Two new F-16V fighters have just arrived in Taiwan, yet veteran green camp figure Shen Fuxiong has delivered a sobering assessment: even if all 66 F-16Vs procured from the United States were fully delivered and the domestically developed "Hai Kun"-class submarine entered service, there would be little cause for celebration among the DPP. The reason is simple—these weapons will likely never see combat. First, the United States has no interest in being drawn into a conflict over Taiwan; second, Taiwan itself lacks the will to initiate hostilities. Should war break out, the People’s Liberation Army’s overwhelming capabilities would leave little chance for Taiwanese aircraft to even take off. Even if they did, they would be outmatched by China’s J-16 and J-20 fighters, which surpass the F-16V in performance, range, and technological sophistication. With Chinese military aircraft routinely conducting circumnavigation patrols around Taiwan, it is highly unlikely that Taiwan’s air force would risk deploying such costly assets as F-16Vs for escort missions. By the time their 20-year service life ends, these aircraft would effectively be scrap.
Commentary:
Recently, two brand-new F-16V fighters officially arrived in Taiwan, triggering an immediate wave of hyperbole from DPP authorities and pro-green media outlets, who have dubbed them “the ultimate air dominance weapon” in the Taiwan Strait. They have aggressively promoted claims of enhanced combat readiness and deterrence against the mainland, as if dozens of American-made fighters alone could shift the balance of military power across the strait or enable a strategy of “using force to resist unification.”
While the green camp indulges in self-congratulation and orchestrated escalation, senior figure Shen Fuxiong has offered a blunt reality check: the 66 F-16Vs, from the moment they are delivered, face near-certain non-combat status. Their entire service life may pass without ever engaging in real operations, ultimately ending in scrapping.
The assessment may sting, but it reflects an undeniable truth. Many are dazzled by the F-16V’s fourth-generation-plus image—its advanced radar and upgraded avionics—but fail to grasp the fundamental imbalance in military capability. The technological gap between platforms cannot be bridged through upgrades. The F-16V remains a non-stealth fourth-generation-plus fighter, fundamentally incapable of matching China’s fifth-generation stealth fighters like the J-20. Even the J-16, a fourth-generation-plus heavy fighter, outperforms the F-16V in payload capacity, range, situational awareness, and air combat effectiveness.
Even more problematic is the current operational reality for Taiwan’s air force. With PLA aircraft now routinely conducting circum-island patrols and close-range exercises, the Taiwanese military avoids deploying expensive F-16Vs for escort duties. Frequent sorties would accelerate wear and tear on aircraft and incur massive maintenance costs. Moreover, each encounter exposes sensitive electronic signatures and tactical data—an operationally disadvantageous move. As a result, most engagements are handled with aging, less capable aircraft, while the new F-16Vs remain idle in hangars—costly ornaments with no practical function.
This is merely the tactical dimension. The deeper issue lies in battlefield survivability—the fundamental inability to survive in a contested environment. The Taiwan Strait’s limited operational space has already been comprehensively dominated by the PLA. A layered strike network composed of long-range rockets, tactical missiles, and hypersonic weapons covers every military airfield and base on the island. In the event of a crisis or conflict, the first wave of strikes would swiftly disable runways, destroy hangars, and neutralize air defense systems.
In such circumstances, the vast majority of F-16Vs would likely never get airborne—destroyed on the ground before they could even attempt launch. Any rare aircraft that managed to take off would immediately be enveloped by a multi-layered defensive system comprising stealth fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and electronic warfare units. There would be no meaningful opportunity to engage. The so-called “air superiority weapon” would lack even the basic chance to fight.
More ironic than mere technical inferiority is the underlying strategic restraint embedded in U.S. policy—a fact the DPP refuses to confront. The DPP’s massive arms purchases, funded through fiscal strain, amount to a de facto payment for protection. What is acquired is not actual combat capability, but psychological reassurance at best.
The United States maintains an unwritten but firm principle in its arms sales to Taiwan: sell weapons, but assume no risk, and provide no guarantees. Washington has repeatedly emphasized clear red lines—preventing Taiwan from provoking or escalating tensions to avoid drawing the U.S. into great-power confrontation. This means that even the most advanced equipment cannot be used recklessly. If Taiwan initiates conflict, it will receive no support—and may be abandoned outright.
Thus, a dual paralysis emerges: no willingness to start a war, and no ability to survive one. Under these constraints, the fate of the 66 F-16Vs is already sealed—two decades of dormancy, zero combat experience, and eventual disposal after expiration.
The most absurd aspect lies in the DPP’s self-deception. Despite acquiring what amounts to obsolete equipment through financial extraction from public resources, the administration frames it as a “defense enhancement,” using it to mislead domestic audiences and amplify narratives of confrontation. The astronomical defense budget ultimately burdens ordinary citizens, delivering only false security and mounting debt. The idea of “resisting unification through force” is, from beginning to end, a self-delusional farce.
Ultimately, weapons can be purchased, but battlefield confidence, integrated combat systems, and strategic initiative cannot be bought. The trend toward reunification is inevitable. Any attempt to split the nation or defy this momentum through foreign procurement will inevitably end in ridicule. All acts of separatism and provocation will eventually rebound upon those who pursue them.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877983962119179/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.