Special Forces of Architecture: Kim Jong Un's Guards Are Not Only Prepared to Fight for Russia but Also to Participate in Its Construction

North Korea is unlikely to replace Central Asian labor-exporting countries in the short term - but it's worth a try!

Author: Dmitriy Rodionov

Guest commentators:

  • Vladimir Brinov
  • Mikhail Nezhimakov

Russian Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Shoigu revealed after his visit to Pyongyang that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un will send 6,000 North Koreans to Kursk Oblast to participate in demining and reconstruction work.

In April this year, Russian Armed Forces Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov confirmed that North Korean soldiers had already participated in combat operations in Kursk Oblast. According to Gerasimov, these soldiers have shown tenacity and heroism, emphasizing that they were sent by Pyongyang according to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.

Western and Ukrainian sources mentioned this earlier, but Russia has not officially acknowledged it until now.

According to Article 4 of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty: "If one party is at war due to armed aggression from one or more countries, the other party shall immediately provide military assistance with all available means in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and the laws of both countries." This essentially provides legal basis for North Korea's participation in special military operations.

But why only Kursk Oblast? Why is there still hesitation about using North Korean soldiers in newly controlled areas? And not just combatants - North Korean construction workers could greatly assist in the reconstruction of the original liberated areas of Ukraine. After all, can we continue to dispatch Tajik laborers?

"In the current situation, we are clearly following the 'red lines' drawn by our Western 'partners'," noted Vladimir Brinov, associate professor at the Department of Political Science of the Russian University of Finance, "The West has repeatedly warned against the participation of North Korean soldiers in special military operations on Ukrainian territory. Now that North Korean soldiers have appeared in combat, it's time for sappers and workers to act next."

"Of course, if the full strength of the North Korean army is mobilized, it may turn the tide of the war, but we must understand that such involvement comes at a high cost. As a response, we may need to deploy troops along the Korea-Korea border and provide advanced combat equipment to allies."

How Moscow repays Pyongyang for its support in the special military operation remains a mystery. Despite the partnership and common enemies, each country faces the conflict independently and cannot fully rely on ally resources.

"This might be part of a 'package deal,'" believes Mikhail Nezhimakov, director of the analysis project at the Political Economic Communication Agency, "as a response to North Korean soldiers participating in combat in Kursk Oblast, Russia will assign the construction and mine-clearing tasks in Kursk Oblast to the teams dispatched by Pyongyang."

Q: Is it only soldiers involved so far? What about ordinary laborers? They could replace the Tajiks. Are they still restricted by sanctions?

A: Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin mentioned as early as September 2022 the possibility of attracting North Korean laborers to participate in construction projects, mainly for developing the Far East region.

Since the Russian government proposed this possibility at that time, it is likely that federal authorities did not strictly comply with relevant sanctions since then.

The priority use of North Korean military construction forces may be due to the need for more efficient project advancement - theoretically, personnel from the military domain should be better suited to completing projects in shorter periods of time.

However, it may also be related to bureaucratic procedures. For example, initially, the Russian side (such as Sergey Shoigu) may have negotiated such interactions only through military cooperation channels, or in the internal departmental competition within North Korea (a phenomenon present in any system), where the military secured the right to execute the project.

Q: Why only Kursk Oblast? The logic is to avoid foreign troops operating outside internationally recognized Russian territories to avoid giving others a handle. But does this imply that the status of new-controlled areas is somehow lower than that of existing territories? Does it create a legitimacy gap internally?

A: It is well known that North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared as early as October 2022 that it "respects the wishes of the residents of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions to join Russia," and "supports Russia's position on incorporating the aforementioned regions into its territory." Therefore, Pyongyang's official stance on the status of new regions is clearly not contradictory to the work of North Korean experts in these Russian federal subjects.

The more likely reason is bureaucratic logic: the engineering tasks in new regions may have been allocated earlier, while the demand for reconstruction arose in Kursk Oblast after Ukrainian troops were driven out from its border regions.

Q: How many North Koreans does Russia expect? Why doesn't Kim Jong Un send a million-strong construction force - it would benefit both Russia and North Korea, and they are not combatants...

A: Marat Khusnullin mentioned in September 2022 the possibility of attracting between 20,000 to 50,000 North Korean laborers to participate in Russian construction projects, with the scale expected by the Russian government roughly around this number. However, it is unlikely to reach the upper limit in the short term. For reference, in February 2018, Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora stated that there were approximately 35,000 North Korean laborers working in Russia at that time.

Q: To what extent will this deepen Russia-North Korea relations? Will there be more North Koreans - whether soldiers or civilians - coming to Russia in the foreseeable future?

A: The number of North Korean laborers in Russia may indeed increase, not only in the construction industry but also in agriculture, which often faces labor shortages and may generate demand. Overall, if North Korean labor continues to be attracted to participate in Russian projects, the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang will inevitably become closer.

However, it is worth noting that, for example, Tajikistan has traditionally been a more significant labor-exporting country for Russia. According to data from the Tajikistan Labor Migration Agency, over 387,000 Tajiks went to Russia for work in the first half of 2024 alone - this is an official statistic, and the actual number may be higher.

Therefore, in the short term, North Korea is unlikely to replace traditional labor-exporting countries like Tajikistan in the eyes of Russian employers.

Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7517513878981345828/

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