"Trade war" drums are beating, and the power transition between China and the United States is accelerating the reshaping of the world map: from gravitational shifts of the east rising and the west declining, to the changing dynamics of the technology Long March; from the reorganization of industrial chains, currency wars, to the struggle for civilizational discourse power. The century's transformation has turned into the palpable pulse of the times that can be felt by all of us.
In this "trade war" course stirred up by Trump, what can the younger generation learn? As we stand at the turning point of the times and become witnesses and participants of history, what can the younger generation do?
The Observer Network live broadcast studio presents a youth edition, inviting Mao Keji, a doctoral student in the School of Social Sciences at Tsinghua University, senior journalist and international affairs commentator Yang Sheng, and Editor-in-Chief of the Observer Network Shi Yang, to share their views on the Sino-US trade war and how the younger generation's perception of the two countries has changed.
The first part of the dialogue was published on May 1st, and this article is the second part.
[Compilation/Observation Network Guo Han]
When it comes to a battle of strength, there will naturally be winners and losers.
Shi Yang: I've also heard many teachers say that sometimes they are surprised by scholars and think tanks coming out of so-called high-level American schools who know nothing about the basic national conditions between China and the US, reaching an appalling degree, just saying "America wins, wins, wins" and "China doesn't work." Even the "User Guide for Reconstructing the Global Trade System" and Trump's entire tariff war are based on such serious fact inversion.
In fact, I'm very curious if there has been any progress or improvement in the U.S. academic community's understanding of China's basic situation, the overall state between China and the US, and the changes in the world?
Mao Keji: I have met quite a few people in academia here, and my overall impression is that when facing a powerful opponent, the first thing everyone thinks of is a self-protective mentality. Unless they are completely defeated or gain a decisive advantage, they will always find an excuse, such as, am I really losing, could it be that the other side cheated, or that the other side won unfairly, or that the other side got lucky, right?
When I first heard this kind of view, I would feel a little emotional fluctuation. Because I think we Chinese are already doing pretty well, yet you still call us evil and claim we violate rules, so I wanted to debate with them. Later, I thought, why bother debating? What difference does it make if you win? Since you think that way, then continue thinking that way. After all, when it comes to a real showdown of strength, the winner will naturally emerge. If Americans cannot objectively view this gap, it's your loss, not mine (your lost, not my lost). Why should I remind you when you're making mistakes?
Mr. Mao's mindset shift is somewhat like transitioning from wanting to argue online that "you're wrong, it should be like this," to "okay, fine, whatever you say." Does this mean that many American academic elites you've encountered are still the same as the ones many teachers previously complained about, with no significant improvement?
Mao Keji: Objectively speaking, this depends on the specific circumstances. After all, Harvard University is a big school, and all kinds of people exist there. But I can say a few principles. First, those who engage more closely with the market have a more objective understanding of China. Some of the best research on China I’ve heard was done in business schools or engineering schools. Because if you do business with China the wrong way, you’ll lose money yourself, and no one would go against their own wallet.
Second, I think young people are much better than older generations. Perhaps they don’t have such strong motivations to maintain ideological halos, haven’t experienced the Cold War, and don’t have such strong desires to defeat another socialist country.
Third, those on the fringes, not professionally trained, may have fewer preconceptions. I’ve met many very famous people, some even attending high-profile events in China, but when they teach students domestically in the U.S., they have another set of narratives. Often, you find that many people are opportunistic.
Of course, I feel these things are irrelevant because there are objective standards for success or failure. So my attitude is very relaxed; I listen to everything you say, and I can talk to you about anything you want. I might even add something extra.
Doctoral Student in the School of Social Sciences at Tsinghua University, Mao Keji
Yang Sheng: I once studied in the UK, where the environment was similar but the temporal and spatial context was different. It was 2011-2016, when China’s GDP had just surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy. For them, China was still a relatively newly emerging phenomenon.
