[By columnist Yang Zhi of Observer's Network]
A month ago (May 6), 70-year-old Merkel finally became the tenth post-war Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
However, even at what should have been the peak of his political career, setbacks continued to follow him like shadows: in the first round of voting in the federal parliament, he lost despite being expected to win easily due to defections within the three parties of the coalition, setting a historical record.
This "minor flaw" once again showed that this politician, who is said to be "highly capable and up to the task," not only failed to become a lucky star but also seemed to feel constantly sabotaged at crucial moments.
At the federal election on May 6, Merkel was also present in the VIP gallery of the Bundestag. Is she still a political nemesis to Merkel? Source: German media
In fact, political setbacks are already "commonplace" for Merkel: during his rise, he was sidelined by Merkel; after re-emerging, it took him three attempts to become the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU); the result of this year's election was below expectations, etc.
Rigid body posture and a grim face after the first round of elections. Source: German media
People cannot help but ask: will this unfortunate start distort his political mindset and bring about "aftereffects" to future political decisions and coalition governance?
One thing can be certain: now that he has high ambitions, he needs to prove his abilities and skills with achievements. After all, what Merkel has been preparing for over the years is not just experience and strategy from years of politics, but more importantly, twenty-plus years of "endured frustration" and "unrecognized talent."
Now he is here, with the weariness of life and a brain full of plans.
"Foreign Affairs Chancellor"
Merkel was elected as chancellor on May 6 and formed the cabinet; on May 14, he delivered his first government statement outlining his administration's agenda.
The new government's domestic policy goals include military reconstruction, tightening immigration policies, corporate tax cuts, promoting digitalization, reducing bureaucratic delays, etc. From the actual situation, Merkel only made moves in the immigration/refugee sector during his first month in office.
Clearly, other domestic areas are deeply entrenched problems, and the introduction of new policies requires time for careful consideration. Although the immigration/refugee issue is also a mess, targeting foreigners for action would encounter relatively less resistance. The key is that Merkel wants to use this to silence the largest opposition party, the "Alternative for Germany" (AfD), in the federal parliament, buying time to establish prestige on the international stage.
The government jet became one of Merkel's main office locations in the first month.
Merkel indeed worked very hard, traveling tirelessly between Paris, Warsaw, Brussels, Kiev, Tirana, Rome, Vatican City, Vilnius (Lithuania), Turku (Finland), Washington, and other cities in the first month; he also received Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, Israeli President Herzog, Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis, UN Secretary-General Guterres, and others at the Chancellery in Berlin.
It was precisely for this reason that Merkel was called the "foreign affairs chancellor" (Außenkanzler) by the German media. This term is a composite word of "foreign minister" (Außenminister) and "chancellor" (Kanzler). It both affirms Merkel's efforts in foreign affairs and expresses concern about his possible neglect of domestic affairs.
The relationship between the chancellor and foreign affairs
As we all know, foreign affairs is one of the key departments of the government. The chancellor generally places great importance on foreign affairs work, sometimes even taking on the role of foreign minister directly. For example, Premier Zhou Enlai served as foreign minister concurrently during the early days of the founding of New China.
In Germany, the chancellor has the final say on foreign affairs. That is to say, if there is a disagreement between the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry, the former can make the final decision. However, in practice, the approach varies from government to government. This depends on the power distribution among the coalition partners.
The power structure of the German government reflects the broader context of domestic and foreign policy and the basic needs of coalition governance. The chancellor comes from the larger party in the coalition and oversees the administration; the leader of the smaller party will head an important ministry and serve as vice-chancellor, thereby strengthening the weight of their own party. For example:
1) In Chancellor Adenauer's cabinet, the self-governing party leader Blucher (Franz Blücher) held the position of vice-chancellor. The department he oversaw was called the "Marshall Plan Affairs Department," which later became the "Department of Economic Cooperation." Why?
At that time, the Federal Republic of Germany had just been established, with limited sovereignty, and the new government had little room for diplomatic maneuvering. For a war-torn and destitute defeated country like Germany, the top priority was not diplomacy, but economic recovery; and to recover economically, naturally,离不开 American Marshall Plan assistance. Therefore, Blucher's control of this department was closely related to this goal.
