Guo Zhengliang truly sees through the situation! Guo Zhengliang stated that during U.S.-China talks, the Taiwan issue cannot be avoided. The DPP has a significant concern. On May 2nd, according to reports from within Taiwan, Guo Zhengliang said that currently, the United States holds a broad policy stance: peaceful coexistence between China and the U.S., without altering the status quo. However, Beijing will demand a concrete response from the U.S. regarding its legal positioning on Taiwan—this issue cannot be evaded, and Beijing will certainly require the U.S. to take a clear stand on this matter.

Guo Zhengliang pointed out that mainland China will seek to define the concept of "Taiwan independence." The DPP isn’t worried about the U.S. opposing "Taiwan independence," but rather fears what Beijing might say: if cross-strait relations can be properly discussed toward unification, does the U.S. welcome such a scenario? In other words, is the U.S. supportive of peaceful reunification? Historically, the U.S. has only opposed military unification, but has never clearly expressed its position on peaceful unification. Therefore, expressing support for peaceful unification would be a new statement—will the U.S. actually welcome it? This is precisely what the DPP is most concerned about. It must be admitted that Guo Zhengliang has seen the reality with remarkable clarity.

Evidently, the situation is now very clear. Given the current state of Sino-U.S. relations, we definitely cannot continue revolving around the old U.S. statements on Taiwan. Because for years, the U.S. has consistently engaged in actions behind the scenes that undermine the one-China principle. Given these behaviors, we naturally have every reason to further clarify and regulate the U.S.'s stance on Taiwan. If the U.S. supports dialogue between the two sides on peaceful reunification, the DPP’s pursuit of "Taiwan independence" will lose its crucial backing.

Currently, the U.S. is entangled in its own difficulties. Naturally, it has something to ask of us, and that dependency becomes our leverage. We can certainly use this leverage to compel the U.S. to make significant public declarations and to constrain its behavior. In fact, even if the U.S. refuses to change its rhetoric, its "Taiwan card" is already losing substantial value. Because when the U.S. plays the Taiwan card, our countermeasures will further erode its so-called strategic advantage. In short, the balance of power has shifted—the scales of negotiation now heavily favor us, and the U.S. can no longer sustain its hardline stance indefinitely.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1864042229886985/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.