At that time, the West discussed more about whether China’s rise could last, whether the Chinese model was a normal phenomenon or an accidental one, and whether it might collapse suddenly at some point. Therefore, at that time, Western media like The Economist, and Western elites or those who did not understand China questioned China from this perspective.
Now ten years have passed, and China’s scale is getting closer and closer to that of the United States. In recent years, when I talk to foreign journalists or scholars, they basically have already concluded that China and the US are like Cristiano Ronaldo and Lionel Messi.
Now, the West’s judgment and understanding of China has shifted to another focus: What will the world look like after China becomes stronger? Or if America’s hegemony is destined to decline, and China is destined to replace the US as the largest economy, what kind of world will it be? They have gotten used to this system dominated by the West, but China is different from the West, whether it’s collectivism, family values, or religious beliefs. These differences are too great, so they have fallen into deep fear.
This is not fear due to conflicts of national interests, but fear from lifestyle. Because after America became powerful, it changed the lifestyles of people around the world, and they naturally believed that when China becomes powerful, it will change the lifestyles of people around the world too.
To avoid change, they can only deal with China, although they know that China has the right to develop, but they can't help it. They have a zero-sum mindset. Thus, this kind of view dominates some discussions now. The recognition of China has shifted from questioning whether China’s development is real and sustainable, to whether China’s development is essentially good or bad.
When doing public opinion work or external exchanges, I find that our work has shifted from explaining how successful and solid China’s development is, to asking: what will happen if we develop? Can we bring you what America brings? Can we bring you what America can't?
Or they might ask: You talk so well, it sounds beautiful, but what benefits will you get? America does it for hegemony, sharing some development dividends while globalizing the world. What is China’s motive? Because they don’t fully understand our worldview of “when you reach a certain level, help others” and “cultivate oneself, regulate the family, govern the country, and pacify the world,” misunderstandings arise.
Welcome to the "post-reason era."
Shi Yang: At the beginning of the new century, people looked at China as if they were watching a young scholar in school: "Oh, this student is quite good, meets teaching requirements, and publishes papers."
But over the past two years, people have felt that this student is not content with being the head of the department, but wants to be the dean instead. Meanwhile, the old dean is corrupt and has moral issues, and he’s going senile. If he becomes the new dean and starts his term with three sweeping reforms, how will he handle us old scholars? So people are starting to worry about this.
By this point, evaluations of your abilities are no longer objective. They now start from a so-called ethnocentric perspective, believing that China does everything for its own benefit. Therefore, nowadays, when the West suppresses and contains China, it no longer debates whether it is morally reasonable or noble; all it cares about is survival and living its own life. How do you become the dean?
This is what we see domestically. Mr. Mao, since you are in the U.S., what is the general attitude towards containing China there?
Mao Keji: Since China's rise has entered a stage where the U.S. can no longer stop it, the West believes that China's rise will definitely lead to a drop in their standard of living, a halt to their global expansion, an impact on their global interests, an inability to continue financial exploitation, a lack of technological dominance, and a failure to attract talent. Their military superiority will also disappear.
Once this happens, excuses become meaningless. I think Trump has already reached this point.
When the U.S. imposed tariffs on China, they initially used fentanyl as an excuse, later saying retaliation itself was an excuse. If we really cooperate with Trump to tackle fentanyl, would he stop targeting us? If we give in to him, would he stop targeting us?
We have entered the "post-excuse era" and the "post-reason era." Excuses and reasons are things of the past. Now it's purely about hard power competition. One side is about competing in hard power, the other is about competing in shamelessness, seeing who has less底线 (bottom line).
Yang Sheng: I find that studying international relations to a certain extent makes it easier to rely on power rather than reasoning. We are realists; let's just compete in power. It's simpler.
Shi Yang: This is what Millsheim called "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics."
Mao Keji: Actually, what the U.S. is doing is not particularly smart. Sometimes, finding excuses and reasons on issues concerning morality is not to persuade oneself, but to persuade third parties, to show the rest of the world.