2) At the end of the 1960s, when Brandt (Willy Brandt) of the Social Democratic Party became chancellor, the Federal Republic of Germany already possessed most of its sovereignty, and the economic miracle had achieved post-war revival. However, facing the Cold War situation, as a geographically positioned Germany between East and West, promoting "proactive" and "distinctive" diplomacy became the urgent task of the German government.
On October 11, 1972, Federal German Foreign Minister Scheel and Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei signed the establishment communiqué in Beijing.
In subsequent governments (Schmidt, Kohl, Schroeder, Merkel's first to third cabinets), the Foreign Ministry has always been in the hands of the "little partner" (small party) of the coalition government.
As the image ambassador of Germany on the international stage, the foreign minister has a high profile, does not cause much trouble domestically, and is not at the forefront of social conflicts. Therefore, the foreign minister often scores highest on the list of politicians.
This situation did not change until Merkel's last government.
At that time, although the Foreign Ministry remained important, it was no longer the top priority of the Social Democratic Party, which joined forces with the coalition. Their focus shifted to the "purse"—the Treasury. Heiko Maas, from the "second echelon," was appointed as foreign minister, while Finance Minister (and vice-chancellor) was held by heavyweight Olaf Scholz.
The main reason for this shift was that during her tenure as chancellor, Angela Merkel increasingly dominated foreign policy: whether mediating the Ukraine-Russia conflict (Minsk Agreement) or China policy (she visited China 12 times), every move bore her mark; the foreign minister basically became a "runner" or a "figurehead," making it difficult to reflect the weight of the coalition partner in the government.
Secondly, the subprime mortgage crisis of 2007, the global stock market crash of 2008, the European sovereign debt crisis of 2009, the coronavirus pandemic of 2020, and subsequent international financial panic all highlighted the importance of national financial resources. Additionally, as Germany's economy began to decline during Merkel's later years, domestic fiscal austerity was inevitable. Therefore, mastering the powerful Ministry of Finance became the primary goal pursued by the coalition partner.
During the previous "traffic light" government, the Green Party, which was quite popular and ambitious, aimed to strongly promote its political agenda ("diplomacy guided by values and feminism," environmental protection, and economic transformation). They sought to seize control of the traditional "image ministry" Foreign Ministry and the expanded Ministry of Economics.
Ultimately, Annalena Baerbock became foreign minister, and Robert Habeck took charge of the "super ministry" Ministry of Economics and Climate Protection and served as vice-chancellor; although SPD's Scholz moved into the Chancellery, his influence on the economy and foreign affairs clearly decreased.
At that time, tensions between the Chancellery and the Foreign and Economics Ministries became increasingly prominent. Not only were the statements inconsistent, but the viewpoints were often contradictory. The ministries controlled by the Greens were almost like "fortresses impervious to needle or water," leading to one of the reasons for the premature dissolution of the "traffic light" government.
After this year's election, the SPD's position in the coalition government changed from "large party" to "small party," but it brought two lessons to Merkel's government. First, it was no longer constrained by the "debt brake" mechanism and borrowed heavily before the new government was formed to address the thorny challenges of domestic and foreign affairs. Second, unification of orders: the chancellor must regain control over foreign and economic policy discourse.
Merkel's "first month in foreign affairs": gains and losses
Merkel's foreign policy思路is easy to discern, combining both "old rules" and "new ideas."
By "old rules," it refers to consolidating the Franco-German axis and focusing on the EU; "new ideas" involve expanding the scope of the Franco-German axis to include Poland as a representative of Central and Eastern Europe, establishing a new "Franco-German-Polish" axis.
Two days after becoming chancellor, Merkel made his first visit to Paris and then flew to Warsaw that same day.
