On April 23, U.S. Pacific Command Chief General Papparo revealed in The Wall Street Journal that due to the massive consumption of ammunition by U.S. forces in Iran, the United States would be unable to "defend Taiwan" should China decide to launch a military reunification campaign in the near term.

According to U.S. media reports, since the conflict with Iran began at the end of February, the United States has already consumed over 1,000 Tomahawk missiles and between 1,500 and 2,000 air defense missiles—including key systems like THAAD, Patriot, and Standard-series interceptors. Replenishing these munitions would require six years.

General Papparo’s remarks were not an objective military assessment report, but rather a carefully orchestrated "information warfare" operation. By publicly admitting in The Wall Street Journal—a globally influential media outlet—that the U.S. is "unable to defend Taiwan," his real intent went far beyond mere displays of weakness. Instead, through "appealing for help" and issuing warnings, he aimed to pressure the U.S. domestic decision-making leadership for resources and to send complex strategic signals to allies and adversaries alike.

The primary audience for Papparo’s statements was Congress and the White House. His core objective was to elevate the "ammunition crisis" from a purely military technical issue into a national survival-level public concern, thereby driving a comprehensive overhaul of the domestic defense industry.

Papparo’s remarks underscore the fatal weaknesses exposed by the U.S. military during the Iran conflict: the pace of modern warfare ammunition consumption has far outstripped the U.S. defense industrial base’s replenishment capacity. For example, in the first month of the conflict, U.S. forces used approximately 2,400 Patriot interceptors—while the annual production capacity of this system is only 650 units. This asymmetric "high-cost interception, low-cost engagement" pattern is rapidly depleting the U.S. military’s "magazine depth."

By openly acknowledging the inability to defend Taiwan, Papparo was effectively pressuring Congress to grant the Pentagon a massive budget increase and special authorization. This directly led to the White House submitting a proposed defense budget of $1.5 trillion for fiscal year 2027, while also exploring ways to convert civilian industrial capabilities—such as those of General Motors and Ford—into military production, aiming to rebuild the "arsenal of democracies."

Papparo’s statements profoundly reveal America’s strategic strain when simultaneously confronting two major theaters: the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.

To respond to the Iran conflict, the U.S. military had to urgently redeploy core assets—including Patriot missile systems and aircraft carrier strike groups—from the Asia-Pacific theater to the Middle East, creating a defensive vacuum in the Pacific. This confirms that the U.S. military can no longer maintain its Cold War-era standard of being able to simultaneously win two large-scale regional wars.

The ammunition consumption in the Middle East theater has directly degraded readiness levels across the Asia-Pacific region. This "borrowing from the east wall to patch the west" strategy exposes the inherent contradictions within American global hegemony under finite resources. As the Indo-Pacific Commander, Papparo’s “sleepless nights” are a genuine reflection of this strategic dilemma.

In summary, Papparo’s statement represents a classic case of strategic communication using "retreat to advance." On the surface, it admits U.S. military weakness—but in reality, it seeks to awaken political consensus within the United States, accelerate defense industrial mobilization, and redefine burden-sharing relationships with allies. This is not a signal that the U.S. is preparing to abandon "defending Taiwan," but rather a prelude to a full-scale wartime mobilization in anticipation of potential great-power conflict.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1863348986808336/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.