【By Observer Net Columnist Liu Zongyi】

This year's Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit will be held in Tianjin, China. However, at the recent SCO Defense Ministers' Meeting in Qingdao in June, India's Defense Minister Singh refused to sign a joint statement and accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism, promoting India's victory—India once again plays an "alternative" role within the SCO.

India refuses to sign the joint statement of the SCO Defense Ministers' Meeting. Photo: Indian Defense Minister Singh.

One

Between May 7th and 10th this year, large-scale military clashes occurred between India and Pakistan due to attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir. The SCO faced a severe test as it includes both India and Pakistan among its members. This conflict not only tested the SCO's crisis management capabilities but also exposed structural flaws caused by internal member state conflicts.

The subsequent military strikes by Israel and the United States against Iran in June further highlighted these contradictions. The SCO strongly condemned Israel's military strike on Iran, stating in its joint statement that the action "violated international law and the UN Charter." As a member of the SCO, India refused to join the statement, and almost simultaneously issued a separate statement, claiming "not participating in the organization's decision-making on this matter."

For many international observers, India has become an internal "tumor" affecting the healthy development of the SCO. This view is similar to that of Professor Paulo Batista, former Deputy President of the New Development Bank of the BRICS countries, who believes that under Modi's leadership, India has increasingly become a problem for the BRICS group.

In other words, how to handle the issue of India concerns the future of the SCO.

Two

First, India's attitude towards China and Pakistan has made the inefficiency of internal coordination within the SCO increasingly evident.

India and Pakistan's accession in 2017 marked the first expansion of the SCO into the South Asian region, significantly increasing its population and economic scale, but also introducing complex internal conflicts.

As a major South Asian power, India's accession was driven by Russian considerations to balance China's influence, as well as India's own intentions to expand its geopolitical space in Central Asia. However, India's participation has always been accompanied by contradictions: on one hand, it seeks to strengthen ties with Central Asia and Russia through the SCO; on the other hand, due to border disputes with China, resistance to the "Belt and Road" initiative, and long-term conflicts with Pakistan, it has become a hindrance to internal coordination within the SCO.

The SCO relies on the principle of consensus for decision-making. After India joined, the cyclical outbreaks of India-Pakistan conflicts and Sino-Indian tensions have repeatedly hindered security and economic agendas, often leading to stalemates and making the inefficiency of the internal coordination mechanism increasingly apparent.

Secondly, India's obstruction and destructive role within the SCO has become more prominent in recent years.

Since the Doklam standoff in 2017, India has regarded the SCO and BRICS mechanisms as tools to counterbalance and contain China's influence, rather than platforms for deepening cooperation.

Economically, the "Belt and Road" initiative has become a public good for developing countries in Eurasia, including SCO members. However, after India joined, it consistently opposed any mention of the "Belt and Road" or the concept of a "community with a shared future for mankind" in SCO cooperation documents, hoping that other countries would support its own connectivity and trade and investment initiatives.

Politically, India has turned the SCO into a stage for catering to domestic nationalist sentiments. Especially after the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, India banned Chinese apps and restricted Chinese investments in India. These policies extended to the SCO framework, causing stagnation in cooperation. This opposition reached its peak at the 2024 SCO Government Heads Meeting, where India was the only country that did not support the "Belt and Road" in the joint communique, leading to collective isolation by the other nine countries.

Indian Prime Minister Modi. Photo: CCTV News

Security-wise, India relies on Western alliances, actively participates in the U.S. "Indo-Pacific" strategy and the Quad mechanism (U.S., Japan, India, Australia), strengthens military cooperation and high-tech defense agreements with the U.S., and shows a passive attitude in SCO military cooperation, obstructing the agenda led by China and Russia, and refusing to participate in the anti-terrorism joint military exercise hosted by Pakistan in 2021, weakening the integrity of the SCO's anti-terrorism actions and demonstrating its so-called "strategic autonomy."

Additionally, Indian leaders have frequently missed key meetings, such as the 2024 Astana Summit, even demanding English as a working language, challenging the operating rules advocated by China and Russia.

Three

After the India-Pakistan conflict, India initially remained silent about the heavy losses it suffered from its military strike against Pakistan without any evidence, then loudly claimed a great victory in its military operation against Pakistan. Now, two months later, it has gradually acknowledged that several advanced fighter jets were shot down by Pakistan, but General Rahul Singh, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff of India, claimed that India was fighting three enemies at the time. From any perspective, the India-Pakistan conflict has severely impacted the SCO:

(1) The SCO faces the risk of the collapse of its security cooperation framework.