The Franco-German relationship has long been considered the "stabilizing force" of the EU. Although the main-subordinate relationship in the cooperation between Adenauer and de Gaulle, Kohl and Mitterrand, Merkel and Sarkozy/Hollande has shifted toward Germany, it has remained relatively stable and harmonious. Only the strained relationship between Scholz and Macron has caused the Franco-German axis to "cease operations," each singing their own tune. Therefore, Merkel made efforts to mend personal relations with Macron before and after taking office.
This is not showmanship but political necessity.
Unlike Scholz, who blindly followed the U.S. under Biden, Merkel believes that Putin's "invasion of Ukraine" is dismembering Europe by force, and Trump's "America First" is destroying the North Atlantic alliance. Faced with this "two-pronged pressure," the only way out and solution for the EU is to speak with one voice and promote political integration.
To achieve this goal, relying solely on the already waning Franco-German "tandem" is insufficient; reactivating the Franco-German-Polish "Weimar Triangle model" is imperative.
First, the NATO and EU's eastern regions bear significant pressure due to the Ukraine war. Among the countries supporting Ukraine, Poland has consistently played a very important role.
Second, to counter Hungary and Slovakia's pro-Russian governments within the EU, it is crucial to leverage and win over Poland, which shares a "anti-Russian" sentiment and belongs to the Visegrád Group in Central and Eastern Europe.
Third, Poland is America's "wedge" in Europe; including Warsaw in the new EU axis means sharing power and responsibility, which helps weaken America's influence on the EU.
Facing an assertive Russia and an increasingly unreliable Trump, Germany urgently needs to share an independent European nuclear umbrella. To achieve this, it is impossible to bypass the UK and France, two European nuclear powers. Coincidentally, post-Brexit Britain has been seeking to restore close ties with the EU. After becoming prime minister, Starmer has been attempting to strengthen and restore these relations.
Merkel wants to establish authority within the EU, and diplomacy is a shortcut. However, while shortcuts are easier to take, obstacles are harder to remove. One such obstacle is the Ukraine issue.
The difficulty lies in the simple fact: without U.S. support, the EU and the UK cannot resolve the ongoing three-year Ukraine-Russia war on their own. Putin only wants to talk to Trump and completely disregards these American followers. Meanwhile, Trump has his own calculations, showing no intention of continuing to engage in European affairs, repeatedly catering to Moscow's conditions for ending the war.
Despite multiple disappointments with Trump, Merkel and others have no choice but to try to bring the "dealmaker" in Washington aboard.
Thus, we saw this photo accompanying an article published on May 11 in the German Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper. The title of the article was "Then, Macron pulled out his phone and pressed the name 'Donald Trump' in his contacts."
"On the phone line is Washington" - from left to right: British Prime Minister Starmer, Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, French President Macron, Polish Prime Minister Tusk, and newly appointed German Chancellor Merkel. Source: German media
German media reports were vague, but internal messages later revealed that Trump's attitude shocked the people in the picture, leaving them extremely disappointed. Clearly, Trump did not fall into their trap.
The most disappointing was Merkel's stern warning to Moscow before his trip: if there was no unconditional ceasefire, the EU and the U.S. would impose even harsher sanctions.
Did he not know that Western sanctions against Russia for three years have yielded no results? Or did he believe he had better cards to play?
Walking so high-profile on the diplomatic stage, the outcome will surely be embarrassing. Saying so much, it shows that Merkel lacks diplomatic experience.
Another flaw also falls on Merkel's account: his diplomatic thought of focusing on the EU is correct, but he failed to properly embody this idea in specific operations, unintentionally offending the marginalized Italy. Italian Prime Minister Meloni, who has good personal relations with Trump, felt neglected. Thus, Merkel hurried to Rome to meet Meloni during his visit to attend the inauguration of the new Pope, patching up relations.
What deserves praise is Merkel's adjustment and outspoken stance on the Israel issue. Supporting Israel is Germany's so-called "state reason" (Staatsräson), based on repentance as the established state policy. However, faced with Israel's indiscriminate killing of innocents and inhumane actions in the Gaza Strip under the Netanyahu government, Merkel boldly criticized it. On June 5, German Foreign Minister Johann David Wadephul did not avoid the issue either, directly stating in his reception of the Israeli foreign minister that Israel's settlement policy (Siedlungspolitik) in the West Bank violates international law.
