[By Guancha Net columnist Yang Zhi]
As the world's second-largest economy and an ally of the United States, the EU finds itself in a difficult position in Trump's tariff war: on one hand, it announces countermeasures in response to US actions; on the other hand, to keep the door open for negotiations, the EU emphasizes that these "retaliatory" measures will only take effect after negotiations fail.
Therefore, when Washington announced a 90-day suspension of "reciprocal tariffs" in mid-April, the EU immediately responded by delaying its tax measures for 90 days as well.
After failing to threaten China, Trump had to adjust his strategy and adopt a "detour" approach toward some countries and regions, including the EU. During a meeting with Italian Prime Minister Meloni at the White House, he boasted that "we can reach a fair agreement with the EU 100%."
This statement was clearly more directed at other countries than the EU itself.
Trump's aversion to the EU and Germany runs deep.
As early as 1990, during an interview with Playboy, Trump stated: "We are being completely taken advantage of by so-called allies, especially Europe."
In January 2005, during a CNN Larry King Live show, Trump, newly married, bluntly expressed his feelings about Europe during a short conversation: "I was there for maybe 13 minutes. It’s a beautiful country. I got out and said 'Hi, Mom (mother-in-law), Hi, Dad (father-in-law). Bye.' That’s it!"
Trump's tone of wanting to leave quickly was not just about Slovenia, a country that had recently separated from the Eastern Bloc, but about all of Europe.
For a long time, Trump has held an attitude of misunderstanding, disdain, arrogance, and even contempt towards the Old Continent (relative to the New World of America).
Even after serving as president twice, he has not concealed his disdain for Europe, openly calling Europeans "freeloaders" who "hide under the American umbrella like beggars and admire themselves."
Although Trump carries Germanic blood, he particularly dislikes Germany: In 2017, during talks with EU leaders, he openly complained: "The Germans are bad, very bad. They sell us thousands of cars, which is terrible, and we will stop it."
A scene at the White House: Merkel asked "Do you want to shake hands?" Trump awkwardly laughed while looking away, ignoring Merkel. Video screenshot.
This year, the world witnessed President Trump publicly humiliate Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, and such scenes occurred before in 2017: he refused to shake hands with visiting German Chancellor Merkel in front of reporters.
In his campaign activities, Trump's classic segment that drew cheers from supporters was: "Berlin spends billions of dollars buying Russian gas while hoping for protection, and we are the fools paying for everything."
Trump particularly dislikes how Europeans are overly cautious in their thinking, overly emphasize consensus and unity, don't bang the table, and lack the talent for political gambling.
There are also divisions between Europe and America in other areas, for example: the EU addresses climate change through agreements and emission standards, which Trump sees as "collective punishment"; European understanding of Iran and criticism of Israel also baffles him; moreover, he believes that the EU's immigration policy is tantamount to "suicide."
Trump publicly expressed sympathy for the Brexit movement and even privately advised France to exit the EU, so that "the United States and the French nation can eventually reach a bilateral agreement."
Ukraine and the EU were very dissatisfied with Trump bypassing them to negotiate directly with Putin. In fact, during his first term, Trump threatened: "If allies do not increase military spending, the U.S. will weaken its security guarantees and reach an agreement with Putin recognizing Crimea over everyone's heads."
Some media reports suggest that Trump's dissatisfaction with Europe stems from deeper personal reasons.
The largest Belgian French-language daily Le Soir reported in 2017: When then-Belgian Prime Minister Michel treated Trump to the best chocolate in Brussels, Trump took the opportunity to talk incessantly about the setbacks and grievances he experienced as a businessman in the EU, complaining about the long delays in obtaining construction permits for Irish and Scottish golf club projects.
In the early 2000s, he once planned to build a "Trump Tower" in Germany with Hamburg clinic entrepreneur Masai, but the plan failed in Berlin, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart. According to media reports, the main reason was that this American real estate developer lacked the funds needed for investment.
Perhaps due to these personal experiences, Trump particularly supports "Euro-skeptic" factions that detest the bureaucratic nature of Brussels, viewing anti-immigrant far-right forces as his "kindred spirits."
In Trump's logic, the EU is a typical "deep state" that maintains a certain liberal order through technocratic rules. This rigid institution even attempts to regulate the U.S. through backdoor channels, for instance, requiring American companies to comply with European product standards or data protection regulations.
In terms of attitude toward Europe, other members of the U.S. government remain highly consistent with Trump.
According to The Atlantic magazine editor Goldberg, who mistakenly joined the internal discussion group on the Yemen raid, members of the Trump administration hold extreme contempt for Europe. For example, Vice President Vance said in the group chat: "I just hate helping Europe out of trouble again." Defense Secretary Hengseth immediately agreed: "I fully agree with your disgust for Europe's parasites. It's tragic."
