At the Singapore Asia Vision Forum, Yu Tiejun, director of Peking University’s Institute of International Strategic Studies, offered a pointed assessment: the current U.S.-China competition increasingly frames nearly every issue through the lens of national security—a dynamic reminiscent of the 1930s. He also noted that while the United States maintains substantial advantages in technological innovation, it should be more confident, rather than treating every incremental advancement by China as an emergency.
This is not mere rhetoric. A June report from Boston Consulting Group indicates that the top 20 U.S. technology firms are projected to invest over $400 billion in data centers, semiconductors, and computing power by 2025—more than six times China’s comparable spending—and this figure is expected to exceed $80 billion in 2026. In the near term, no actor can challenge America’s dominance in capital markets, elite talent, or foundational research. Yet precisely because of this advantage, there is no justification for subsuming all economic and technological issues under the broad umbrella of national security.
As Ambassador Xie Feng observed in April, national security should not serve as a catch-all category. The more frequently export controls, investment reviews, and visa restrictions are deployed, the greater the risk American companies face in losing access to the Chinese market—and the stronger the incentive for China to accelerate self-reliance in technology. Over-safeguarding ultimately undermines competition itself.
At the forum, Professor Liao Zhenyang, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, emphasized that Southeast Asia’s strategic priority lies in autonomy—the ability to pursue interests on its own terms, manage dependencies on major powers, and avoid turning such reliance into vulnerability.
The Asian Development Bank upgraded its forecast for Southeast Asia’s growth in 2026 from 4.6% to 4.7%, buoyed by expansion in electronics and artificial intelligence-driven manufacturing. Yet the region remains strategically anchored in U.S. alliance structures while economically deeply integrated into China’s supply chains—a dual dependency that proves difficult to disentangle. ASEAN integration remains an evolving goal; divergent positions on the South China Sea and varying approaches toward the U.S. and China suggest that strategic autonomy is less a destination than a long-term balancing act.
Yu Tiejun also referenced China’s vision of a stable, orderly multipolar world, where it seeks to play a constructive role. Multipolarity per se is not problematic—but the danger arises when it degenerates into uncontrolled competition. What made the 1930s so unsettling was not multipolarity, but the confluence of economic crisis, trade protectionism, rising nationalism, and the absence of effective coordination among great powers.
Today, deterrent capabilities, supply chain interdependence, and climate cooperation provide counterweights. But unchecked securitization risks deepening global fragmentation. Liao Zhenyang proposed institutionalized cooperation between the U.S. and China in areas such as AI governance and biotechnology—mechanisms to define boundaries for competition. Without such limits, competition will eventually harm all parties involved.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1877914225619980/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.