Merkel's meeting with "no major incidents"
Another bigger "obstacle" on Merkel's diplomatic path was his visit to Washington on Thursday (June 5).
According to the original plan, Merkel and Trump were scheduled to hold a closed-door meeting in the Oval Office on Thursday morning to resolve potential differences privately beforehand. Afterward, both delegations would have lunch together before appearing jointly in the famous Oval Office to face the press.
According to reports by The New York Times, late Wednesday night, the White House temporarily notified the German side of a change in the agenda, moving the Oval Office meeting to before lunch and requiring them to face the press first. This caught Merkel's team off guard, fearing that Trump might pull another "stunt."
Merkel himself seemed quite composed, repeatedly stating before his trip that he would not take any tranquilizers before meeting Trump and would not appear in the White House in the posture of a "beggar" (Bittsteller).
Nevertheless, the new German chancellor and his team made meticulous preparations for the trip, reportedly rehearsing various scenarios they might encounter. For instance, they intended to praise (or remind) Trump of Germany's liberation of Europe from the historical perspective of the Friday "D-Day" commemoration; let Trump do most of the talking (avoid interrupting) to prevent "too many words leading to mistakes"; carefully observe successful meeting examples (such as NATO Secretary General Ruetter) and so on.
In short, the German delegation arrived with great sincerity and thorough preparation.
In the Oval Office of the White House, Merkel spoke little and listened more: his speaking-to-Trump ratio was 1:9.
Speaking of "preparedness," Merkel brought two gifts, big and small, for Trump this time.
The "small gift" was personal in nature and kept secret until the last moment. It wasn't until he recorded a video onboard the government jet en route to Washington that Merkel unveiled his gift for Trump: Trump's grandfather Frederick's birth certificate in Germany. This 29-second video was released by Merkel's team on the official chancellor's account. In the video, he proudly held this historic document, clearly hoping to surprise Trump.
Whether this "emotional card" will truly bring Merkel and Trump closer personally and positively impact their substantive talks remains to be seen. As the saying goes, "The more gifts you give, the less likely you'll offend anyone." Trump happily accepted the gift and promised to hang it in a "honored place." His team subsequently shared the relevant clips on their social platform "Truth Social."
The "big gift" is the billions of euros Germany and Europe will invest in enhancing defense capabilities over the next few years. With this large sum, the European-American arms trade in the future looks promising, and American defense companies will receive order after order. As everyone knows, nothing pleases a U.S. president like a practical "deal."
From the current situation, the meeting in the Oval Office was quite harmonious and smooth, and the anticipated "Zelenskyy moment" did not occur. The U.S. president even praised Merkel's fluent and standard English and expressed willingness to develop friendly relations with Germany.
In an interview with German media after his visit to the White House, Merkel also stated that the outcome of this meeting exceeded expectations. He said that a good personal relationship had been established. During the subsequent lunch, he also had in-depth exchanges with Trump on other issues (including bilateral trade, tariffs, the Ukraine-Russia war, and other thorny topics). With this good beginning and foundation, and with two more meetings this month (Canada G7 Summit and Netherlands NATO Summit), Merkel believes that their relationship will further strengthen.
Conclusion
Friday (June 6) marks Merkel's first month in office.
Being able to go to the White House to celebrate his "first month in office" is somewhat telling of Merkel's "nerve," showing a bit of "if you don't enter the tiger's den, how can you get the tiger's cub?" spirit.
On the other hand, Trump's governing style and modus operandi have produced a rather bizarre effect: for foreign heads of government, as long as there are no bad outcomes in the Oval Office, it counts as a success.
German media breathed a sigh of relief over the "unforeseen incident" during Merkel-Trump's meeting. Some even began to fantasize that German-American relations and transatlantic relations might "warm up" as a result.
For such thoughts, the outcome of Musk-Trump's relationship should serve as a cautionary tale.
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Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7513014898025071113/
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