If you openly do many things without reason, other countries will think that the U.S. has no justification for its actions, which will increase the implicit costs of doing many things in the future. Many people would rather not engage with the U.S. or resist until the end than compromise with it. That's why you shouldn't mistreat prisoners or kill those who surrender during a war.
Shi Yang: Yes, a cornered beast will fight. If they think they have no future, they will fight to the end.
Mao Keji: For those captured or those who are bound to fail, it doesn't matter. After all, my life is in your hands anyway. But for those still fighting or possibly joining the conflict, they will consider this question. If surrendering offers a way out, then I will surrender. But if surrendering is useless, then I can only resist firmly. So Trump's approach carries a high potential cost.
Another feeling I have is this: "selling off your grandfather's fields without pain in your heart." Although the U.S. has a dishonorable side, objectively speaking, it has provided a large portion of public goods and facilitated the operation of the international order. Especially for allies and countries that are doing well within the current international system, the U.S. remains a provider of public goods.
If you respect these established norms and discuss them rationally, though it may impose constraints and costs on yourself, it actually reduces the pressure and resistance of the entire system's operation, and ultimately you are a beneficiary. The system has been maintained for so long, indicating that its benefits outweigh its costs.
If Trump didn't explain anything when pressuring China, he would essentially destroy the entire system. Trump's behavior, whether within his alliances or his small circles, is not necessarily beneficial. At least as a Chinese person, I welcome it.
China's Rise Disrupts Western Cognition
Shi Yang: During Trump's first term, he started a tech war, trade war, and tariff war with China. In this process, I feel that not only us media professionals but ordinary people are also being forced to learn—what chips, lithography machines, export controls, supply chains, etc., are. After these "battles," what changes do the two of you think have occurred in the Chinese public, especially the younger generation, regarding the understanding of China and the US?
Yang Sheng: From the perspective of Chinese youth, friends who like our programs or frequently communicate with us already have a relatively high understanding of international relations. I feel that the topics everyone is currently concerned about are related to the latest round of tariff wars or the US-China rivalry.
For example, many overseas students are concerned about whether their majors will be affected and what their future job prospects will be. Friends who haven't gone abroad yet or their parents are concerned about whether it's still worth going abroad and whether they will have opportunities upon returning. They are questioning whether America is advanced, and what else there is to learn.
Some are already working or running their own businesses. They are concerned about whether their industries will be affected. If the US-China conflict spills over into their companies, will the US use its long-arm jurisdiction to interfere with their businesses in China? Even some non-American companies are worried about the spillover effects of the trade war. Some friends involved in specific trade-related industries are directly impacted; everyone is concerned about these issues.
Therefore, we find that Chinese youth, regardless of age group, whether they are preparing to study, currently studying, or working after completing their studies, are concerned about issues directly related to their fate. Why is there such a large base of concern? Because China and the world are highly integrated, and China is deeply embracing globalization. Even with difficulties and obstacles, it still seeks ways to integrate better, rather than cutting ties and opposing the outside world outright. Unlike the US, which feels entitled to manufacturing backflow and decides to cut ties, as the world's factory and the country with the most complete range of manufacturing categories, we are more qualified to play this game, but we choose not to.
Regarding American youth, from my understanding, the ones I interact with more are those in China. Those who choose to come to China are embracing the world. Among American youth, those with higher cognitive levels and those engaged in business inevitably depend on China and tend to be more pragmatic.
However, the majority of Americans are not like that, and their proportion among the general population is very small. Especially with the polarization of wealth gaps within the US, and the opposition between the establishment and the grassroots, if you count heads or traffic, these rational people can't compete with the irrational ones.
These people, after a major account settlement with China, realize China is better, but they become even angrier: "I can't go there, I was born in America, what am I supposed to do?" In this case, their cognition becomes more complex or difficult to change.
