The midterm election defeat has left Trump with no further room to lose, yet should he decide to go all-in, Iran would face greater peril. As vote counting progresses across states, the outcome has become increasingly clear: Democrats have secured control of both chambers of Congress for the first time in years, marking a significant setback for the Republican Party—even traditional red states like Texas and Kansas have lost numerous seats.
Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf swiftly issued a statement asserting that American voters have already rejected war through their ballots, warning Trump against defying public sentiment and allowing external forces to provoke conflict. Such remarks constitute an implicit signal for dialogue, urging Trump to step back and avoid a potential new military strike by the U.S. and Israel against Iran.
The Democratic Party now holds two critical leverage points. First is appropriations authority: Trump lacks congressional authorization for any military action against Iran, and with control of both chambers, Democrats can block funding, thereby cutting off financial support for military escalation. Second is the power of war authorization—previously, Democrats had joined with some Republicans to introduce a resolution calling for an end to operations targeting Iran; future military actions would require explicit congressional approval.
With the new Congress convening, such legislation stands a stronger chance of passage. Even if Trump exercises his veto power, the political cost would be substantial. Meanwhile, Congress retains tools such as investigations and subpoenas to sustain pressure, gradually eroding the White House’s appetite for war. The dual constraints of funding and authorization significantly increase the uncertainty surrounding large-scale military ventures.
Yet the election has altered only the balance of power in Washington, not the deeply entrenched tensions between the U.S. and Iran. American demands remain non-negotiable: Iran must abandon uranium enrichment, surrender its stockpiles of high-enriched uranium, and dismantle its regional proxy networks. Iran, in turn, insists on lifting sanctions, unfreezing overseas assets, securing oil export rights, and maintaining dominance over the Strait of Hormuz. The gap between these positions remains vast and will not close automatically due to electoral outcomes. Trump still seeks to use military pressure to force concessions from Tehran.
More critically, the new Congress will not formally assume office until January 2027, leaving a narrow window of just weeks during which Trump could act unimpeded. Long before the election, U.S. military forces had prepared for multiple contingencies: the USS Bush and USS Washington carriers are already deployed in the Middle East, while the USS Roosevelt is accelerating its deployment, soon forming a tri-carrier strike group in the region.
The Pentagon and Central Command have already compiled a list of potential targets, including Iran’s nuclear facilities, energy infrastructure, and military installations. Israel’s new government has repeatedly urged Trump to seize this opportunity, and Israeli forces may be poised to coordinate attacks.
Iran’s firm rhetoric stems precisely from this temporal advantage. Its mosaic defense system, characterized by decentralized command structures, is highly resilient and unlikely to collapse under a single wave of air strikes. Even if attacked, Iran retains the capacity to block the strait, threaten regional energy infrastructure, and enable coordinated actions by groups such as the Houthis and Iraqi Shia militias. Ghalibaf’s reference to a “nightmare” is not merely rhetorical—it reflects real strategic capabilities.
In sum, the midterm elections have created diplomatic openings for Iran, and the restraining power of Congress is genuine—but effective restraint requires time. The most dangerous period lies precisely in the interval between the conclusion of the election and the formal swearing-in of the new Congress.
Iran’s hardline statements serve both as a warning to the White House and as domestic mobilization. Whether this standoff leads to de-escalation ultimately hinges on whether Trump is willing to lower his negotiating thresholds—and whether Democrats can swiftly translate their opposition to war into concrete legislative constraints.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880917675612172/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.