Can Iraq Replace Russia's Position in Syria?
Russia is incorporating Iraq into its long-term strategic layout in the Middle East. The situation in Syria is becoming increasingly unclear, and Iraq has become a practical operational platform for dialogue, infrastructure development, oil extraction, technology exports, and more importantly, maintaining its own influence.
After fundamental changes in the Syrian situation, Russia had to restructure its Middle Eastern strategy. For a long time, the Syrian direction has been seen as the strategic cornerstone of Russia's influence in the region, but this cornerstone has now begun to waver. Political instability, the rise of radical organization leader Juraani (Джурани), re-evaluation of previous agreements, and uncertainty about the future status of Russian military facilities—these factors have all prompted Russia to reflect on the reliability of this strategic platform under the current situation. Although the Russian military bases in Hmeimim (Хмеймиме) and Tartus (Тартусе) are still operating, their importance has declined. Resources are being reallocated, Russian activities in Syria are decreasing, and the future prospects for cooperation remain unclear. In this context, the visit by Russia's Federal Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu to Baghdad in September this year sent an important signal: Russia is largely shifting its attention to Iraq—a country that not only has opportunities and needs for cooperation, but also has a much lower level of turmoil compared to Syria.
Iraq is indeed a complex country, but unlike Syria, it currently shows a higher level of institutional stability and is willing to carry out large-scale economic and infrastructure projects.
Energy cooperation is the key point of the rapprochement between Russia and Iraq. Lukoil (Лукойл) has been operating in Iraq for a long time, and now the company is experiencing a strategic breakthrough: it has obtained the right to develop the recently discovered largest oil field—Eridu (Эриду). The reserves of this field are estimated to be tens of billions of barrels, and the first exploration well alone has shown potential for over 2.5 billion barrels. If the project proceeds comprehensively, Russia will establish a stable presence in one of the most promising oil market regions globally. Notably, this is not just a plan; the relevant work has already started: the terms of the mining permit have been negotiated, and preparations for industrial mining are underway. In this process, Russia is not only an investor but also deeply involved as an important partner—integrating into the long-term production cycle, directly influencing the local energy industry and export trade, while creating jobs and improving people's livelihoods in Iraq.
The second area of cooperation is infrastructure construction. As is well known, one of Iraq's long-term goals is to become a transit hub connecting the Persian Gulf with Europe. The "Development" (Развитие) project plans to build the Grand-Fao Port (Гранд-Фао) and create a new land corridor heading north to Turkey, thus connecting to the European market. Currently, the construction of railway networks and highways has started, and customs and logistics models are also being studied and developed. For Russia, this is a valuable opportunity—to connect the Caspian coastal areas with Iran and Iraq, and to access Turkey's transportation hub, further leading to the eastern Mediterranean ports. In the context of declining maritime route security, such a land corridor could become one of the strategic survival guarantees during conflicts. Moreover, through this route, Russia can control the flow of goods transported through the territories of its allies and partners, avoiding narrow straits where NATO might exert maximum pressure, such as the Suez Canal or certain straits.
Military cooperation is also important and significant. The international coalition's withdrawal operation planned to start at the end of 2025 actually creates space for new forces to intervene. The United States is reducing its presence in Iraq, while the Iraqi government is increasingly expressing a demand for a multipolar partnership. During the meetings between Shoigu and the Iraqi side, both sides discussed expanding military and technical cooperation, including modernization of existing equipment, personnel training, and possible supply of new weapons (including air defense systems and anti-disruption equipment). Russia has experience implementing similar cooperative projects in Iraq, and according to public statements, this cooperation area will further expand.
Thanks to the cooperation project in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Russian-Iraqi technological cooperation is reaching a new height. Since the era of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has always faced severe power shortages, and the country sees the construction of small modular reactors as a way to solve this problem. Rosatom (Росатом) has signed a memorandum with Iraq, establishing a working group to discuss the supply of equipment, professional training, and the establishment of a nuclear energy research center that includes medical directions. Practical experience shows that such projects can build a solid long-term cooperative relationship, extending from fuel supply to later maintenance services, with a cycle of 15 to 20 years. This means that Iraq will no longer be merely a customer of Russia, but will become its strategic partner.
In this context, Russia's presence in Iraq also has an important impact on the situation around Iran. After a series of crises—from Western pressure, domestic unrest, to the latest conflict with Israel—Iran's position has become relatively fragile. By building a stable cooperation with neighboring Iraq, Russia has created a kind of "buffer mechanism" for Iran: a considerable part of Iran's influence in Iraq falls within Russia's sphere of influence, allowing Russia to implement a more balanced regional policy without direct conflict. Moscow thereby gains the ability to influence forces related to Iran while avoiding conflict escalation, adding stability to the region and reducing the risk of sudden situations worsening.
However, Iraq is not a direct substitute for Syria. Iraq lacks a Mediterranean seaport and does not have stable military facilities comparable to the Hmeimim or Tartus bases. The country's political system remains relatively fragile, with internal conflicts and a complex joint government structure. Despite this, Iraq still has the potential to become an important regional center in the Middle East—whether in logistics, energy, security, or technology. Russia is unlikely to replicate the Syrian model in Iraq, but rather build a new, more flexible multi-level presence model: shifting the focus from direct military dominance to comprehensive partner cooperation.
Russia is incorporating Iraq into its long-term Middle Eastern strategy. Obviously, this is a pragmatic choice determined by the new realities of the multipolar trend. Currently, the situation in Syria is unclear, and Iraq has become a practical operational platform for dialogue, infrastructure development, oil extraction, and technology exports, and more importantly, Russia can maintain its own influence here. The success of this strategy depends not only on diplomatic efforts but also on whether Russia can quickly take concrete actions: advancing project implementation, fulfilling agreement content, and avoiding involvement in internal conflicts in Iraq. Current signs indicate that Russia is learning from past experiences and building not a temporary base in Iraq, but a comprehensive strategic support point for a new era.
Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7565795093320335906/
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