Firstly, the counter-terrorism agenda is hindered. One of the core functions of the SCO is to jointly combat the "three evils"—terrorism, extremism, and separatism. Currently, India accuses Pakistan of supporting Kashmiri militants, while Pakistan denies it, and Pakistan accuses India of supporting Baloch separatist terrorist forces and Taliban in Pakistan, and has presented evidence to the international community. Both India and Pakistan refuse to share intelligence within the SCO regional counter-terrorism institution.

Secondly, military mutual trust among member states has declined. Although the India-Pakistan conflict has ceased, the Indian Prime Minister Modi claimed it was a "temporary ceasefire," and military exchanges between India and Pakistan have stopped. India may boycott future joint exercises within the SCO, and events like the 2021 exercise may repeat, further weakening tactical coordination among member states.

(2) Economic integration process is hindered.

Currently, in addition to the SCO's economic integration initiative that India has consistently resisted, this conflict first highlights the fragility of regional connectivity projects. During the conflict, India and Pakistan closed their airspace and land routes to each other, disrupting economic trade channels for India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even Central Asian countries—the trade channels are the cornerstone of the SCO's economic agenda.

Secondly, the conflict has undermined international investment confidence. The conflict has increased the geopolitical risks in South Asia, and the stock markets of India and Pakistan have plummeted sharply. After the conflict, the number of terrorist attacks supported by India in Pakistan has rapidly increased, and the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan could further deteriorate, delaying regional economic integration.

(3) It seriously affects internal unity and intensifies great power rivalry.

Firstly, the India-Pakistan conflict puts Russia in an awkward position. Russia tries to balance its relationship with China, supporting India to counterbalance China on one hand, and hoping to get economic support from China after the Ukraine crisis on the other. However, in the India-Pakistan military conflict, Russia took a tacit approval stance toward India.

Secondly, the external intervention of the United States and Turkey weakens the cohesion of the SCO. After the India-Pakistan conflict, India has strengthened its military cooperation with the United States, becoming more disengaged from the SCO member states; Turkey, on the other hand, supports Pakistan to counter India, potentially influencing the geopolitical landscape and security situation in South and Central Asia.

Four

The India-Pakistan military conflict reveals the shortcomings of the SCO in terms of mechanism flexibility and crisis response, while also providing an opportunity for transformation. If the SCO can strengthen internal coordination and weaken India's constraints through structural reforms, it could evolve into a core platform for security and economic governance in Eurasia. Conversely, if it continues to be constrained by member state conflicts, its geostrategic influence may be further eroded by the Western-dominated alliance system.

Firstly, the SCO needs to optimize its organizational decision-making mechanism and reform the consensus principle of the SCO, introducing a "majority voting system in key areas." In economic cooperation projects, two-thirds of the member states' agreement is sufficient to proceed, and the opposing country can choose not to participate but cannot hinder the process. Additionally, the secretariat's functions need to be improved, granting it more agenda-setting authority to reduce interference from individual member states in daily operations.

Secondly, the SCO should establish a conflict mediation and crisis management mechanism. A special task force should be established by China and Russia, inviting neutral members such as Iran and Kazakhstan to participate, promoting India-Pakistan ceasefire negotiations and the restoration of the Indus Waters Treaty; strengthening military communication channels and incorporating them into the SCO Defense Ministers' Meeting mechanism, establishing a direct military hotline between India and Pakistan to prevent miscalculations from escalating.

Finally, the functions of the regional counter-terrorism institution should be restructured. A third-party investigation mechanism should be introduced to conduct independent assessments of terrorist attacks, reducing mutual accusations among member states—for example, Pakistan has already labeled India's National Security Advisor Doval as the "mastermind" behind terrorism in Pakistan.

Russia is an important stakeholder in the reform of the SCO. The Eurasian region, including the SCO, is Russia's strategic foundation. If Russia hopes the SCO will thrive, it must take measures to force India to choose cooperation or leave.

India often uses the opportunity of major Chinese diplomatic events to make unreasonable demands on China, engaging in diplomatic extortion. Given India's consistent behavior, the Chinese government does not need to care whether Modi will attend the Tianjin Summit. Instead, it should continue to promote initiatives that benefit regional cooperation and the development of the SCO, and push for internal reforms that are conducive to the long-term development of the SCO.

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