Reference News Network, December 31 report: Russia's "Kommersant" newspaper published an article titled "The Year of Multipolarity" on December 25. The author is Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics in Russia. The following is an excerpt:
The turning point in U.S. foreign policy in 2025 became evident from the beginning of the year.
"Atlanticism" Is Coming to an End
As soon as the Trump administration took office, it implied that the policy of the Biden administration, which sought to defeat Russia strategically through the Ukraine war, had failed. This policy also diverted America's attention, leaving it unable to focus on more strategically important priorities.
The Trump administration also clearly stated that it would not support Europe's position on Ukraine or consider the interests of the EU. This led to a rift within the transatlantic alliance: the United States and its European allies diverged on two core issues: first, how to assess what Europeans call the greatest security threat since the end of the Cold War; second, how to respond to the largest military conflict in Europe since World War II. In addition, the American government essentially viewed the elite class of current European countries as untrustworthy allies, but rather as "opponents in the field of political ideology" (allies of the opponents of Trump in the United States); and under the leadership of these elites, Europe is an economic competitor and a parasite of the United States, while the United States can extract resources from Europe and use Europe to achieve its own goal of re-industrialization.
Since the 1940s, the United States has always considered relations with European countries, relationships with its NATO allies, and the confrontation with Russia in Europe as one of its foreign policy priorities. Now, the era of "Atlanticism" in American foreign policy is coming to an end. In the future, the United States will focus primarily on regions outside of Europe, and this shift itself has already made the United States no longer view Russia as a natural opponent.
At the same time, during the past year, the United States launched a strong attack on the so-called "rules-based international order," dissolving some national institutions that were previously used to maintain this order, including the U.S. Agency for International Development and Voice of America. The United States launched a global trade war, even targeting its military and political allies; in fact, it destroyed the core principle of the World Trade Organization, the most-favored-nation treatment principle; and began to impose clearly unfair discriminatory trade agreements on all countries.
"America Is No Longer the Hegemon"
At the same time, the arrival of the multipolar era is also clearly reflected: the United States can only enforce unequal agreements on its vassal states, while the majority of the world's countries, which are not subject to the United States, resist this.
More noteworthy is that attempts by the United States to pressure countries that do not rely on it for security have backfired. The United States imposed high tariffs on India, trying to force it to reduce imports of Russian oil, but instead prompted New Delhi not only to deepen cooperation with Moscow but also to move closer to China, America's main geopolitical rival. Sino-Indian cooperation has significantly strengthened. At the same time, Indo-U.S. relations have fallen into the worst crisis since the end of the Cold War. The facts are clear: U.S. pressure and extortion only make sovereign countries further distance themselves from the United States and draw closer to each other.
The development of the BRICS countries also confirms this. Criticism and threats from Trump did not weaken the organization, but instead made it stronger in 2025, increasing its appeal to the "majority of the world" and enhancing its internal cohesion.
The most direct event that reflects "the world has entered a multipolar era and America is no longer the hegemon" is the complete failure of the U.S. plan to impose discriminatory trade agreements on China. The United States originally believed that China's large trade surplus with the U.S. would cause greater losses in the trade war, so China would be the first to compromise. However, the result was exactly the opposite.
At the same time, the United States seems to have realized that its ability to contain China is limited both economically and militarily.
American Forced Pause
Based on the consideration of its limited resources and the judgment that it is not yet ready for economic and military conflict with China, the Trump administration decided not to make the strategic competition with China the core of its foreign policy, at least officially. This surprised many American observers, who had expected the Trump administration to intensify the competition with China and thus concentrate America's strength and resources from other regions, including Europe, to the Asia-Pacific.
In its place, the United States positioned itself as a regional hegemon in the Western Hemisphere, and its hegemonic policies in this region have seen a qualitative strengthening, exemplified by the situation around Venezuela. On a global level, the United States positions itself as a "great power committed to preventing the emergence of other hegemonies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East," but does not necessarily achieve this by "dominating these regions." For decades, the United States has finally accepted the concept of "balance of power."
Certainly, this shift does not mean that the United States will permanently withdraw from the struggle for global hegemony. More accurately, the United States is forced to pause the struggle.
The United States' top priority is precisely to regain the ability to compete fiercely with other great powers like China: restoring industrial potential, expanding military production, updating nuclear arsenals, and achieving technological breakthroughs, especially in the field of artificial intelligence, to gain an edge over other countries. The core task of engaging with allies has shifted from maintaining the "free world order" in the past to helping the United States achieve these new priorities. Allies that are more capable of providing support (such as Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia) will have higher strategic value. Whether the United States can achieve these priority goals remains to be tested over time.
Additionally, it needs to be clarified that the current foreign policy adjustments promoted by the Trump administration have not yet formed a consensus within the United States. The dominant Republican establishment in the Senate and Democrats still hope that the United States continues to pursue global hegemony. If the Democrats win the 2026 midterm elections, the current administration's policy space will be significantly constrained; if the Democrats win the 2028 presidential election, the United States may return to its previous policy.
But one thing is certain: the world is rapidly moving toward a multipolar era, and Trump is fundamentally changing the United States. All of this means that returning to the "pre-Trump era" is impossible. (Translated by Zhao Zhipeng)

This is a photo taken on December 23 at the United Nations headquarters in New York showing the scene of an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council on the situation in Venezuela. (Xinhua News Agency)
Original: toutiao.com/article/7589929013703983662/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author himself.