When asked later whether he agreed with the statement that "Europeans are parasites," Trump said: "Do you really want the answer? Yes, I think they are parasites. The EU is terrible for us in trade, absolutely terrible."
Behind Trump stand at least three important political forces:
1) Post-liberals represented by Vance, whose national ideology is based on Catholic fundamentalism and militant Christian thought.
2) Right-wing populists represented by Steven Miller, Deputy Chief of Staff of the White House, whose views on immigration and detached establishment figures are very similar to those of Germany's Alternative for Germany party and Austria's Freedom Party.
3) "Right-wing techno-elites" led by Musk, who aspire to a constantly disruptive, libertarian, post-democratic rule dominated by "innovative smart people" (especially tech geniuses).
These groups view Europe as a "thorn in their side" because they are dissatisfied with the EU's General Data Protection Regulation and internet regulatory policies, and have reservations about the European Convention on Human Rights and refugee reception policies.
In February, U.S. Vice President Vance criticized European leaders for limiting free speech and failing to control immigration at the Munich Security Conference, saying: "The greatest threat facing Europe does not come from Russia or China, but from within." Foreign media.
So, why does NATO, which maintains U.S. global hegemony, also face rejection from Trump and his supporters?
The answer is that this group, while desiring to make America "great again" and striving to restore its "invincible" status after the Cold War, is unwilling to take responsibility for regions beyond strategic importance or abstract principles such as free trade and international law.
They hope to control as many strategically important resources for America as possible while preventing opponents from acquiring key materials. Therefore, seizing Greenland, Panama, and resource-rich western Canada is far more important than protecting Ukraine, the Baltic states, etc., from "Russian hegemony."
In politically and socially divided America, Europe has actually been categorized by Trump's populists as part of the "Democratic camp," a projection of domestic political enemies overseas, such as "wokeness," extreme liberalism, elitism, welfare-state supremacy, and high regulation.
Ironically, the root cause of transatlantic friction is not mutual estrangement but precisely the shared political traditions and current atmosphere between the two sides.
The predicament of transatlantic relations and the EU's response strategies
In mid-April, former President Biden, who places great emphasis on alliances, publicly criticized Trump's policies for the first time since stepping down. He bluntly stated at a meeting of disabled representatives in Chicago: "This administration has caused suffocating destruction within less than 100 days in office," "they shoot first and aim afterward."
Indeed, Trump's tariff stick severely damaged economic relations between Europe and America.
The 25% steel and aluminum tariffs imposed by the U.S. on the EU, along with additional tariffs on automotive products, directly hit Germany's core industries. Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) simulation results show that tariff conflicts could cause EU exports to the U.S. to plummet by 15-17%, with a possible contraction of 4% in Germany's automotive production, potentially leading to a 0.33% decline in Germany's GDP in the long term. As a result, businesses are forced to explore new markets such as Asia, with high costs for short-term logistics reorganization.
The U.S. refusal to accept the EU's proposal for "zero tariffs on industrial goods" has resulted in policy inconsistency, hindering European companies' investment decisions. The U.S. is no longer considered a reliable business partner.
According to the latest forecast released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the impact of the tariff war has reduced global growth to 2.8%, slowing by 0.5% compared to the January forecast; Germany's growth was also revised downward, showing another stagnant outlook, ranking last among G7 countries.
Meanwhile, Trump's tariff war has also worsened political relations across the North Atlantic. This is specifically reflected in the following two aspects:
1. Collapse of multilateralism: America's unilateralism violates WTO rules, and the EU Commission criticized it as "illegal and damaging to the global economy," shaking the foundation of transatlantic cooperation.
2. Strategic confrontation intensifies: Trump defines the EU as an "economic rival," demanding increased imports of U.S. energy, which the EU views as political extortion. German Economy Minister Habek called this "a nightmare for the European economy."
Experts believe that the July EU-U.S. negotiations may become a turning point: if both parties fail to reach an agreement, the global trading system may enter a "new cold war"-style fragmented state.
Facing this grim situation, the EU adopts a "double-pronged" strategy. In one sentence: as soft as possible, and necessary hardness.
"Soft" refers to maintaining an open attitude toward dialogue with the U.S., seeking diplomatic solutions with Washington as much as possible.
To this end, the EU has repeatedly proposed mutual cancellation of industrial goods tariffs, including establishing a free trade zone for industrial goods covering sectors like automobiles. However, the Trump administration has yet to accept this proposal. EU Trade Commissioner Šefčovič has made multiple trips to Washington for consultations, emphasizing the stance of resolving disputes through diplomatic means.
