Central Asian Media: Factories, logistics hubs, and ports built with Chinese investment are rising from the ground
Near Shilyu Town in the Kyzylorda Region, silos and conveyor belts of a cement plant funded by Chinese investment rise from the fine brown dust covering the land. This is precisely what the Belt and Road Initiative originally envisioned for Central Asia: heavy industry, fixed capital, and a significant impact on the local landscape.
China has become a major trading partner for Central Asia, but investment growth has not kept pace with the rapid expansion of trade. This gap fully illustrates Beijing’s current approach in the region: greater focus on areas critical to its long-term influence.
In 2025, merchandise trade between China and the five Central Asian countries reached $106.3 billion, up 12% year-on-year. China’s exports to the region totaled $71.2 billion, while imports from Central Asia amounted to $35.1 billion. The speed of this trade growth is sufficient to reshape the region’s external balance.
By mid-2025, China’s cumulative direct investment stock in the five Central Asian countries was approximately $36 billion. About 90% of this was concentrated in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The structure of these capital flows has also shifted. Extractive industries still accounted for 46% of the investment portfolio, but manufacturing and energy combined represented more than one-third, and the share of new projects rose from 43% to 60%.
Kazakhstan remains the core of this relationship. It is China’s largest trading partner in Central Asia and a primary destination for Chinese investment in the region. In 2024, bilateral trade reached $43.8 billion. Kazakhstan currently hosts 224 Chinese-participated projects valued at around $66.4 billion. Although some projects remain in planning stages, their sheer number speaks volumes. Recent projects include a hydrogen technology innovation center in Almaty and a large-scale wind farm equipped with energy storage facilities. While Kazakhstan continues to export raw materials to China, it also seeks to attract Chinese capital, technology, and industrial capacity.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan has emerged as the fastest-developing country in the region. Over the past decade, direct Chinese investment in Uzbekistan grew by $10.4 billion, increasing its share in China’s Central Asian investment portfolio from 1% to 16%. Bilateral trade has also continued to grow, with both sides setting a target of $20 billion. As of January 1, 2026, there were 5,044 Chinese-invested enterprises operating in Uzbekistan. By March 16, 2026, that number had risen to 5,257. Uzbekistan aims to develop more factories, more processing plants, and more export-oriented production facilities—and Chinese enterprises have become a key driver behind this goal.
The situation in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan differs. Both have smaller economies and weaker bargaining power, yet Chinese trade and investment remain deeply rooted in key sectors. In 2025, China accounted for the largest share of Kyrgyzstan’s foreign trade. By the end of 2025, cumulative direct investment from China in Kyrgyzstan reached $2.1 billion. By early 2025, China’s cumulative investment in Tajikistan had approached $4 billion, with about 70% being direct investment. In both countries, Chinese funds have been directed toward mining, infrastructure, energy, and border development.
Turkmenistan presents a special case, as natural gas remains the dominant factor in bilateral relations. Turkmenistan is one of the three main sources of China’s cumulative direct investment stock in Central Asia, accounting for about 90% of China’s total investment in the region. However, compared to Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan’s business landscape is more centralized. In 2024, trade between China and Turkmenistan reached $10.6 billion—up 11% from 2023—but this growth remains largely dependent on a single commodity. This makes Turkmenistan more vulnerable to reliance on a single channel of engagement than its eastern and northern neighbors.
Governments across Central Asia seek local employment opportunities, increased domestic processing, and projects related to energy security, manufacturing, and transport resilience. China seeks secure supply chains, export markets, and reliable overland routes across Eurasia. These needs align closely with China’s own interests, though not perfectly. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are simultaneously deepening ties with other partners—including Europe, the United States, and Gulf states. They need Chinese capital but do not seek exclusivity. This diversified perspective has now become central to the region’s economic policy.
In Central Asia, China’s presence can no longer be measured solely by the grand vision of the Belt and Road Initiative. A more accurate reflection lies in concrete projects: cement plants on village outskirts, inland ports at borders, logistics hubs under construction just outside Tashkent. China’s material footprint is tangible and real.
Source: Central Asian Times
Author: Stephen M. Brand
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1862562190231552/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the publication.