[Military & Weapons Subsection] Author: Golden Bomber

Recently, foreign media reported that a source from the Uzbek Defense Ministry revealed that their military is in talks with China regarding the purchase of fighter jets and has received approval from the Chinese side. However, it is worth noting that this information has not been confirmed by either the Chinese or Uzbek authorities, making its accuracy questionable. Additionally, as Uzbekistan has traditionally been a Russian arms market, turning to purchase Chinese fighters may not necessarily be beneficial for us. The "intricacies" involved here are worth handling cautiously.

▲ Alleged image of Uzbekistan purchasing Chinese fighter jets, source: Internet

Foreign media did not disclose the specific model of the Chinese fighter jet that Uzbekistan wishes to purchase, but based on the current situation, it is likely one of the following: J-10CE, "JF-17 Thunder" Block 3, or J-35E. Both J-10CE and JF-17 are fourth-generation aircraft; the former is a single-engine medium fighter, while the latter is a single-engine light fighter. However, the main production of the JF-17 is completed in Pakistan.

The positioning of these two models differs: J-10CE is more suitable for countries with limited budgets but high-performance requirements. JF-17's positioning is low-cost and high cost-effectiveness, suitable for smaller countries. However, whether it can be exported or how much it can be exported ultimately depends on Pakistan's consent, as China alone cannot fully decide. Exporting J-35E at this stage is premature, as even the People's Liberation Army does not have large-scale production yet, making its own inventory insufficient, and it is far from being ready for external promotion.

▲ J-10, source: Internet

Moreover, J-35 is merely a model that is "not excluded" from having an export version, but it doesn't mean there definitely will be one. As for when there might be one, that remains unclear. Therefore, if Uzbekistan were to buy now, they would only be able to choose between the existing two models.

However, as mentioned before, the official Uzbek side has not verified the reliability of this news, and relying solely on the words of an alleged "informed person" could easily lead to misinformation. Furthermore, Uzbekistan has always been a traditional Russian arms market, and for China to suddenly enter this field without considering Russia's feelings could easily cause geopolitical conflicts, potentially labeling China as "unfair." The political cost outweighs the profits from arms exports, and it might even be counterproductive.

▲ Uzbek Air Force, source: Internet

Uzbekistan is a typical small country with around 60-80 combat aircraft in its air force, including models such as Su-27, MiG-29, and Su-25. These models are relatively old and have low availability rates. However, since Uzbekistan is located in inland Central Asia, it does not face many airspace threats, so the need for advanced modern fighters is not urgent. The primary threats it needs to address are domestic and cross-border extremist organizations.

Its key air force requirement lies in new aircraft having good air combat capabilities and the ability to strike ground targets. With an annual defense budget of only about $1 billion, too many expensive planes are unaffordable. Even if they do buy, it is likely through other means of compensation.

▲ Uzbekistan gold mine, source: Internet

Gold is Uzbekistan's largest source of foreign exchange, creating revenues of $10 to $20 billion annually, accounting for 1/3 of total exports. Major buyers include China, the UK, and Switzerland. Natural gas exports amount to around 5 billion cubic meters annually, which although not a high percentage of overall exports, remains a major source of foreign currency. Other resources include cotton, copper, uranium, etc. Uzbekistan maintains good relations with Russia, and previously did not purchase Su-30 because the unit price exceeded $60 million, making large-scale procurement unaffordable.

The price of J-35E is even less imaginable. Even the "FC-1 Xiaolong" priced at $30 million and J-10CE at $40 million would require Uzbekistan to struggle financially to afford them. Add to that initial training costs, spare parts, and the entire process would require several hundred million dollars, unless China provides subsidies or long-term loans, the deal would be difficult to close. Whether Uzbekistan is willing to take out loans and whether China is willing to offer them are both very difficult questions.

▲ Uzbekistan, source: Internet

Aside from financial considerations, selling fighter jets to Central Asia involves even more complex geopolitical issues. The five Central Asian countries have always been a key area viewed by Russia as its "backyard." Although in recent years, China has attempted to inject new vitality into the region's economy through the "Belt and Road Initiative," deepening its influence in the area, there are still numerous unresolved problems. It is a fact that Central Asian countries have long been unable to escape Russian influence. While Central Asia is attempting to balance this issue, it is also making choices among China, the United States, and even Europe and Japan.

Central Asian countries do not want China to become their "new leader," but rather hope to free themselves from any sustained influence from any side. For example, Kazakhstan has maintained a close relationship with the United States, and during the tenure of former U.S. Secretary of State Blinken, he visited the country multiple times to deepen ties, with no refusal from Kazakhstan. This means that while Uzbekistan indeed has motivation to distance itself from Russian influence, it does not necessarily mean that its final direction will be towards China. If Uzbekistan were to purchase Chinese fighter jets, it must consider a serious consequence: as a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia shoulders a significant portion of the country's security defense responsibilities, providing substantial military aid, exchanges, and training.

▲ Uzbekistan map, source: Internet

Uzbekistan's move to "turn to China" could bring considerable pressure on itself. Moreover, selling fighter jets to Uzbekistan is akin to giving "proof of allegiance," which presents a clear political problem. After China completes this business, it must use diplomatic means, possibly even interest exchanges, to appease Russia's emotions. If this situation occurs, the money earned from this deal might be better left unearned.

In recent years, Central Asian countries have indeed purchased quite a few Chinese weapons, such as FM-90 short-range air defense missile systems, KS-1C medium-range air defense missile systems, and Hongqi-9 long-range air defense missile systems by Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan bought Y-8 transport aircraft and Wing Loong I drones. Turkmenistan acquired Hongqi-9 air defense missile systems and QW-2 portable air defense missiles. Kyrgyzstan purchased VN-3 armored vehicles and QBZ-95 rifles. Tajikistan bought VN-3 and Chinese-made radio communication command systems. From these examples, it is evident that China's weapon sales to Central Asia have a distinct category—air defense missiles. It has been difficult to break through in other types. Additionally, when purchasing, Central Asian countries often request loans, low prices, or even "donations," and payments are not made smoothly. They often prefer bartering with natural gas, minerals, etc., to reduce foreign exchange pressure, which has become routine.

▲ Uzbekistan testing Hongqi-9, source: Internet

Therefore, for China, selling fighter jets to Central Asia not only carries potential geopolitical risks but also realistically cannot bring immediate benefits. China's true broad prospects in the international arms trade lie not in competing with Russia for limited "poor country markets," but in the high-end market. Unfortunately, in terms of military trade, the world has already been divided into several major markets: Europe and America form one table, Russia forms another, and the share of the market left for China is not particularly high. Moreover, it is not easy to join the other tables.

Selling weapons is never just about the quality of the equipment itself. In fact, performance is secondary. Its essence is "full trust." For example, selling fighter jets is like handing over your country's air force directly to the other party for "handling," placing a significant portion of "weaknesses" in someone else's hands. Thus, unless there is absolute trust, the general mindset of most countries is: whether it is good or bad, it is none of my concern, and I won't buy it even if it is excellent.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7492281668662657599/

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