I think no matter how our perception of America changes, it is still heading toward a rational direction. Judging from the overall image and portrait displayed by both sides' youth, we are clearly the advantageous side, and we have the potential to win in this game of chess.
Senior Journalist and International Affairs Commentator, Yang Sheng
Mao Keji: I think there is one thing that deserves particular attention. China's rise has overturned many things that the West, especially since the Cold War, has promoted for more than a decade, some of which we once took for granted. For example, we used to think that a high proportion of the service sector meant being advanced, that Silicon Valley enterprises were high-tech enterprises, and that heavy chemical industries were backward.
But in recent years, I've noticed that the U.S., Europe, and many developing countries are paying more attention to manufacturing and placing it back at the core of economic development, whether it's high-end chip manufacturing, aerospace manufacturing, or so-called low-end sectors like steel and machinery. The shock China's rise has brought is that we have proven with facts that what you said before was flawed. Whoever believes you dies, and you believed it the most, so you suffer the worst. We didn't believe it, and we are doing well.
I think this is a key realization. We used to think that the rise of the service sector represented economic sophistication, which is clearly a very American understanding: why not go after high-end profits? Not because we don't want to, but because we can't. We don't have the ability to harvest dollars like they do, nor do we have so many high-value-added products, so we can only work hard in manufacturing. If we had the capability, we probably wouldn't have to earn this hard money. Now it seems we got it right after all. Americans, because of their ability to earn easy money, don't do hard work anymore, and now they are degenerating.
So now is the time for us to tell our story. Do we have a Chinese solution or our own strategy, not passively proving that our approach works, but actively telling everyone that this is the right way to do things? This actually poses a high requirement for theoretical workers. At least now, we can only empirically demonstrate that what we do might be correct, but we don't have a very strong theory. This is a recent deep feeling of mine.
If we measure the U.S. using this framework, we will find that it is basically beyond saving. For the U.S. to achieve comprehensive recovery in manufacturing, it would be a very painful problem because first, the U.S. dollar's hegemonic position keeps the value high. To bring the dollar down, it would require giving up the dollar's hegemony and the U.S.'s global influence. But if the dollar's value drops, your global influence decreases. Could you still do these things? Could you still enjoy so many talent dividends and capital dividends? Enjoy so many global resources? Not necessarily.
If we follow Trump or MAGA's logic further, you'll find that he's actually talking himself into a dead end: he's caught between two stools. To boost manufacturing, he must dismantle the dollar's hegemony; but if he dismantles the dollar's hegemony, he might not even have the foundation to build manufacturing.
Comparison of Trump's approval rating with previous U.S. presidents
So after going through these rounds of popularization, we find that our path is indeed correct. Whether it's an active choice or a passive acceptance, it doesn't matter; it's just right.
“China will surely win” and “America will surely win” are both inferior to pragmatism.
Shi Yang: Mr. Mao raised a very good topic, which boils down to "demystification." We, this generation, feel it very strongly. When we were in school, we still firmly believed in the globalization architecture led by the U.S. Although we weren't so dogmatic as to throw away rice porridge and only eat hamburgers and steaks, we did use the Western political and economic structure to measure whether we were doing things right or wrong.
In our military fan community, there is a faction called the "Father Party." Whenever the PLA develops a weapon, the first thing they check is whether there is a similar weapon in the West. If there is, the development route is correct; if it's different, it must be due to insufficient technology; if it's completely different, the leader will have opinions.
This was a very common logic in the past, but recently, due to the tariff war and trade war, people have learned more, including many of my own and my friends' perceptions have been overturned, "demystification" is happening, and people are beginning to reevaluate the Western system.
On the other hand, because this is a "trade war" and a "tariff war," there will naturally be winners and losers. Between these winners and losers, there are two factions: "Germanic Winology" and "China Must Win." Both of you are very rational research-oriented scholars, and at the same time, you are immersed in this public discourse. How do you view these two factions?
