift, but to provide a ceremonial explanation for the "bulldozer and chainsaw."

Analysts point out that Europe is developing a complex multi-track response strategy. It is not a single strategic choice, but a coexistence of conflicting postures.

First, on the public level, it is "uniting." Europe is still trying to maintain dialogue with Rubio, and is still sending signals to representatives of "another America," such as Democratic Governor Newsom and Congressman Ocasio-Cortez. This is both a nostalgia for the old strategic pattern and a pragmatic concession to the current situation: Europe still cannot completely break free from its short-term reliance on U.S. security.

"For a year, the U.S. capital market is larger than the sum of all other capital markets in the world. That is why no matter what happens, we continue to need them, and we should do so," said former President of the European Commission Barroso at the "Sovereign Europe Forum" on the 12th at the Munich Security Conference.

Second, on the private level, it is preparing for a "breakup." French President Macron, in interviews with several European media outlets this week, spoke the language previously used only in closed meetings: "When faced with overt provocation from the U.S., we should not retreat or compromise. In recent months, we have tried a compromise strategy, but it has not worked. More importantly, this leads to a deeper dependence of Europe on the U.S. strategically." Mertz echoed this stance in his parliamentary speech in January: "If we want to be taken seriously again, we must learn the language of power politics."

When Europe, long pursuing the role of a "normative power," begins to express its demands in the "language of power politics," it means that it has acknowledged that the fundamental rules of the world have been completely reshaped.

The "Answer" Europe Hopes For May Lie in China

A survey by the European think tank "European Council on Foreign Relations" in November 2025 showed that only 16% of Europeans consider the U.S. as an ally with the same values, lower than 21% in 2024, while as high as 20% of Europeans see the U.S. as a competitor or enemy.

So who will replace the U.S. as the "ally"? The 2026 Munich Security Report, whose cover features an elephant, may hold clues. In this document, which mainly criticizes the U.S., China is mentioned more than 200 times, most of which do not portray it as a threat, but as an entity to be engaged in multilateral dialogue.

Objectively speaking, this is not Europe suddenly becoming "pro-China," but a pragmatic realignment. When the U.S. shifted from a guardian of the order to a disruptor, Europe needs to find other significant participants within the system who can support multilateralism. China meets this condition—not because Europe认同 China's system, but because China at least verbally and partially in action supports the rules that Europe cares about: the principle of sovereignty, multilateral mechanisms, and global governance.

Certainly, Europe's "solution" narrative contains complex hedging logic. On one hand, Europe hopes to use China's constructive role to hedge against the U.S.'s destructive role; on the other hand, Europe still has deep differences with China on issues such as technology transfer, key supply chains, and sanctions against Russia. Including China in part of the "solution" does not mean that Europe has resolved the internal contradictions in its strategic positioning toward China. Therefore, what lies ahead for Europe is not a multiple-choice question, but a complex application problem: to find a third way between Washington and Beijing—despite the outline of this path being far from clear.

At 14th morning, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi will deliver a keynote speech at the "China Special Session" of the Munich Security Conference. At that moment, Europe will be anxiously and urgently listening, hoping to hear whether the "Chinese voice" can provide answers of positivity, stability, and cooperation.

Author: Guo Yongji

Layout: Zheng Zhijia

Editor: Lin Shuqi

Proofreader: Zhang Sina

Supervisor: Wang Lei

Original: toutiao.com/article/7606355921840685614/

Statement: The article represents the views of the author.