Threat: China's Control of Rare Earth Minerals to Hit the Pentagon Hard

A new report from the U.S. military calculates that over 78% of U.S. military weapons depend on Chinese materials.

Author: Patrick Tucker | Publication Time: April 23, 2025, 3:23 PM Eastern Time

China's move to restrict exports of rare earth minerals critical to U.S. military power is making long-predicted vulnerabilities an urgent reality.

From tungsten in armor-piercing rounds to gallium in radar systems, the Department of Defense has built a supply chain directly linked to China. Recent developments threaten the Pentagon's ability to maintain this supply chain.

In early April, China implemented a full export ban on seven rare earth elements used in everything from laser-guided weapons to MRI machines. Samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium now require government-issued licenses for export, with officials citing "national security" as justification.

Dan Darling of Forecast International analyzed: Although this is a new measure, the requirement for export permits undoubtedly introduces uncertainty, disrupting the stable supply of key components to manufacturers. This action adds turbulence to an already unstable global market, highlighting the potential risks of weaponizing critical supply chain resources.

China has long dominated rare earth mining and processing. However, this latest decision tightens the supply of materials needed for everything from hypersonic missile systems to cancer treatments. Previously, in December 2024, China issued similar export bans on metals like gallium, germanium, and antimony, which are used in semiconductors, infrared optics, and armor-piercing ammunition.

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Since 2010, demand for components containing five key minerals - antimony, gallium, germanium, tungsten, and tellurium - has surged for the Pentagon, with related contracts increasing by 23.2% annually. Contracts related to gallium alone grew by 41.8% per year. Now, approximately 80,000 different components rely on these materials, accounting for about 78% of all U.S. defense weapons. According to a new report by Govini Analytics, the Navy leads in dependency, with 91% of its systems containing at least one of these minerals.

Taking gallium as an example, this mineral plays a crucial role in GPS systems and radar. After China's export bans on antimony, gallium, and germanium were implemented, prices for components containing these key minerals rose on average by 5.2%, compared to no such increase in the months prior to the ban. Specifically, components containing gallium increased by 6.0%, those containing antimony by 4.5%, and those containing germanium by 1.6%, while other components rose by only 1.4% on average.

However, the bottleneck is not the minerals themselves but the refining process. The U.S. often ships raw materials to China for processing and then imports finished components. With China's 2024 export ban expanding to include tungsten and tellurium, this cycle is being disrupted. Even Australian antimony cannot be used in U.S. systems unless processed in China. As a result, 88% of the U.S. Department of Defense's critical mineral supply chain is influenced by China.

Almost all antimony used in key platforms such as the F-16 fighter jets, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, and Minuteman III ICBMs goes through some processing stage in China. Only 19% can be obtained through non-Chinese intermediaries. Strategic costs are measurable – after the ban, component prices containing gallium surged by 6%, those containing antimony by 4.5%, while other components under the Department of Defense only rose by 1.4%.

Even if the U.S. manages to break free from dependence on these five minerals, more vulnerabilities remain. China dominates magnesium, essential for airframes and missiles, and the U.S. lacks reserves. Similarly, graphite and fluorite, used in rocket propulsion, fluorescent lamps, and nuclear fuel processing, are also problematic.

The report recommends addressing the issue from multiple angles:

Restore domestic processing capabilities: The U.S. still lacks domestic sources for gallium, germanium, and tungsten, but recent federal investments may yield results. For instance, Utah's Kennecott Mine helped reduce reliance on imported tellurium from 95% in 2019 to 25% in 2023.

Leverage mineral coexistence: Key minerals often occur alongside others. A zinc mine in Tennessee produces 30 tons of germanium and 40 tons of gallium annually, nearly equivalent to China's global export volume in 2022. However, developing these resources takes years.

Leverage artificial intelligence and software: Discover overlooked byproducts within the U.S. industrial base and establish connections with commercial suppliers.

Build strategic defense reserves: In some cases, strategic reserves must be established. For example, the U.S. government still lacks reserves of gallium and tellurium.

The report concludes: "America's reliance on China for critical minerals represents a clear and growing strategic vulnerability." If the U.S. does not act swiftly, this vulnerability could soon determine America's military deterrence, not due to troop numbers or manpower shortages, but because of the scarcity of critical elements.

Original Article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1830293564423579/

Disclaimer: This article solely represents the author's personal views.