Yang Sheng: "China must win" and "America must win" share a similar trait: absolute statements tend to cause problems. "China must win" differs from revolutionary optimism. If we define "China must win," it's akin to a quick victory theory, thinking we're already good enough and don't need to learn anything else. It even looks down on talents returning from abroad, and recently some entrepreneurs influenced by this mindset have made some comments. This implies that we don't need openness anymore; we can just close ourselves off and play by ourselves.
Certainly, this viewpoint has a market, especially during wartime, as we need it to boost morale. We all know that when mobilizing public opinion, the more absolute and sharp the statement, the more compelling it is. This holds true everywhere.
However, our decision-making body and mainstream consciousness are rational, which is our difference from the U.S. and our advantage. Our party's operational logic and historical logic know that such approaches won't work, and we firmly adhere to high-quality openness while having a clear understanding of our developmental stage. This rational logic plays the role of a stabilizing anchor in policy formulation and in our understanding of the external world. I am confident about this.
As young people, even if we become powerful, we should still keep an open mind. I find that most of my friends can distinguish between confidence and complacency when recognizing certain things. As for sliding into nationalism, the danger in the U.S. is far greater than in China because the U.S. leadership exploits such emotions, and the U.S., being the status quo power, is experiencing a decline in its hegemony. Naturally, its anxiety and sense of crisis are stronger, and it is rushing to protect itself while looking down on others, making it harder to learn from others or acknowledge their achievements.
So the situation in the U.S. is reversed compared to ours. As I mentioned earlier in answering the previous question, our overall image of young people is more competitive and rational. Of course, there will always be extreme conservatives and win-theory advocates, but overall, it won't have a major impact.
Mao Keji: I think this is a very good question. I have great confidence in China's younger generation and the vast majority of the Chinese people. There will always be extreme thoughts among a minority, but don't underestimate that we are a socialist country led by the Communist Party of China. On Tiananmen Gate, one side reads "Long Live the People's Republic of China," and the other reads "Long Live the World's People's Unity." At least in our mainstream values, we are inherently resistant to ethnic chauvinism and religious extremism.
If there were a fair and open competition between China and the U.S., we wouldn't be afraid of them at all. If it's about who is more open and who can unite the Global South and include countries including U.S. allies, whoever can do that will win. In terms of unity, we have an advantage over Trump, and our development momentum, industrial foundation, and national spirit suit participating in this global competition, and we can win in the end.
When we look at this issue, we should adopt a pragmatic approach and objectively estimate our chances of winning. Once compared, we will find that we don't need to resort to extreme ideas. I think Mr. Yang put it very well: the danger in the U.S. is much greater. They have to resort to extremely extreme and foolish things just to achieve the same chances of winning. We can win with progressive, open, and wise approaches, so why resort to the worst tactics?
I've always been optimistic, but I don't think I'm a "China must win" advocate. If we have shortcomings, we can learn from them. But if MAGA says they want to learn from China, they would go crazy: why should I learn from China? This is our difference. I think the U.S. has always been our teacher, even if one day we face each other on the battlefield, they can still be our teacher. Any country in the world has something we can learn from, so why should we appear arrogant?
In fact, we have been doing very well. Trump's softening of his tariff policies is also due to the rise in U.S. Treasury yields, with everyone suspecting that it was because of China selling. It turns out it wasn't. This shows what? We have a reputation as a major power, and we are cautious about many things. U.S. debt is not a burden for us; it's an asset.
Sometimes wisdom lies in long-term, multiple, complex games. Of course, if viewed as a single game, some might think our policies are too restrictive, missing out on many enjoyable opportunities. But in the long run, isn't this reducing our diplomatic costs and risks?
Of course, this is a topic worth further discussion, but I think we can steadily advance with a more open, progressive, efficient, and scientific approach to overcome the U.S., which is deluded by superstition and greed.
What can young people do as witnesses and participants in history?