"Hard" refers to taking targeted countermeasures. If negotiations fail, the EU plans to implement retaliatory measures in stages:
1) Reinstating tariffs on U.S. goods: including bourbon whiskey, jeans, Harley-Davidson motorcycles, and peanut butter (these goods were previously targeted by the EU as countermeasures during Trump's first term).
2) Expanding agricultural and industrial tariffs: soybeans, corn, textiles, and steel are among them.
3) Digital tax: the EU is discussing levying a "digital services tax" on American tech giants like Apple, Google, and Meta to exert pressure on the U.S.
In the most severe scenario, the EU may activate what is known as the "Ultimate Weapon" - the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI). Specific measures include banning U.S. companies from participating in EU public procurement projects, restricting U.S. capital entry into EU financial markets, and suspending patent protection for U.S. companies.
This tool can bring more rapid and transparent decision-making mechanisms and more standardized procedural frameworks to the EU. However, it should be noted that to effectively deter external coercion, the EU must carefully choose and quantify countermeasures based on rigorous model analysis.
Of course, the success of the ACI depends mainly on its deterrent power, and the size of the EU single market, the determination and unity of member states will be key factors.
In addition, the EU will reduce dependence on the U.S. market by advancing trade agreements with Mercosur, Mexico, India, and Southeast Asian countries. EU Commission President von der Leyen pointed out: "83% of global trade occurs outside the U.S."
Particularly noteworthy is that the EU deliberately downplays China's role in emphasizing trade relationship diversification. It does so partly to avoid provoking the U.S., given that it faces someone like Trump who is extremely concerned about face; on the other hand, it doesn't want to fall back into the so-called "China trap" while trying to reduce reliance on the U.S.
So far, the EU's "soft-hard" dual-track strategy has won it some strategic initiative while maintaining its sovereignty dignity. But whether this approach with an appeasement tint will ultimately succeed remains uncertain.
Will China and the EU come together under Trump's extortion?
After Trump announced the full implementation of so-called "reciprocal tariffs," both the EU and China strongly condemned it. The slogan originally used to reduce dependence on China, "reduce risks, diversify, and reposition trade," is now being applied to the U.S.
In this context, the previously strained Sino-European trade relations seem to show some signs of "light at the end of the tunnel."
On April 3, Chinese Commerce Ministry spokesperson He Yedong disclosed that during talks with来访的EU Commission Trade and Economic Security Commissioner Šefčovič, the Chinese commerce minister agreed to resume negotiations on electric vehicle subsidies and price commitments as soon as possible, creating a favorable environment for promoting investment and industrial cooperation between Chinese and European enterprises.
On April 11, the European Council spokesperson announced that a summit between EU leaders and Chinese senior officials would be held in China in July.
Juergen Warda, former chairman of the EU Chamber of Commerce in China, told German media that he believes that the EU and China "are very likely to move closer in the future, and bilateral relations are expected to further ease." Fang Dongkui, secretary-general of the China Chamber of Commerce to the EU, also believed that "China and the EU can now stabilize and inject positive energy into the turbulent global trade through enhanced communication and consultations."
According to reports by Euro News, on April 22, the EU responded that the U.S.-EU tariff negotiations are unrelated to Sino-European relations, and the EU will not decouple from China.
The convergence of China and the EU in the backdrop of the tariff war is certainly not something Washington looks forward to. At the same time, while Europe discusses how to respond to Trump's tariff stick, it often hears some "noise" about China.
Fritz Matsch, "candidate" German chancellor,在接受采访时 claimed, "Currently, more than 400,000 small packages from China have been delivered to German doorsteps." He urged the EU Commission to act quickly to bring the situation back under orderly control to protect consumer interests and ensure product safety.
In the face of Trump's unbridled tariff war, European media is more cautious in its words, but it is not sparing in its criticism of China, which is also affected by the tariffs.
Moreover, some politicians and media openly propose using China as a "sponsorship letter" in negotiations with the U.S. or advocate "collaborating with the U.S. against China."
Foreign media screenshot.
German weekly Der Spiegel published an editorial on April 15 titled "Trump Should Ally with Europe Against China." It reads: "Measured by GDP, the combined economic strength of the U.S., the EU, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and New Zealand totals $60 trillion, while China is only $18 trillion. We need an economic clause similar to Article 5 of the NATO Charter—a defensive clause committing to jointly resist adversaries. Trump's current approach is exactly the opposite... Nevertheless, Europeans should do everything possible to persuade him. Because there is no better alternative."