Shi Yang: This is the final question of our conversation today. As we are in the midst of unprecedented changes in a hundred years, we are both witnesses and participants. Finally, we'll pick a smaller切入点,也算是一种寄语吧. What do the two of you think is the most important thing young people should do in this era?
Yang Sheng: Listening to Mr. Mao's explanation, I was reminded of a scene from the movie "Detective Chinatown 1900" I watched during the New Year. There's a scene where the protagonist tears up the immigration paper after realizing America's ugly face, and Chow Yun-fat's character sticks it back on and returns it, saying that this country still has many things worth learning, take it first, and learn later.
This statement held true in 1900 and remains valid today. For young people, I think they should maintain confidence, cultivate a mindset of being a citizen of a great nation, and broaden their horizons to view the world. Of course, we must certainly care about our own affairs in China, but also learn to care about world events from a Chinese perspective. In short, we need to tell China's story well and use China's voice to narrate global events. This is something we are particularly lacking in.
When disasters or conflicts occur somewhere in the world, can our microphones reach the scene first? When engaging in public opinion battles, we need to shape communication capabilities or discourse power that match our standing. We can look at how the West does it. When an earthquake happened in Nepal, the first website I opened was the BBC; when conflicts occurred in Myanmar, I received more information from CNN, Reuters, etc., than from Chinese media. In such a situation, how do we shape discourse power?
So we should maintain curiosity about the world while remaining humble. Even if China stands at the center of the world stage, we should still learn from others, not just developed Western countries but also many Southern countries. Perhaps our own culture and colors are so diverse that understanding ourselves is already challenging, but to stand at the center of the world stage, we must care about the world. My expectations are roughly these.
Mao Keji: Mr. Yang's words made me quite excited. We are also peers, and some of the younger friends around us are in a very good era. Our great-grandparents fought with their lives on the line to win this red land for us; our parents tightened their belts, worked hard, and accumulated capital and industry. By our generation, we can participate in this great revival process more easily and peacefully.
I think everyone just needs to do their own job well, and even small acts of kindness contribute to the rise of the nation and the revival of the ethnic group. It may seem like there aren't many grandiose things happening, but when everyone does their small tasks well, it creates an incredibly grand picture.
Do your job well, love your family, have one or two more children, buy more things, and at critical moments, express more rational voices beneficial to social welfare and the country. That's already a huge contribution. If you have spare energy, you can do more. Everyone knows my main job is not American studies, so inviting me to talk about America today makes me an amateur.
Yang Sheng: Next episode, let's talk about India.
Shi Yang: No problem, we all know that the U.S. is eyeing India.
Yang Sheng: When Mr. Mao mentioned India, he shook his head.
Mao Keji: I also know that many fans of the Observation Network might miss me, as they often ask in the video comments. Let me say something heartfelt: doing regional studies on small countries in China is actually an extremely promising field. Everyone knows Xiao John Khan, who is now the top expert on small and micro-states. Before him, many countries were virtually ignored online, just like Trump's "fecal pit states" (shit hole). If it were in the past, we might not have needed to pay attention, but now our global attributes are increasingly strong, so we can't ignore them.
I have always believed that small countries only need to focus on major powers because major powers determine the fate of small countries. However, if you consider yourself a major power or aspire to be one, you must focus on small countries because you have interests globally, and you can't expect other major powers to safeguard your interests for you. So shouldn't we study more about these countries that people usually don't pay attention to? Don't just focus on the U.S., Europe, Japan, and Russia. If you're interested in South Asia, you can follow our "South Asia Research Newsletter." It's a volunteer platform where everyone contributes to this effort. If you follow the Observer Network, you'll often see our articles being reposted.
Yang Sheng: Also, welcome viewers to follow our live broadcasts. Mr. Mao, I'd love for you to join our live program to talk about India. I enjoy discussing India.
Shi Yang: Look at you guys starting to promote each other commercially, that's great. Today's conversation ends here. Thank you very much, Mr. Mao and Mr. Yang. Viewers, see you next time. Bye-bye.
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