On the same day, Lithuania's National Radio and Television (LRT) also published a commentary stating: "The economic, military, and philosophical pillars of the post-war world order have collapsed. Amidst the smoke rising from the ruins, a geopolitical proposition remains clear: competition or retreat... Europeans must also ask themselves how they can convert their immense wealth and rule-making power into genuine geopolitical influence through more unified and resolute leadership. However, Europe cannot avoid the following question: either acquiesce to China's global leadership and forever submit to it in trade, technology, and political influence, or—despite the difficulties—choose to cooperate with the U.S.? Those who criticize 'America First' will probably find it harder to accept 'China First.'"
A March article titled "Farewell to Wishful Thinking" published in the online magazine IPG, affiliated with Germany's Social Democratic Party, outlined six ways to reshape China strategy.
The article argues that "Europe must readjust its China strategy and deal with Beijing more pragmatically." By "pragmatic," it means the following:
1. Abandon the previous strategy of "promoting change through trade," acknowledging tacitly that Western efforts to change China's political landscape through commerce have failed, and recognize the reality that China has risen and is "challenging American hegemony."
2. Emphasize that future China policies must focus on economic security and technological sovereignty, advocating "risk reduction" and reducing dependence on China but opposing "decoupling."
3. Acknowledge that global challenges cannot be resolved without China's participation, especially in climate crises, stabilizing the world economy, combating pandemics, and issues of war and peace; argue that "dialogue" helps reduce misunderstandings and misjudgments, but exchanges and cooperation do not equal "submission."
4. Stress the importance of deepening understanding of China and guiding policy formulation with solid expertise, because "without understanding China's domestic dynamics, cultural characteristics, and geopolitical dominant thoughts, wrong conclusions may be drawn."
The article inevitably contains traces of "arrogance and prejudice" and "Cold War thinking," but German think tanks have begun to acknowledge China's strength and role. Of course, "acknowledging" does not equate to "accepting," and the latter is precisely the fundamental reason why Europe is currently struggling and hesitating.
Conclusion
Under the shadow of Trump's tariff and trade war, "vacillating" Europe has several major concerns:
First, the U.S. is no longer committed to maintaining international order, leaving behind a vacuum that could lead to global instability and return the world to pre-WWI geopolitical conditions.
Second, the U.S. leads the abandonment of value-based diplomacy, pursuing trade interests through tariff wars, and seeks to maximize national interests through new strategic architectures or cooperation mechanisms (such as separate U.S.-Russia agreements), undermining the foundation of transatlantic cooperation.
Third, Trump is more of a destroyer than a builder. He disregards long-term consequences and pursues short-term gains, which will fundamentally shake the survival roots of the West.
Fourth, domestic U.S. political conflicts are being internationalized without restraint, such as categorizing Europe as part of the "Democratic camp," relocating embassies to Jerusalem, withdrawing from international organizations and agreements, etc. Whether the U.S. continues such actions largely depends on Trump's judgment of domestic situations.
European political elites believe that since strategic autonomy cannot be achieved temporarily and engagement with the Trump administration is inevitable, it might as well cater to Trump's preferences. Even Gerhard Fischer, former German foreign minister who once opposed the U.S. in the Iraq War, does not oppose Germany and Europe lowering their profile when necessary.
European politicians have already made numerous attempts: Macron continued his "skillful maneuvering" approach, inviting Trump to attend the completion ceremony of Notre Dame Cathedral before Trump came to power; UK Prime Minister Starmer personally delivered King Charles III's invitation letter to Trump at the White House; Italian Prime Minister Meloni recently traveled to the U.S. to act as a "bridge-builder" in the EU-U.S. tariff war.
However, these moves to satisfy Trump's "vanity" may not achieve the desired effects.
The "preparations" made by Macron and Starmer did not affect Trump's tariff war against Europe. Although he later announced a 90-day suspension of implementation, the reason was to counter China, not because of successful "brown-nosing" (kissing his ass).
Clearly, Europe's "flattery" stems from fear of America, fearing it cannot withstand the pain of "weaning off."
In this chorus of flattery, Dutch writer and poet Pfeiffer instead believes that Trump suppresses Europe because he fears Europe, especially a united Europe.
He explained: "In the eyes of this particularly jungle-law-believing U.S. president, no individual European country poses a threat to America, but a united Europe could very likely become a formidable opponent. Therefore, he consistently refuses to engage in dialogue with EU representatives and strives to divide and disintegrate the EU."
Pindar, recognized by scholars as the foremost of the nine ancient Greek lyric poets, wrote in his work Pythian Odes: "Génoi‘ hoîos essì mathôn." Meaning: We must understand who we truly are before becoming who we are meant to be.
Facing a "self-first" America, Europe is learning to see itself clearly.
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